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FOURTEENTH ANNUAL BRIGHAM-KANNER PRIZE
PRESENTATION DINNER 
AWARD RECIPIENT SPEECH
AWARD RECIPIENT
David L. Callies, FAICP, Benjamin A. Kudo Professor of Law, William
S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai‘i at Mânoa
INTRODUCTION
Lynda L. Butler, Chancellor Professor of Law and Director, Property
Rights Project, William & Mary Law School
BUTLER. Each year, the Brigham-Kanner Prize is awarded to some-
one who has made significant contributions to our understanding of
property and its role in our society, to someone who has thought
deeply about property’s relationship to the human condition. Prior
recipients have included some of our nation’s leading property schol-
ars, a Supreme Court Justice, a very accomplished practitioner, and
a Peruvian economist.
This year’s recipient, David Callies, is one of the most prolific
scholars we have recognized. He began his scholarly career as a grad-
uate student with a prophetic thesis on positive planning law in
England, while he was getting his degree—his LL.M. degree—from
the University of Nottingham in England. He then burst onto the
American scene with the publication of The Quiet Revolution in
Land Use Control,1 written with Fred Bosselman, for the U.S. Council
on Environmental Quality. I remember noticing that publication
when I first started teaching. He has subsequently revisited that
text for a number of reasons.
Before he entered the legal academy, David practiced law in cold
Chicago. The Chicago winters must have convinced David to move to
paradise and join the law faculty at the University of Hawai‘i; and
in Hawai‘i, he met his wife.
Scholars and practitioners noticed David’s early work and were
looking forward to more. David has not disappointed them.
His some twenty books have included casebooks on property and
on land use, and a variety of books on eminent domain topics. He
1. See FRED P. BOSSELMAN & DAVID L. CALLIES, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971) [hereinafter THE QUIET REVOLUTION].
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has also written more than ninety articles. Two hallmarks of his
scholarship are its accessibility—both to practitioners and to pro-
fessors—and the timely relevance of the topics that he writes about.
These qualities, as well as his commitment to advancing society’s un-
derstanding of property, have already been recognized by a number of
prestigious professional organizations. They include the American
Law Institute and the American College of Real Estate Lawyers,
among other organizations.
David, one of the best barometers of the wisdom of a decision is
the reaction of your peers. I can tell you that I have received count-
less messages—from the right, the left, and the in-between—ap-
plauding our choice of you as the next Brigham-Kanner recipient.
We are deeply honored that you are here to receive the prize. Please
come forward.
CALLIES. President Reveley, Dean Douglas, Dean Soifer, colleagues,
co-conspirators, and friends:
When one starts like this, there’s a danger of a very, very long after-
dinner speech. I should point out that the average class session in
Hawai‘i is one hour and fifteen minutes. Unless I am mistaken,
Professor Butler can’t quite get to me in time, and as opposed to the
Academy Awards, there’s no music that will signal that my time is
up and it’s time to leave. But I will definitely attempt to be brief.
Thank you very much for this singular honor. It was, as my wife
Laurie will tell you, most unexpected and most appreciated. I thank
William & Mary and the committee that was kind enough to bestow
this honor on me.
I have a couple of points I would like to make. Judging from the
talks that I’ve heard before and, in particular, the one that I was priv-
ileged to witness that Mike Berger gave just a few years ago—I should
talk a little bit about how I got here; about property and property
law; and about what we owe as property lawyers in the current econ-
omy, the current state of the nation, and the current state of law
schools today. After I make these three points, of course I would
expect a spontaneous explosion of wild applause. In part because my
remarks will hopefully be brief. So the sooner you clap, the quicker
I will leave and that will get everyone home at an appropriate time.
(Audience claps.)
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I should have seen that coming, shouldn’t I? A good trial lawyer
would have, which tells you a little about what I don’t do.
It’s a truism to say that one owes a great deal to one’s parents, and
I’m not going to dwell on it. I certainly do owe a lot to my parents.
Among other things, I would not be here except for them, and that’s
an unarguable proposition. But there are people both here and
absent that really affected my going into law and the way I treat it.
I am indebted to my economics professor Fred Silander at DePauw
University who encouraged all of us to think in terms of a combina-
tion of what is now called behavioral economics and traditional eco-
nomics: that every action and every decision has a consequence, and
you can choose to accept it or you can choose not to accept it. Whether
you accept it or not, it doesn’t affect the fact that you have made a
choice, and there are consequences. My family has suffered from my
tendency, for decades, to convert everything to that economic equa-
tion, and I thank them for their patience. That often makes me less
than easy to live with on a day-to-day basis. Thank you to my fam-
ily, for that.
Austin Fleming is a name that may be familiar to some of the older
practitioners in the area of wills and trusts. He wrote largely in the
field of trusts and estates. He was extremely good at what he did.
For upward of fifty years, he was general counsel at Northern Trust
Company in Chicago. He was a very blunt-spoken individual, and
he and his daughter were neighbors of mine. After he visited his
daughter at Stanford—where he did some work while he was visit-
ing her—he wrote a scathing letter to Stanford, something to the ef-
fect of: You call yourself a law school. Here are the treatises you
don’t have in your library. Very truly yours, Austin Fleming. He per-
suaded me (and my parents, who paid the bills) to go to DePauw
University not Stanford and to Michigan not Harvard or Yale. He per-
ceived, very well, that for a Midwestern, second-generation American
lad, those schools would probably chew me up alive. I owe a great
debt to Austin Fleming for seeing that, perceiving it, guiding me
toward the law, and guiding me in those two areas. It was extremely
helpful, and I would not be here today without Austin’s guidance.
When I was at law school, Paul Carrington was an iconoclastic,
maverick attorney, who disappointed his father hugely by going into
the teaching of law rather than the practicing of law. I was his
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research assistant, and he showed up regularly in either a red vest
or a yellow vest under a grey suit. He was an interesting person, ar-
ticulate in his beliefs, and I owe him a great deal as well.
I also owe a great deal to a Professor from Japan named Tsuyoshi
Kotaka. For ten years Kotaka and I undertook a study in Asia hav-
ing to do with takings and, in particular, eminent domain. Professor
Kotaka tried to teach me and gave me a great deal to think about,
not only in regard to respecting folks no matter where they’re from
and what their culture is but also, a samurai down to his toes, when
to keep quiet and when to listen. A lesson that I unfortunately never
learned, as you can see tonight. But that was not because Professor
Kotaka did not try.
Then there are those, here in this room, that have been extremely
helpful to me.
To Jim Ely, who exemplified how to be an enthusiastic and gra-
cious gentleman in areas having to do with practice and property:
I thank you for that, Jim, and for my time in Vanderbilt when you
were so gracious.
To Gideon Kanner and Mike Berger, who taught me the limits of
advocacy: there aren’t any. You dig in. You fight. You stay profes-
sional.
I will try to sprinkle some of these remarks with an anecdote or
two. And I must, must, absolutely must, relate this one that has to
do with Gideon. I met Gideon for the first time in about 1973. The
sequel to The Quiet Revolution and Land Use Control2 came out,
called the Taking Issue3 (a little bit more about that later). I was
tasked with bearding the lion in his den—going and seeing Gideon
Kanner after having just written, having co-authored something
that stood for the opposite of virtually everything that Gideon has
spent his life doing. And Gideon made that quite clear at the time.
He said, you have no idea what you’ve done. You have no idea what
you have affected. What were you thinking? By the way, it’s about
noon, do you want to grab some lunch?
I learned a lot from that experience. I learned that one could make
statements to take a strong point and do it apparently with a great
2. See generally THE QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 1.
3. See FRED P. BOSSELMAN, DAVID L. CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL (1973).
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deal of feeling. But it was for effect (I learned that lesson very quickly).
I also learned never to drive with Gideon again. He is the only per-
son that I know today who, when he changes lanes, doesn’t go for-
ward. We went directly into the next lane without any forward motion
at all. I don’t think that Le Mans drivers could do that as well,
Gideon, and it certainly did make me less interested in lunch by the
time we got there.
There are folks like my colleagues from Hawai‘i that I wish to
thank.
The first is Dean Aviam Soifer, who kindly enough came down,
but not all the way from Hawai‘i this time. He is on what apparently
administrators and deans do. You can’t give them a sabbatical be-
cause they’re not teaching (he teaches, but it doesn’t count that way).
So he’s on administrative leave and has come in from New York. I
want to thank Dean Soifer, who pretty much lets me do what I want
and occasionally listens to my suggestions about running the law
school—which I have no interest in doing.
Thank you to Ron Brown, my colleague for almost forty years at
the William S. Richardson School of Law, who came all the way
from Hawai‘i.
My thanks continues to former students (and now colleagues) like
Rob Thomas, who, you all know, has done many wonderful things
so far in pushing the limits of property law that we all hold dear;
and speaking, writing, and holding and co-chairing conferences.
And it extends to Justice Sabrina McKenna. At that time she was
a second year law student at the University of Hawai‘i and what we
call a Hapa Haole—half Japanese, half Caucasian, and fluent in both
languages. After eighteen years in Japan, she came to the Univer-
sity of Hawai‘i, played varsity basketball, and then came to the Law
School. She won me over forever when she came up to me in the
pouring rain after graduation. Everything was dripping wet, and—
which took guts as a first-year student—she put her arms around
me, gave me a hug, and said, it’s okay, Professor Callies, tomorrow
will be sunny. Those are the kinds of things that one remembers
later on.
I also wish to thank David Breemer, whom I think many of you
know from the Pacific Legal Foundation and who was probably one
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of the two brightest research assistants that I’ve ever had. He walked
into my office seeking a job as a research assistant with a baseball
cap reversed on his head, flip-flops, board shorts, and a tank top. And
he said, hey dude, I understand you’re looking for someone to work.
Some of you who know David might be reminded of that. He’s cer-
tainly been doing wonderful things for the Pacific Legal Foundation
ever since.
I also wouldn’t be here today without my late father-in-law, Norvin
Garrett, who was a Duke and Citadel graduate and served on Nimitz’s
staff in World War II. He taught me, a northern Yankee from the
Midwest, about the gracious side of the South, and about what it
meant to grow up and work in the South as he had done for eighty
years. I owe him a great deal for the time that he spent with me. I
still remember sitting on the banks of the Chowan River in his ga-
zebo, drinking more bourbon than is good for me, and listening to
him speak.
And of course, I wish to thank my family. I am ever so lucky, for-
tunate, to have as my life’s partner someone who lets me do pretty
much whatever I want to do—or at least that’s what she makes me
think. I suspect there are things that are controlling me that I have
no knowledge of and probably never will. To my dear wife Laurie.
And my thanks for the huge surprise today from my stepson, Lindsey,
who came all the way from Los Angeles (well, not actually Los
Angeles but El Segundo), who came to surprise me, and that was
awfully, awfully nice of you, Lindsey. I just kept sitting, sneakily
eating granola, when Lindsey walked in. I couldn’t believe that he
was here. Thank you for that.
This brings me to the end of where I think I have come from, and
how I got to where I am today.
Now I want to turn to property and property law. To paraphrase
Winston Churchill, I think, property rights can be messy, until one
considers the alternative: a regulatory state (which is what we are
in, an administrative-regulatory state). I learned today not to follow
the folks who spoke before me. It is really hard, and all my best an-
ecdotes have already been taken. So this will be shorter as a result,
because of the comments that you’ve already heard. But to para-
phrase Jim Ely who writes so eloquently, it is a property right that
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is so very fundamental and important, and affects every other right.4
We defend property rights—sometimes it is daunting, often thank-
less, and always time-consuming.
It is not enough.
We need to share property rights. We need to broaden their ap-
peal. Not only because it’s the right thing to do but also because it’s
the practical thing to do. Such rights are more and more available
to fewer and fewer—not only the poor but also the young middle
class—who are increasingly divorced from such rights, who prefer or
are forced into foregoing them, or who find them out of reach. Those
with access to these rights are increasingly outnumbered: a perilous
thing in what is left of our democracy.
We need to change that. The poor, the oppressed, the disadvan-
taged—whatever class and race—must be provided with a stake or
the means to achieve it, less we breed generations with no stake and
no appreciation of property and all the benefits it accrues. The hold-
ing sector, we must increase. We must attack discrimination when
we see it. We must attempt to provide funds in the way of cheap
loans or something of that sort and provide a stepping-stone—which
the popular press is beginning to pick up on. Shelter is sometimes
nothing more than a ten-by-ten house on a mini-lot, which in many
of our jurisdictions is forbidden. We have old case law that finds
these kinds of shelter fundamentally unsafe, but they are no longer
deemed unsafe but a necessary part of what we need to provide. And
so with the bully pulpit that I have up here, I charge us all, as prop-
erty rights attorneys, property rights practitioners, and property
rights scholars, to do more to broaden the access to property rights
to those that don’t have it at this time.
Lastly, I want to talk about the practice of law, again taking ad-
vantage of the bully pulpit that I have. I neither liked nor enjoyed
law school. And I sometimes wonder about my students who say
they do both; I wonder if they have a screw loose. Law school is many
things, but enjoyable and fun? I don’t think so. It is superb for teach-
ing analytical skills that are useful not only in the practice and the
teaching of law but in the world generally: digging out relevant facts,
4. JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2008).
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problem solving, developing alternative solutions and scenarios, and
predicting outcomes.
And so, I want to make suggestions to what I see as my two sets
of colleagues here.
For my younger colleagues, I have three suggestions gleaned from
fifty years in learning about law and property. One, keep an open
mind. Back off, look at all sides (top, bottom, and above), and listen
(a lesson that I have still not learned). Two, visit the site. After all,
property is always site related in some fashion. Things are rarely
what you’re told. Something new, something wrong, something dif-
ferent—there is always something to be learned from a visit. Three
(which I expect will strike some as a little bit different, maybe anath-
ema), as you go through with your open mind and visit the site, drain
passion and emotion. Reason clinically. If your intent is to change the
world, whether through property or something else, set it aside on
a case-by-case basis. Again, something that I learned from my ad-
vocate colleagues, Berger and Kanner: there is a place for emotion.
If it’s in court, it should be something used, not felt, to make a point.
Give me an emotionally addicted opponent, and I will guarantee you
I will win every time.
Finally, for my contemporary, older colleagues, those on the other
side of twenty nine, I have this advice: forget about your legacy. It
won’t survive long anyway. Rather, recall those who lent you a help-
ing hand along the way. Befriend not only a young colleague but also
a young adversary.
Many years ago, I was sent to argue a motion before a federal judge
in Chicago, and I lost miserably. I was figuratively torn limb from
limb. The judge was a former law partner of Mayor Richard Daley
in Chicago. The advocate on the other side was his right-hand man,
Tom Keane. At the time, the Democratic Party in Chicago ran the
city because the mayor held three positions, or at least controlled
them. He was not only the mayor of Chicago but chairman of the
Cook County Democratic Organization, appointed the assessor, and
appointed the corporation counsel—and therefore had a ball park
with all the balls, all the bats, all the bases.
Keane took me aside, took me to lunch, and told me how things
worked in the city. He told me:
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You can do it “this” way if you like. You can stick with just the
law. I won’t really care one way or the other; you’re far too young
for me to bother respecting you. But if you want to succeed, and
you want the power, you need to take it from us, the Irish. We
took it from the Germans. The Germans, and others tried to take
it from us. That’s the way it works.
So, put in a good word. Recommend to a learned society or a profes-
sional organization not only your young colleagues but your young op-
ponents. It will go a long way in making a difference.
Thank you very much.

OPENING REMARKS: THE FUTURE OF 
LAND USE REGULATION
PANELIST
David L. Callies, FAICP, Benjamin A. Kudo Professor of Law, William
S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai‘i at Mânoa
INTRODUCTION
Lynda L. Butler, Chancellor Professor of Law and Director, Property
Rights Project, William & Mary Law School
BUTLER. Good morning. Welcome to the Fourteenth Annual Brigham-
Kanner Property Rights Conference. We are going to begin our first
panel by focusing on the work of David Callies, our recipient of the
Brigham-Kanner Prize. We will use his scholarship as a springboard
to discuss issues concerning the future of land use regulation. David
will speak first, and then each panelist will speak for about fifteen
minutes. At the end, we will have about fifteen minutes for questions
and answers. Panelists, if you see me waving, that means it’s time
to move on so the next person has time. Now let’s welcome David.
CALLIES. I understand I have about an hour and a quarter to speak,
so relax—that’s class time in Hawai‘i, which is what I’m used to
speaking at.
I want to reserve two minutes for rebuttal just in case my col-
leagues take the opportunity to say something they think I’m not
going to be able to respond to; I’ll do my best.
Thank you all for coming. I thank the William & Mary Law School,
Lynda Butler, and everybody for the invitation and for the wonder-
ful award last night. It was a wonderful evening for me, and I hope
everyone else enjoyed it as well.
I have spent a lot of time in the area of regulatory takings, almost
accidentally. This, of course, is the odd sort of theory that Justice
Holmes sprung on the legal world in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.1
Before that case, eminent domain and physical takings were pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment and were never connected to the
1. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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exercise of police power. And after that, the theory of regulatory
takings was born.
The Supreme Court then abandoned the field for about fifty years,
leading my former partner, the late Fred Bosselman, and I to write
something with a gentleman named John Banta called The Taking
Issue.2 At that time, I was representing mainly governmental inter-
ests, and the truth of the matter was that since the Supreme Court
hadn’t said anything about regulatory takings in fifty years, we had
a suggestion: Let’s do away with regulatory takings. The Supreme
Court hasn’t said anything about it, so why don’t we just do away
with it?
Well, of course, the Supreme Court did say something thereaf-
ter—in a sort of ridiculous April Fools’ decision that dealt with a
bunch of students who were turfing the area around their residence
and with the city that passed an ordinance that provided no more
than three people, unrelated by blood or marriage, could live in the
same house.3 That provoked a sort of odd decision on April Fools’
Day, and everybody thought it was very appropriate that this deci-
sion came down then, because it was very foolish. The Supreme
Court then went on from that case to decide a trilogy of cases: lots
of things about regulatory takings, total takings under Lucas,4 partial
takings under Penn Central,5 and then land-development conditions
in the cases that came after.6 So we do have regulatory takings. It’s
a matter of its reach and what it does.
I would like to share a quick anecdote. My former partner, Fred
Bosselman, was invited to Harvard to speak. By the way, The Taking
Issue got its name because John Banta and I could not come up with
a name after two days, despite the fact that Fred Bosselman was
asking us to. So he said, “Okay, I’ll fix you guys. It’s going to be ‘The
Taking Issue.’” And there we have it.
So, Fred shows up on campus to give his lecture at Harvard. The
posters read that the famous alum Fred Bosselman was coming back
2. See generally FRED P. BOSSELMAN, DAVID L. CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, COUNCIL ON
ENVTL. QUALITY, THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND
USE CONTROL (1973).
3. See Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
4. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
5. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
6. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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to give a speech, and listed the title of his book. The book was sort
of reddish and tannish, and “The Taking Issue” was in modest print
at the bottom of the front cover. The Constitution was prominently
displayed on the front of that cover, commencing as it does, in very
large script, “We the People of the United States.” So all the posters
read that everyone should come and see the wonderful lecture by
Fred Bosselman, author of “We the People.” You think people know
what you’re going to talk about, and then out it comes. And people
really have no idea, and it’s not all that important.
So, to some extent, that’s why I’m here. I hope it’s at least reason-
ably articulate this morning.
I have a couple of remarks. A number of years ago I took the lib-
erty—having been in the law business at that point close to fifty years
(now, it’s an even fifty years)—I suggested ten things were going to
happen with respect to takings7:
(1) I said that land development conditions would continue to
come under even more scrutiny for nexus and proportional-
ity. Then we had the City of San Jose case from California,8
where the Court does not seem to appreciate the difference
between regulation of land use and rules that make land-
owners produce something. Then Koontz came along.9 So
we certainly do have more security about land develop-
ment conditions.
(2) Of course, we’ll continued to be confused by the difference
between legislative and administrative/quasi-judicial ex-
actions.10 The court still hasn’t dealt with that, and it’s
probably one of the last unresolved issues in the regula-
tory taking area.
(3) There will be more use of consensual tools like development
agreements.11 It’s happening in California, but it’s not hap-
pening in a whole lot of other places. There are hundreds
7. David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use Takings
Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 44 (2014) [hereinafter Callies, Through a Glass].
8. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).
9. Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt., 570 U.S. 595 (2013).
10. Callies, Through a Glass, supra note 7, at 44.
11. Id. at 45.
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and hundreds of agreements (as Mike Berger will confirm,
I’m sure) with respect to communities getting together
with commercial enterprises and developers, and working
on development agreements. Hawai‘i has had a statute like
California’s in place for thirty-five years, and so far we’ve
had two development agreements. So, as Larry Tribe once
observed, those of us that use crystal balls may have to get
used to eating ground glass.12
(4) The Supreme Court continues to reexamine its decisions
with respect to Kelo.13 That hasn’t happened either. We
haven’t had a recent eminent domain case, and I thought
there would be at least one coming up.
(5) The courts will continue to wrestle with exceptions to per
se government takings, and the public trust doctrine will
be an issue.14 That’s coming up more and more as excep-
tions to Lucas, safe havens for total takings under Lucas.15
(6) If a government is passing a regulation that is essentially
abating a nuisance or has got to do with the background
principles of common law property, custom and the public
trust doctrine seem to be safe havens for government
when it enacts a total-taking regulation.16 And the public
trust threatens to do a lot that way. In Hawai‘i we have a
pending case where the argument is that the summit of a
mountain is subject to the public trust doctrine.17 It’s the
farthest out attempt to recognize how far the public trust
doctrine can be extended. Our Supreme Court will be
dealing with that in the next year, and lots of folks are
watching it outside of Hawai‘i.
(7) The Court will cut back the application of the ripeness
rule.18 That’s been happening in many circuits around the
12. Tribe: As U.S. Drifts, Courts No Guiding Light, 65 AM. B. ASS’N J. 1468, 1468 (1979).
13. Callies, Through a Glass, supra note 7, at 45.
14. Id. at 45.
15. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
16. See Callies, Through a Glass, supra note 7, at 45.
17. In re Contested Case Hearing Re Conservation District Use Application (CDUA) HA-
3568 for the Thirty Meter Telescope at the Mauna Kea Science Reserve, Ka‘ohe Mauka,
Hamakua, Hawai‘i, BLNR-CC-16-002 (Sept. 20, 2016), https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/mk/files/2016
/09/TMT-Doc-276-Notice-of-Contested-Case-Hearing.pdf.
18. Indeed, the Court has accepted Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir.
2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1262 (Mar. 5, 2018) (No. 17-647), for decision this term.
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country, much thanks to some of the work being done by the
Pacific Legal Foundation. And I suspect that it will increase.
(8) Partial takings cases will be decided more on the merits but
with mixed results.19 We’re not getting a lot of partial tak-
ings cases, even though ripeness is, again, not as impor-
tant as it used to be.
(10) And finally, the Court needs to and will resolve the so-called
“relevant parcel” or denominator issue, both with respect
to partial and total regulatory takings.20 We all know by
now, with all the webinars and conferences dealing with
it, the Supreme Court has decided the Murr case.21 You’ve
got to watch what you wish for. We do have rules—sort
of—and they are very strange. In the course of his opinion,
Justice Kennedy managed to nearly drive a stake into the
whole area of property rights, and I’m sure my colleagues
will be talking about that at some length.22
So, thank you for your kind attention. It’s a pleasure to be here.
I have reserved two minutes for rebuttal.
19. See Callies, Through a Glass, supra note 7, at 45.
20. Id.
21. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
22. Id. at 1939–50.

RUMINATIONS ON TAKINGS LAW
IN HONOR OF DAVID CALLIES
MICHAEL M. BERGER*
INTRODUCTION
Scholar? Lawyer? Teacher? Dave Callies has been—indeed, contin-
ues to be—all of these and more. With a career closing in on a half
century, it is time the profession honored him for his contributions
to property law—and particularly to land use and takings law. But
what is there for one of us to say amidst this compendium of honor-
ifics? He has educated us on so many aspects of these topics for so
long that it is difficult to pin down a subject to write about that would
do him justice. Just by way of illustration, consider that Callies was
part of the team that produced two ground-breaking and highly
influential books at the beginning of the modern takings era, under
the auspices of the Council on Environmental Quality: The Quiet
Revolution in Land Use Control in 19711 and The Taking Issue in
1973.2 From those early days (seen as dark days by those of us who
generally represent property owners) when his interests appeared
to be pointing toward restricting the rights of property owners, David’s
scholarship has matured.3
* Partner, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP; co-chair of the firm’s Appellate Practice
Group; 2014 Recipient of Brigham-Kanner Prize. I have spent a half century defending the
rights of private property owners in court, including arguing four takings cases in the United
States Supreme Court and participating as amicus curiae in many of the other important
takings cases in that Court since 1980. I have also taught takings law at the University of
Miami, Washington University in St. Louis, and the University of Southern California. My
thanks are offered to Professors Gideon Kanner, Steven Eagle, and Janet Madden for their
helpful comments on this Article as it was being written.
1. FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE QUIET REVO-
LUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971).
2. FRED BOSSELMAN, DAVID CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE
TAKING ISSUE (1973) [hereinafter TAKING ISSUE].
3. And thankfully so. The Taking Issue itself was openly peddled as a screed to evade
constitutional precepts that favored property owners: “If this book seems technical and
detailed, it is because it is designed to assist government officials and attorneys who seek to
fashion solutions to environmental problems.” Id. at iii (emphasis added). The idea was “to cast
doubt on the theory of regulatory taking in any form.” (David L. Callies, Fred Bosselman and
the Taking Issue, 30 TOURO L. REV. 255, 259 (2014)). For critical discussion of the whole idea
of the government using its influence to seek “to screw its citizens out of their constitutional
17
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A review of the vast array of Callies’s works over the decades re-
veals a thread that connects the disparate, individual subjects that
have animated each of his articles or books. David is a ruminator.
And a damned fine one. In some of his earliest works, for example, he
mused about how government should react to the cosmically Delphic
statement in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that “if regulation
goes too far[ ] it will be recognized as a taking.”4 David and his co-
authors viewed rigorous enforcement of that concept to be the “weak
link” in the government’s ability to solve environmental problems
through regulation,5 and pondered ways to strengthen or avoid that
link. Their possible solutions ranged from disregarding the use of
regulations altogether6 to seeking to convince the Supreme Court to
overrule Mahon and thereby eliminate the “myth of the taking clause”
as a strong protector of the rights of property owners.7
Subsequently, however, the Callies view of constitutionalism has
acknowledged that, although the case law reported in his two early
books gutted Fifth Amendment protections to such an extent as to
render them “virtually moribund”8 if not “nearly . . . meaningless,”9
the U.S. Supreme Court’s output since then has “added exponen-
tially” to the protection afforded property owners.10 Thus in David’s
rights,” see Gideon Kanner, Helping the Bear, Or “The Taking Issue” Was a Failed Propa-
ganda Screed. So Why Is It Being Celebrated?, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Sept. 8, 2013), http://gide
onstrumpet.info/2013/09/helping-the-bear-or-the-taking-issue-was-a-failed-propaganda-screed
-so-why-is-it-being-celebrated/.
4. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). In its most recent takings decision, the
Supreme Court confessed that “[i]n the near century since Mahon, the Court for the most part
has refrained from elaborating this principle through definitive rules.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137
S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017). After nearly a century of trying, we remain in the dark, with the
cryptic “too far” remaining our guiding light.
5. TAKING ISSUE, supra note 2, at iv.
6. Id. at 302.
7. Id. at 236.
8. David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on
Property Rights Have Changed From Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal
Courts are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523, 524 (1999).
9. David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use Takings
Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43 (2014).
10. Id. For a discussion of the eight U.S. Supreme Court decisions between 2010 and 2016
dealing with property rights (all of them favoring the property owners’ positions), see Michael
M. Berger, Property, Democracy, & the Constitution, 5 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J.
45, 96–105 (2016) [hereinafter Berger, Property]. A footnote to this footnote should mention
that, after this manuscript was written, the Supreme Court broke that string. See Murr v.
Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (adding, in this observer’s view, nothing but additional
confusion to regulatory takings law by importing valuation issues into the definition of property
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honor—and inspired by the example he set by tugging and pulling
at various loose threads of the law to tease out hidden meanings and
theories—the remainder of this Article will consist of a series of rumi-
nations on various issues and developments in the law of takings.
Some of these issues have been the subjects of recent, unsuccessful
petitions for certiorari, showing their currency. Interest in them will
continue until the issues are resolved. Some—if not all—of these de-
serve more extensive treatment than can be afforded here, hopefully
leading to further exegesis.
I. CAN GOVERNMENT CONVERT PRIVATE INTO PUBLIC PROPERTY BY
STATUTORY REDEFINITION WITHOUT COMPENSATION?
An issue that keeps popping up like some crazed whack-a-mole is
whether the government can simply redefine private property, so as
to convert property interests that it would like to own into public
property, with the wave of a Harry Potteresque wand and without
having the good grace of paying for the transformation.11 One won-
ders why government agents keep trying, because the Supreme
Court has been quite clear that such definitional games cannot fit
the constitutional matrix.12
The issue is worth examining at this time because the courts of both
Mississippi and North Carolina have recently issued opinions seem-
ing to approve the conversion of private into public property by the
simple “definitional game” of saying so. Petitions for certiorari were
filed to have both decisions reviewed.13 Regardless of the outcome of
as well as into the liability determination of whether a taking occurred at all). See infra text
accompanying notes 50–55.
11. The idea is hardly new. Nearly a half century ago, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund
financed a study whose conclusion is aptly summarized in the news article announcing it:
Gladwin Hill, Authority to Develop Land Is Termed a Public Right, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1973,
at 1. In other words, “henceforth ‘development rights’ on private property must be regarded
as resting with the community rather than with property owners.” Id. at 1.
12.  One surmise, of course, is that the government plays the odds. The U.S. Supreme
Court hears very few cases of any kind during any given year. The Court has never heard a
lot. In 1987, for example, when I argued my first regulatory taking case there, it decided only
one hundred fifty cases—from state and federal courts throughout the entire country. That
number has steadily declined until currently the Court hears only about half that amount. So,
if an agency is able to convince a state supreme court—or even one of the federal courts of
appeals—to buy such a theory, the odds that the U.S. Supreme Court will review and reverse
it are slim indeed. So, with a soupçon of cynicism, they keep trying.
13. Bay Point Props. v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 201 So. 3d 1046 (Miss. 2016) (Sup. Ct. No.
16-1077); Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. App. 2015) (Sup. Ct. No. 16-1305).
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those decisions, it is a certainty that the issue will not go away. Either
the Court will decide the issue now—in a hopefully definitive man-
ner, or at least with clearer standards—or the issue will pop up in
some other jurisdiction to be presented to the Supreme Court again.
It is possible that some agencies are seduced by the virtual and
oft-repeated truism that property interests are created by state law.14
The underlying concept is largely true. The Supreme Court has said
that property rights “are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law.”15 However, the Court has rejected the
assertion that federal courts lack the power to determine whether
a state action that “purports merely to clarify property rights has
instead taken them.”16 Thus, states do not have the power to run
roughshod over private property rights by exercising sleight of hand
by redefining existing rights. The U.S. Constitution in general, and
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in particular, stand as a
bulwark providing protection against confiscation.17 In short, the
ability to define—or even redefine—property rights does not mean
that such wordplay may be done without compliance with the Fifth
Amendment’s just compensation guarantee.18 The power to define
is not the power to confiscate.19
14. See, e.g., Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998); Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
15. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
16. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 728
(2010) (plurality opinion).
17. E.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012) (finding
that any sort of taking imparts on the government a “categorical duty” to compensate);
Phillips, 524 U.S. at 167 (“[A] State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing
traditional property interests long recognized under state law.”); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (“[G]overnment action that
works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates the ‘constitutional obligation to pay
just compensation.’” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415 (1922) (warning against “a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying”).
18. E.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001) (States do not have the
unfettered authority to “shape and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed
expectations,” leaving landowners without recourse against unreasonable regulations.); Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (“Any limitation so severe cannot be newly
legislated or decreed (without compensation) . . . .”; Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 8 (1990).
19. Professor Tribe noted this truth in the early days of modern takings law. Analyzing
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), he queried, “Did the government effect
a taking by saying to the general public, ‘Come on in, the water’s fine’?” LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 176 (1985). The Court had answered the question by voiding the
government action. In Tribe’s words, the owners possessed “investment-backed expectations
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That this solid foundation of protection for the rights of private
property owners might cause some difficulties for government agencies
is something that the Court has acknowledged and accepted—even
celebrated—as a necessary part of our constitutional system:
We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen
to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners
and governing bodies of municipal corporations . . . . But such
consequences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a claim
of constitutional right; many of the provisions of the Constitution
are designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of governmental
authorities, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment is one of them.20
Indeed, two weeks after the Court published these words of clear
restriction on governmental power and flexibility, it added emphasis
by holding that compliance with the Fifth Amendment’s property
clause requires more from the government “than an exercise in clever-
ness and imagination.”21 So saying, the Court struck down an action
by a California agency that sought to evade the Fifth Amendment
by what the Court called a “play on words.”22 To ease the reader’s
suspense, the “play on words” was a decision to call a compelled ex-
action (which the Supreme Court would bluntly label “extortion”23)
a “dedication,” as though it were some voluntary gift from property
owner to government regulator.24
These concepts from 1987—a year in which the Court decided
more takings cases than any other25—show the need for the Court’s
rising to the status of property rights for which the government must pay when it effectively
nationalizes them.” Id. at 176–77.
20. First English, 482 U.S. at 321 (emphasis added).
21. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
22. Id. at 838.
23. Id. at 837.
24. California continues to like this game. Recently, for example, it ducked the question
of whether an inclusionary housing requirement was a taking within the meaning of Nollan
and its progeny by asserting that the government action was not an “exaction” but merely a
police-power regulation, and the Nollan line did not apply. So saying, the California Supreme
Court simply ducked the holdings in Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz. See infra notes 62–86 and
accompanying text.
25. In addition to First English and Nollan, the Court decided Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Fed. Commc’n
Comm’n v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987); and United States v. Cherokee Nation,
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continuing intervention to protect the rights of property owners. Left
to their own designs, government agencies continue to seek to acquire
property at no cost.26 The current cases from Mississippi and North
Carolina illustrate rather bluntly how government agencies can
abuse such power: simply redefining property so that what once was
private becomes, ex post facto, public.
In Bay Point Properties, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld a
state statute whose effect was to convert private property underly-
ing an easement into public property. This was allowed to stand,
despite the fact that the easement encumbering the plaintiff’s land
had ended.27 In a nutshell, the dispute arose after Hurricane Katrina
destroyed a bridge. The bridge was rebuilt but at a slightly different
location. An easement that had provided access to the former bridge
was no longer needed for bridge access, so the easement’s govern-
mental owner converted it into a park—simply by saying so. There-
after, when the agency sought to acquire the vestigial fee title, the
trial court instructed a condemnation jury to provide virtually no
compensation because the agency had not formally abandoned the
easement even though it had ceased using it for its intended pur-
pose.28 This cannot satisfy the constitutional strictures laid down by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has steadily
enforced the protections established by the Fifth Amendment.29
After all, the Bill of Rights was adopted to protect individuals
480 U.S. 700 (1987). The quotes above, coming at the end of a Term with such a heavy em-
phasis on takings law, clearly were written after the Court gave much thought and deliberation
to this field. For a fuller discussion of the Supreme Court’s 1987 decisions, see Michael M.
Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, 1 BYU J. PUB. L. 261 (1987).
26. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) (“[C]omplete
deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate be-
cause the State’s self-interest is at stake. A governmental entity can always find a use for
extra money . . . .”). As the Chief Justice recently put it, “governments . . . might naturally look
to put private property to work for the public at large.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933,
1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
27. For a discussion of such restricted-use easements, see Marvin M. Brandt Revocable
Tr. v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2014) (“[I]f the beneficiary of the easement
abandons it, the easement disappears, and the landowner resumes his full and unencumbered
interest in the land.”); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 8 (1990); Toews
v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004); JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY JR.,
THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND §§ 10:8, 10:26 (2017).
28. Bay Point Props. v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 201 So. 3d 1046, 1054–55 (2016).
29. All clauses of the Fifth Amendment were designed to “limit the power of government.”
Tonja Jacobi, Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Creating a Self-Stabilizing Constitution: The
Role of the Takings Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 601, 616 (2015).
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against the government—the few against the many—not the other
way around.30
Mississippi’s actions bear strong resemblance to the Florida actions
disallowed in Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith.31 There,
the Supreme Court struck down an action treating privately owned,
interpleaded funds as though they were public. The issue in Webb’s
was the assignment of interest earned on the funds while in the
state court’s custody. Treating the funds as public merely because
they had been deposited with the court clerk for safekeeping (as the
government wanted) was disallowed. The Court left no doubt, saying
that the government could not make such a presumptive conversion
from private to public ownership “simply by recharacterizing the
principal as ‘public money.’”32
In other words, neither Florida’s nor Mississippi’s actions fit the
constitutional matrix, which, for years, has placed determinative
focus on the beliefs and expectations of property owners.33 The ex-
pectations of the property owner at the time the property was ac-
quired have been central to the Court’s takings jurisprudence for
nearly four decades, as the Court explained in Penn Central.34 Indeed,
the Penn Central formulation has been referred to as the Court’s
“polestar” in takings clause analysis.35
30. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
375–76 (1971); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). See
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 4 (3d ed. 2008) (stating the Fifth
Amendment is “designed to limit the scope of majority rule”).
31. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
32. Id. at 164. See also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
560 U.S. 702 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public
property what was previously private property.”); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n,
494 U.S. 1, 8 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
33. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
34. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. In sum, the property acquired by an individual is
“guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State’s power
over, the ‘bundle of rights’ that they acquire when they obtain title to property.” Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (citations omitted). While this manuscript was
being prepared, the Court muddied the water a bit when it decided Murr v. Wisconsin, 137
S. Ct. 1933 (2017). See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
35. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 n.23
(2002). See also Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 715 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“If
a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established right of private property
no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State had physically appro-
priated it or destroyed its value by regulation.”).
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The Supreme Court dealt with a similar railroad-easement defini-
tional problem in Preseault. That case involved an easement that
had been acquired for railroad purposes and railroad purposes only.
The railroad sought to abandon the easement and then sell the right
of way to the State and trail groups for transformation into a recre-
ational trail. A number of state courts had similar issues and uni-
formly held that factual abandonment of railroad use meant that
the railroad company retained nothing that it could transfer to
others.36 So Congress intervened, enacting a statute that purported
to redefine the concept of “railroad use” to mean that such uses have
not been “abandoned”—even if the tracks and ties are torn up and sold
for scrap, and the trains are gone—as long as the railroad retains an
intent (however ephemeral or inchoate) to someday, maybe, perhaps,
relay the tracks and reactivate the line. Honest.37 In other words, by
definitional sleight of hand, Congress sought to completely change the
nature of railroad easements.38 In Preseault, the Supreme Court re-
fused to permit that change. At least, it refused to permit it without
compensation.39 The parties were told to repair to the Court of Federal
36. E.g., Pollnow v. State, 276 N.W.2d 738 (Wis. 1979); Schnabel v. County of DuPage, 428
N.E.2d 671 (Ill. App. 1981). For a discussion of this historical development, see Michael M.
Berger, Rails-to-Trails Conversions: Has Congress Effected a Definitional Taking?, in SOUTH-
WEST LEGAL FOUND., PROCEEDINGS OF THE INST. ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN
ch. 8 (1990).
37. The text of the statute plainly reads:
Consistent with the purposes of that Act, and in furtherance of the national policy
to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service,
to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transpor-
tation use, in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of-way
pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner consistent
with this chapter, if such interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction
for railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law
or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad
purposes. If a State, political subdivision, or qualified private organization is pre-
pared to assume full responsibility for management of such rights-of-way and for
any legal liability arising out of such transfer or use, and for the payment of any
and all taxes that may be levied or assessed against such rights-of-way, then the
Board shall impose such terms and conditions as a requirement of any transfer or
conveyance for interim use in a manner consistent with this chapter, and shall
not permit abandonment or discontinuance inconsistent or disruptive of such use.
16 U.S.C. § 1247(d).
38. Remember, as noted above, the definition of property has generally been a matter of
state, rather than federal, law. It would seem there was little room for such congressional
action in any event.
39. Geneva Rock Prods., Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 166, 172 (2012) (stating that
there was “not enough to insulate the government from a takings claim”).
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Claims to determine the compensation that might be due. Compen-
sation was eventually awarded.40 If Congress could not get away with
such definitional gamesmanship, Mississippi should not either.41
If anything, North Carolina has been even more high-handed than
Mississippi. An example comes in the case Nies v. Town of Emerald
Isle,42 which involved beachfront property. In this case, there was no
dispute over the ownership of the wet-sand areas; they had always
been public. However, the dry sand—in North Carolina as in many
other states—had historically been privately owned. That was the
law until the legislature enacted a statute purporting to treat all dry-
sand area as part of the state’s “public trust” land that was subject
to unlimited public use. North Carolina, in fact, did the California
Coastal Commission’s Nollan extortion one better. It simply de-
clared, majestically, that all dry sand was ipso facto public, rather
than seeking to accomplish its statewide goal one property at a time.
Guidance may be found in Hughes v. Washington,43 particularly
in the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart. The issue in that case
was the boundary of property on the coast. The State sought a rule
that would have made all accretions to the shore (i.e., to Stella
Hughes’s land) public land. Mrs. Hughes claimed any accretions be-
longed to her under settled state law. Justice Stewart examined the
effect of a sudden change in law coming from the state court system.
His conclusion was simple and straightforward: “to the extent that
it constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms
of the relevant precedents,” the new state law would be entitled to
no deference. “[A] State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitu-
tional prohibition against taking property without due process of
law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it
has taken never existed at all.”44 In other words, a state cannot simply
declare private property to be public and have that be the end of the
matter. The Constitution remains a bar. As another recent opinion
40. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
41. Indeed, the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
have consistently applied the Preseault rule and have required compensation in similar
situations. E.g., Howard v. United States, 106. Fed. Cl. 343 (2012); Ellamae Phillips Co. v.
United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Schmitt v. United States, No. IP 99-1852-
Y/S, 2003 WL 21057368 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
42. Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. App. 2015).
43. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
44. Id. at 296–97 (emphasis added).
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put it, “[s]tates effect a taking if they recharacterize as public property
what was previously private property.”45
Thus, the property that is constitutionally vouchsafed is the prop-
erty as it existed when the owner acquired it. And that is the central
point of this issue. No state can “redefine” what has plainly been
private property so that it automatically becomes public property,
just because the State wishes that it were so.46 At least, it cannot do
so, as Justice Holmes put it for the Court, “by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change.”47
As it happens, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bay Point
as it was leaving town for the summer.48 The North Carolina town
involved in Nies elected to file no response to the petition. The Su-
preme Court requested a reply and asked that it be filed in August.49
Alas, when all was said and done, the Court denied certiorari in
Nies.50 However, it is a matter of time until the issue will be decided
in another case down the road. My point is simply that this is an
important issue and deserves consideration by the Supreme Court,
not just rumination by me. It will keep popping up until the Su-
preme Court deals with it.
A postscript: After the draft of this Article was virtually complete,
the Supreme Court decided Murr v. Wisconsin.51 Before allowing
this Article to go to bed, we ought to poke at that new opinion to see
whether it sheds any light. Sadly, I think it sheds only confusion,
but its impact on this issue bears note.
The reason that Murr is related to this issue at all is that it
involves a family’s acquisition of two adjoining lots and the County’s
adoption of an ordinance that impacted the lots by redefining them
45. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713 (2010)
(plurality opinion).
46. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), in which the Court repeatedly
noted that the property in litigation was private under state law (id. at 166, 167, 179) and
thus protected from interference—even from federal law—by the Fifth Amendment (id. at
180). See also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (finding that the statute purporting to
eliminate Native American rights to devise and inherit property by intestacy was invalid
because it was not accompanied by compensation).
47. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
48. Bay Point Props. v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 201 So. 3d 1046 (2016), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 2002 (2017).
49. Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle 138 S. Ct. 75 (Oct. 2, 2017) (No. 16-1305).
50. Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. App. 2015), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
75 ( Oct. 2, 2017) (No. 16-1305).
51.  Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
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as a single lot, through the magical planning tool known as “virtual
joinder or merger.” Had the two lots remained in separate owner-
ship, they would have universally been recognized as separate lots
available for separate development. However, as soon as title settled
on the same people, the County’s ordinance created a “virtual” merger
of the two lots, and they “virtually” became a single lot for all intents
and purposes, except, perhaps, for taxation.52 When the Murrs sought
to sell one of the lots, the County told them that the heretofore sepa-
rate lot had ipso facto, eo instante, abracadabra, etc., become merely
a part of the virtually conjoined lot. What had been two had become
one, and the lots could not be rent asunder to facilitate development.
So, does Murr stand for the proposition that local government is
free to redefine property interests at will, allowing rearrangement
of land titles for the benefit of the government?
I suppose we’ll have to wait and see. The Murr decision directly
says it does not want to be stretched that far. Pointedly, it notes
that “[s]tates do not have the unfettered authority to shape and
define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions, leaving landowners without recourse against unreasonable
regulations.”53 By invoking that settled precept from Palazzolo, the
Court signaled its intent to deny government the unfettered right
to “shape and define property rights” so as to violate constitutional
doctrine. Carrying the hypothetical to its extreme, the Court con-
cluded that a state’s ability to define property could not go so far as
to “merge” “nonadjacent property owned by a single person or entity
in different parts of the State and then impose[ ] development limits
on the aggregate set.”54 Of course, this should not be the case. Not
even the most ardent planner or bureaucrat has suggested that non-
congruent lots owned by the same person or congruent lots owned
by different people should be considered virtually joined in order to
ease the planning burden.55
52. In a somewhat cruel twist of fate, the same county that insisted that these two lots
must be treated as a single entity had been sending separate property tax bills to the owners
for years, taxing each individually at its highest and best use, without regard to the neighboring
lot. But this is probably digressive.
53. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944–45 (quoting Palazzolo v.  Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626
(2001) (punctuation simplified)).
54. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
55. There is one place where such separated joinder is allowed. In direct condemnation
cases, where such separated properties share unities of title and use (and at least close
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Although rendering a decision in favor of the State, the Court
declined the State’s suggestion to clothe it with absolute, defini-
tional power over property, saying the State’s approach was equiva-
lent to framing the question this way: “May the State define the
relevant parcel in a way that permits it to escape its responsibility
to justify regulation in light of legitimate property expectations?”56
In a word, no.
But wait; there is more. Four days after deciding Murr, the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari in United States v. Lost Tree Village
Corp.57 The reason this action may have meaning here (which some
might dismiss as routine in light of the myriad petitions that receive
the “denied” stamp every week) is that it was considered at the very
time the Court was parsing the words of the Murr opinion and its two
dissents, and it involves a related (perhaps similar) issue. One might
even call Lost Tree the blood brother of Murr. Moreover, the Lost
Tree petition had been pending since March 2016—fifteen months
earlier—and the United States (the petitioner) had asked the Court
to defer action pending the decision in Murr so that the decisions could
be consistent.58 Whether acting deliberately or not, holding Lost Tree
is what the Court did. There are additional threads to harry here.
Lost Tree was another “parcel as a whole” case. It certainly re-
ceived its share of judicial attention, having made two trips to the
court of appeals. It was another case in which the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers denied a wetlands-fill permit. The property owner had
developed homes on approximately 1,300 acres and then sought a
permit to fill a 4.99-acre wetlands tract. The permit was denied. The
trial court initially entered judgment on the takings claim in favor
of the government. On appeal, that was reversed.59 The next time
around, the property owner won. The trial court held that the denial
proximity), they can be considered together for the purpose of computing severance damages.
See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Neumann, 6 Cal. 4th 738 (1993); City of Los Angeles v. Wolfe,
6 Cal. 3d 326 (1971). But that is a different story for a different day. A good discussion of the
complex issues involved in analyzing proximity and use in inverse condemnation cases can
be found in Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel
as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549 (2012).
56. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946.
57. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 2325 (2017).
58. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29, United States v. Lost Tree Vill. Corp., 137
S. Ct. 2325 (2017) (No. 15-1192), 2016 WL 1166134, at *29.
59. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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of the permit deprived the owner of 99.4% of the property’s value60
rendering the government action a total and categorical taking.
Seeking certiorari, the government argued that the wetlands
parcel could not be evaluated separately from what it called “the
contiguous uplands under common ownership.”61 Right after Murr,
however, where the Court held that such contiguity was an impor-
tant factor, certiorari was denied without comment, or dissent. This
provides more food for thought.
II. WHETHER GOVERNMENT ACTS LEGISLATIVELY OR
ADMINISTRATIVELY, IT MUST COMPENSATE WHEN ITS ACTIONS
ADVERSELY IMPACT PRIVATE PROPERTY
The Constitution is concerned with governmental action. Its Bill
of Rights is designed specifically to protect individuals against gov-
ernment actions.62 As Justice Stewart put it in a classic concurring
opinion, “the Constitution measures a taking of property not by what
a State says, or by what it intends, but by what it does.”63
The most serious place where this issue currently arises is in the
field of exactions. Specifically, it arises in analyzing whether a taking
occurs only when an exaction is imposed during an administrative
process (i.e., on a case-by-case basis, depending on the individual facts)
or whether a taking also occurs when an exaction is imposed legisla-
tively (i.e., across the board, regardless of individual facts). The
issue is of particular importance in California where municipalities
are seeking to increase their stock of housing for low- and moderate-
income residents.64 The favored governmental method of ensuring
60. There have been disagreements about how much use or value can be eliminated before
courts will acknowledge that a taking has occurred, but 99.4% should be “too far” in anyone’s
view. Compare this with Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed.Cl. 21 (1999)
(determining that there was a 73.1% value loss; taking found).
61. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i., United States v. Lost Tree Vill. Corp., 137 S. Ct.
2325 (2017) (No. 15-11192), 2016 WL 1166134.
62. Some examples include the protections around the government actions of quartering
soldiers (U.S. CONST. amend. III), establishing religion (U.S. CONST. amend. I), interfering
with the possession of property (U.S. CONST. amend. V), and deprivations of life or liberty
(U.S. CONST. amend. V).
63. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (concurring opinion) (emphasis in the
original).
64. More than four decades ago, the California legislature formally declared “a serious
shortage” of housing for those of low and moderate means. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
30 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 7:017
such housing construction is to compel the developers of market-rate
housing to include a specified amount of “affordable” housing as part
of their developments. In its most recent iteration, the California
Supreme Court approved a requirement that obligated residential
developers to sell at least fifteen percent of their units at a price
that is “affordable” to low- or moderate-income occupants—and to
keep those units affordable for forty-five years.65 Developers who don’t
want the low-income units in their developments were given the
option of either paying ransom66 (in the form of fees “in lieu” of con-
tributing those units to the local low-income housing stock) or building
the units on a different site.67
Forgetting the lesson the U.S. Supreme Court tried to teach in
Nollan about not evading the Fifth Amendment by a “clever” “play
on words,”68 the California Supreme Court concluded that it need
pay no attention to Nollan, Dolan, or the most recent application in
Koontz69 through the simple, definitional expedient of saying that
the affordable housing condition was not an “exaction” but merely
§ 50003 (1977). That problem remains unsolved. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose,
61 Cal. 4th 435, 441 (2015). A recent study suggests that local government may be engaging
in some version of the infamous “shell game” by planning for housing but not approving any.
See Liam Dillon, California Lawmakers Have Tried for 50 Years to Fix the State’s Housing
Crisis. Here’s Why They’ve Failed, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2017, at 1. The supply continues to trail
the need. See Kevin Smith, With California Housing Prices Surging, Developers Say They
Can’t Build Enough Homes, L.A. DAILY NEWS, July 5, 2017, at 1; Liam Dillon, A Bay Area
Developer Wants to Build 4,400 Sorely Needed Homes. Here’s Why It Won’t Happen, L.A.
TIMES, July 28, 2017, pt. B, at 1. Recently, the California Department of Housing and Com-
munity Development released a report concluding that more than five hundred cities and
counties are failing to meet housing goals for all income levels. Jeff Collins, 98% of California
Jurisdictions Fail to Approve Adequate Housing, State Report Finds, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER,
Feb. 1, 2018. See also Liam Dillon, Blame California’s Cities and Counties for Housing Delays,
Not State Environmental Law, New Study Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2018.
65. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435, 441 (2015).
66. No pejorative meaning is intended by the choice of this word. All the Justices use it.
In the recent decision in Horne v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015),
liberal Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined an opinion decrying the government’s
holding property “hostage” to be “ransomed by the waiver of constitutional protection.”
67. A mild digression brings us to the City of Patterson, California, which sought to
increase its “in lieu” fee from $734 per house to $20,946 per house. Even the California courts
could not stomach that. Bldg, Indus. Ass’n of Cent. Cal. v. City of Patterson, 171 Cal. App. 4th
886 (2009). See Michael M. Berger, Appellate Advice On What Is NOT A “Reasonable” In-Lieu
Fee, REAL ESTATE FIN. J. 114 (Winter 2010). At least in this context, we have an answer to the
conundrum spawned by Mahon, that is, how can we tell how far is “too far”?
68. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838, 841 (1987).
69. Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
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a “regulation” of land use.70 So saying, the California court found no
need to analyze this legislatively imposed exaction by U.S. Supreme
Court standards.71 Although the California Supreme Court’s opinion
was a little blurred about the administrative/legislative distinction,
a recent court of appeal decision applied that distinction clearly.72
That the California courts have approved such actions should not
be surprising.73 The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly had to explain
to the California judiciary that the Constitution will not permit some
of California’s actions regarding private property.74 The surprising
thing is the state courts’ analyses in these cases. In a nutshell, a
central reason for the courts saying they approve of these govern-
ment regulations is that the Constitution protects only against ad-
ministrative actions not legislative ones. Is that—more importantly,
can that be—true? We need to deconstruct the analyses and see if
there is any there there.
Let’s begin with a fundamental misconception: that the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s exactions cases involved administrative impositions
of conditions based on the individual facts of each case. Even Justice
Thomas, who wants the Court to decide this issue, fell into this trap.75
But that premise is wrong—demonstrably so. In fact, each of the
70. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435, 443–44 (2015) (stating that
the regulations “do not impose exactions . . . but rather place a limit on the way a developer may
use its property”). See also id. at 457–58 (finding the regulations “do[ ] not effect an exaction”).
71. Candidly, I get a little dizzy when they do things like this. In Nollan, the U.S. Su-
preme Court had told the California Supreme Court not to play the “word game” of calling an
exaction something more bland (in that case, a “dedication”) in order to define its way out of
a problem. Yet here is the same lower court playing the same game to evade the same
constitutional guarantee, and then certiorari was denied. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of
San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016). Go figure. For further discussion of definitional word games,
see generally Michael M. Berger, To Regulate or Not to Regulate—Is That the Question?
Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property
Rights, 8 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253 (1975) [hereinafter Berger, To Regulate or Not].
72. 616 Croft Ave., L.L.C. v. City of West Hollywood, 3 Cal. App. 5th 621 (2016), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 377 (2017).
73.  See Gideon Kanner, Tennis Anyone? How California Judges Made Land Ransom and
Art Censorship Legal, 25 REAL ESTATE J. 214 (Winter 1997).
74. E.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
330 (1987) (noting that California cases were decided “inconsistently” with Fifth Amendment
law); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (stating that “extortion” is not
constitutionally permissible); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 707 (finding
the City’s position is “contrary to settled regulatory takings principles”).
75. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (“Our precedents in Nollan [and] Dolan . . . would have
governed San Jose’s actions had it imposed those conditions through administrative action.”).
32 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 7:017
Supreme Court’s exaction cases involved a hardline legislative deci-
sion that was applied by rote, albeit the decision was handed down
in an administrative proceeding. In Nollan, the California Coastal
Commission adopted “a comprehensive program to provide continu-
ous public access” to the beach.76 That program applied to all coastal
property from Oregon to Mexico, and a condition of dedication was
attached to all permits, regardless of individual circumstances. Al-
though the condition was imposed in the context of an administrative
proceeding where a permit was being sought, the fact is the decision
to require the “dedication” in exchange for a permit was legislatively
made as a common requirement along the entire coast.
The same is true of Dolan. There, the City of Tigard decided that
it needed to provide three layers of protection and public uses along
the banks of Fanno Creek as it wove through town. In order to im-
plement that plan, the city council decreed that all permits for
property bordering the creek must dedicate three different classes
of concentric easements spreading outward from the creek: one to
protect the creek, one to provide pedestrian access, and a third to
provide a bike path. Again, although the conditions would be imposed
on individual properties during administrative proceedings, there
were no considerations made for individual fact-finding or special
circumstances. To make the three-deep set of easements work along
the entire creek, the same easement, of the same size and quality,
had to be imposed on each of the neighboring properties.
In other words, the conditions were ironclad and applied across
the board—not dependent on the individual characteristics of indi-
vidual property owners.77 In technical terms, the condition was im-
posed legislatively not administratively, notwithstanding some judicial
comments to the contrary.78 As the court put it in California Building
Industry Ass’n, the core distinction is “between ad hoc exactions and
legislatively mandated, formulaic mitigation fees.”79 But it really
76. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
77. See also Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641
(Tex. 2004); J. David Breemer, What Property Rights: The California Coastal Commission’s
History of Abusing Land Rights and Some Thoughts on the Underlying Causes, 22 U.C.L.A.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 247, 265 (2004); Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces
into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1040–41 (1997).
78. E.g., Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 61 Cal. 4th 457, 459 n.11 (reviewing the validity of “ad
hoc administrative decisions”).
79. Id. at 471 (quoting this distinction with approval).
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shouldn’t matter. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said, “[t]he Takings
Clause . . . is concerned simply with the act.”80 And, here, the types
of acts being examined are those that force the extraction of valu-
able property as quid pro quo for a development permit.
A second misconception derives from the first, that is, that the
identity of the regulatory entity makes a difference. Should it? Re-
calling that the Bill of Rights deals with guarding individuals
against governmental action and that the Fifth Amendment’s pro-
scription of federal action has been incorporated against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, there is
no valid basis for distinguishing among various, potential actors.81
Justice Thomas raised this issue years ago when he noted, “It is not
clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the type of gov-
ernmental entity responsible for the taking. . . . A city council can
take property just as well as a planning commission can.”82 And yet
some courts and commentators persist in maintaining that the
identities of the players require different rules and fret that the line
dividing them could be erased.83 Thus, one group of states is defer-
ential to legislative bodies and cuts them a great deal of slack when
reviewing exactions.84 Other states see no difference whether exac-
tions are imposed legislatively or administratively.85 As this was
80. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713–14
(2010) (plurality opinion).
81. See James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary
Zoning and Other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 407–16
(2009) (showing that Supreme Court precedent before Nollan never distinguished between
conditions imposed by different sources of government).
82. Parking Ass’n of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117–18 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); see San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 41
P.3d 87, 124 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“A public agency can just as easily extort unfair
fees legislatively from a class of property owners as it can administratively from a single
property owner. The nature of the wrong is not different or less abusive to the victims.”).
83. E.g., Molly Cohen et al., Revolutionary or Routine? Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 245, 257 (2014) (discussing impact fees and
the possibility of Koontz “erasing the longstanding legislative/ad hoc distinction recognized
in many states”); John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever? 22
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 51 (2014) (stating that the decision suggests heightened scrutiny in the
review of “legislative and executive branch action”).
84. See 616 Croft Ave., L.L.C. v. City of West Hollywood, 3 Cal. App. 5th 621, 629 (2016);
West Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. v. City of West Linn, 240 P.3d 29, 45 (Or. 2010); Alto
Eldorado Partnership v. City of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170, 1179 (10th Cir. 2011).
85. See Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d
349, 355–56 (Ohio 2000); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d
620, 641 (Tex. 2004).
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being written, the Court denied certiorari in the Croft case from
California, missing that opportunity to bring clarity to the field, but
a new petition has been filed in the Dabbs case from Maryland, keep-
ing the issue alive.86 One of these days, certiorari will be granted.
Unless anarchy is going to be allowed to continue to reign, it will
have to be granted.
III. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
“Property” consists of many things. Indeed, the concept is so
complex that the Supreme Court has repeatedly used the law profes-
sors’ “bundle of sticks” analogy to illustrate it. The Court thus has
concluded that both the taking of an entire “stick” (or right) from the
“bundle” and the taking of a part of all the “sticks” violate the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.87
One “stick” which has received special protection from the Court
has been the right of property owners to exclude others. The Court
has repeatedly referred to the right to exclude others as “one of the
most essential”88 and “most treasured stands in an owner’s bundle
of property rights.”89
Moreover, the Court has been particularly protective against
governmental actions that permit strangers to invade the property
of others:
This is not a case in which the Government is exercising its
regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial
86. Croft, 3 Cal. App. 5th, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 377 (Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-1137). See
Dabbs v. Anne Arundel Cty., No. 18-54 (seeking review of Dabbs v. Anne Arundel County, 182
A. 3d 798 (Md. 2018), in which Maryland’s highest court held that impact fees imposed on
broad basis by legislation are not subject to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny).
87. Indeed, it is hard to pick up a property decision by the Supreme Court and not find
some reference to the bundle of sticks as an explanation for the holding. E.g., Murr v.
Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1952 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982); United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76 (1982);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
88. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Irving, 481 U.S. at 716; Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011;
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176.
89. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. Professor Callies calls the right to exclude “a fundamental
part of the equally fundamental Constitutional Right to the enjoyment of private property.”
David Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from Private Property: A
Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 58 (2000).
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devaluation of petitioners’ private property; rather, the imposi-
tion of the navigable servitude in this context will result in an
actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina.90
One form of this kind of conflict has arisen lately in the context
of labor/management relations. The factual scenarios have to do
with where, when, and under what circumstances members of labor
unions may take actions that would nominally be recognized as
trespasses (either outside or inside stores) but are held not to violate
the Fifth Amendment. Like Kaiser Aetna, these cases do not involve
“insubstantial devaluation[s]” of property. In Ralphs,91 for example,
the court was presented with state statutes that not only allowed
actual physical intrusion onto Ralphs’s private property, it also pro-
hibited aid from the judiciary.92 Colorfully, Professor Tribe once
referred to such interlopers on private property as “government-
invited gatecrashers.”93 Indeed, they are.
But the Fifth Amendment provides a shield against “gatecrashers”
who carry government passes. The Supreme Court has routinely
noted that government action resulting in actual physical invasion
is relatively simple to analyze from the vantage point of the Fifth
Amendment: physical invasion is a taking that cannot be accom-
plished without compensation.
The Court’s cases make no distinction between actual physical inva-
sion by the government,94 and legislation or regulation authorizing
trespass by others. Some of the Court’s prime physical invasion cases
simply involved enabling third party trespass. In Nollan,95 a California
agency sought to authorize random beachgoers to trespass on private
property. In Loretto,96 the New York legislature authorized cable TV
companies to install equipment in apartment buildings without
consent from the building owners. In Kaiser Aetna,97 the United States
sought to open a private marina for use by the general public.
90. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180 (emphasis added).
91. Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 290 P.3d 1116 (Cal.
2012).
92. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1138.1; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 527.3.
93. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-5, at 602 (2d ed. 1988).
94. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (regarding military aircraft);
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871) (regarding artillery shells).
95. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
96. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
97. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
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The point is simply this: neither by itself, nor through authorizing
others, may a public agency hinder the right of private property
owners to exclude third parties from their land—not without com-
pensation.
The labor relations cases are analytical twins to the real estate
cases cited above. In each, government regulation sought to compel
a private property owner to open property to physical intrusion and
use by strangers. Such random and unwanted intrusions by union
representatives—at times and in manners of their own choosing,
ignoring the property owner’s desires or regulations—is so signifi-
cant that it prompted the Court’s holding in Kaiser Aetna:
[T]he ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental
element of the property right, falls within this category of inter-
ests that the Government cannot take without compensation.98
The idea that compensation is necessary following government
actions that take private property was augmented eight years later in
First English. In that case the Court declared: “[G]overnment action
that works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates the ‘consti-
tutional obligation to pay just compensation.’”99 Compensation is
thus an automatic requirement when property interests are taken.
How does this concept play out in labor/management relations?
Simple. To accomplish their goals, labor unions need access to two
groups of people: the employees of those businesses whom they
would like to represent and the customers of those businesses whom
they would like to enlist in their cause. For both of these, the unions
seek access to the places of business directly involved. That is the
most direct way to reach both targets. Needless to say, the employ-
ers and proprietors of the businesses do not want either their em-
ployees bothered during the workday or their customers bothered
while they could be shopping. The U.S. Supreme Court has consid-
ered these issues in the context of shopping centers a couple of times
and so has the California Supreme Court. It probably goes without
saying that the latter court has been less protective of the rights of
property owners than the former. The issue erupted again recently.
98. Id. at 180.
99. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315
(1987) (emphasis added).
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The question raised by government regulators in the labor/man-
agement context is whether the standard takings theory might have
been displaced by the Court’s holding in PruneYard Shopping Center
v. Robins.100 The California Supreme Court interpreted PruneYard
as elevating the First Amendment rights of unions and employees
over the Fifth Amendment rights of property owners and employers.
I recognize that the PruneYard case involved students soliciting sig-
natures to oppose an anti-Zionist measure in the United Nations, but
the underlying constitutional precepts are the same and should have
provided Ralphs’s substantial protection. But California misreads
the federal precedents.101
California began its analysis with an erroneous premise and fol-
lowed that line to an erroneous conclusion. The focal point of the anal-
ysis was the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lloyd.102 Pruneyard’s
erroneous premise was that Lloyd was “primarily a First Amend-
ment case.”103 But here is how the U.S. Supreme Court character-
ized the question it addressed in Lloyd:
We granted certiorari to consider petitioner’s contention that the
decision below violates rights of private property protected by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.104
Lloyd thus addressed—and answered—a Fifth Amendment ques-
tion, deciding that the Fifth Amendment rights of the property
owner, even in the context of a large (fifty-acre) shopping center,
prevailed over the First Amendment rights of Vietnam War protest-
ers to distribute handbills. Two points were paramount in that
determination. First, the First Amendment guards against restric-
tions by the government, not private property owners.105 Second, even
100. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
101. California is not alone. New Jersey, for example, has held all private property subject
to an inchoate servitude to free speech: “We do not interfere lightly with private property
rights, but when they are exercised, as in this case, in a way that drastically curtails the right
of freedom of speech in order to avoid a relatively minimal interference with private property,
the latter must yield to the former.” N.J. Coalition Against War v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650
A.2d 757, 780 (1994).
102. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
103. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 904 (1979). Note that the two
courts spell the shopping center’s name differently. In other words, California makes it one
word (Pruneyard) while the U.S. Supreme Court makes a mashup of two words (PruneYard).
The latter seems to be the actual name of the center.
104. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 552–53.
105. Even public property is not universally available for “free speech” activities, as the
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the creation of a large shopping center, which the public is generally
invited to use, does not automatically result in “dedication of private
property to public use.”106 In a companion case, argued and decided
on the same days as Lloyd, the Supreme Court elaborated:
Before an owner of private property can be subjected to the
commands of the First and Fourteenth Amendments the pri-
vately owned property must assume to some significant degree
the functional attributes of public property devoted to public use.
The First and Fourteenth Amendments are limitations on state
action, not on action by the owner of private property used only
for private purposes.107
Curiously, California leapt over the first issue and went right to
the second, disagreeing with the U.S. Supreme Court about the
protection accorded property owners. The California jurists held
that article I, sections 2 and 3, of the California Constitution ac-
corded greater protection to speakers than the First Amendment
and thus prevailed even in private shopping centers.
California’s failure to deal with the question of whether the First
Amendment or the slightly expanded California equivalent is re-
stricted to state action has been regularly criticized by both courts in
sister jurisdictions and by legal commentators.108 When the California
Supreme Court addressed the question again in Golden Gateway
Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n (in the context of an apart-
ment complex rather than a shopping center), only a plurality of the
court concluded that state action—rather than private action—was
a necessary element of the California Constitution, like its federal
counterpart. The court determined the only exception to this was
when private property had become “functionally equivalent to a
traditional public forum.”109 The Golden Gateway plurality reached
that conclusion in an effort to retain California’s Pruneyard as
Court noted in Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 568. More recently, that Court confirmed that different
levels of speech restrictions may apply at different kinds of public facilities. Christian Legal
Society Chapter of the Univ. of Calif. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 (2010).
106. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569.
107. Central Hardware Co. v. Nat’l Labor Review Bd., 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972).
108. See comments collected by the plurality opinion in Golden Gateway Center v. Golden
Gateway Tenants Ass’n , 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1020 n.4 (2001), and by the dissenting opinion in
Fashion Valley Mall v. National. Labor Relations Bd., 42 Cal.4th 850, 874.
109. Golden Gateway, 26 Cal.4th at 1033 (2008).
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precedent110 but still keep it closely tied to the federal Constitution’s
restriction of free speech protections in public forums.
California was wrong in its generalized characterization of shop-
ping centers as having become the functional equivalent of public
parks and town squares. First, implicit in the court’s rationalization
for considering shopping centers quasipublic spaces was the per-
ceived need for the ability of citizens to communicate broadly and
easily. The focus of the analysis was on the idea that more and more
people congregated in shopping centers111 making access to those
people essential to the dissemination of ideas and the collection of
signatures on petitions. If nothing else, technology has overtaken
that need. Not only has the Internet expanded apace, but (as recent
events in the Middle East have shown) social networking sites like
Twitter and Facebook have transformed the way in which people are
able to communicate with vast numbers of others on an almost
instantaneous basis. People no longer need to congregate in town
squares to commune with one another.112 Second, to the extent that
California’s generalized characterization of shopping centers as having
become the functional equivalent of public parks and town squares
can have meaning, it may have application only to the largest shop-
ping centers, like the one involved in Pruneyard. These are perceived
to have become focused gathering spots that contain centralized court-
yards serving as places for general, public gatherings (in contrast to
other shopping centers’ primary function of providing places to shop).
California’s failure to specifically define the contours of a public
forum leaves businesses, property owners, lower courts, and those
seeking to exercise free speech to guess which private properties are
quasipublic and which are strictly private. Third, shopping malls
are dropping like flies.113
PruneYard was sui generis. It involved neither a single store nor
a modest shopping mall. Instead, PruneYard arose from issues at a
shopping center so massive that it drew daily crowds of twenty-five
thousand people. In that context, that shopping center had become,
110. A member of that plurality later explained that retention was based “reluctantly” on
stare decisis. Fashion Valley, 42 Cal.4th at 875 (dissenting opinion).
111. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 907, 910 n.5 (1979).
112. See discussion of the so-called “Arab Spring” in Berger, Property, supra note 10, at 61.
113. See Dead Mall, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_mall (last visited
Mar. 15, 2018).
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in effect, the equivalent of a town square, where members of the public
were invited to congregate for myriad purposes. Even there, the Su-
preme Court concluded that the property owner was entitled to
establish time, place, and manner regulations for use of its facilities.
No such protection is available under the California statutes. Nor
is such protection available even though the California Supreme
Court recognized that Ralphs’s owner had done nothing to convert
the store entry to a “public” space.
The California Supreme Court suggested that the California legis-
lature had recognized a problem, accepted the duty to solve it, and
devised a solution. But its opinion proceeds as though recognition of
a legitimate governmental goal (accepting, arguendo, that the goal is
legitimate) validates whatever solution is chosen. That is not the law
in the United States. Determination of a legitimate governmental
objective is the first, not the last, step. The means chosen to achieve
the objective must then survive constitutional scrutiny. Good inten-
tions are irrelevant. For the proper exercise of any governmental
power, the underpinning of such a beneficent purpose must exist.
This much had been settled by 1922, when the Supreme Court ex-
amined a statute designed to stop land subsidence caused by under-
ground coal mining and concluded that the prerequisites for the
exercises of both police power and eminent domain were present:
We assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon the con-
viction that an exigency existed that would warrant it, and we
assume that an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise
of the power of eminent domain. But the question at bottom is
upon whom the loss of the changes desired should fall.114
More recent authority echoes that conclusion: “[T]he Takings Clause
presupposes that the government has acted pursuant to a valid
public purpose.”115 Once it is determined that the government action
114. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
115. Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (emphasis added). See also Fla.
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) “It is necessary that
the Government act in a good cause, but it is not sufficient. The takings clause already as-
sumes the Government is acting in the public interest . . . .” Id. at 1571. More than that, the
Takings Clause assumes that the government is acting pursuant to lawful authority. If not,
the action is ultra vires and void. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952) (finding an unlawful wartime seizure void), with United States v. Peewee Coal Co.,
341 U.S. 114 (1951) (finding that compensation is mandatory after lawful wartime seizure.)
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was done to achieve a legitimate goal, then the means chosen to
achieve the goal must be examined against the constitutional matrix
to ensure that private property rights have not been violated.
Mahon was merely one in a long line of decisions in which the
Supreme Court—speaking through various voices along its ideologi-
cal spectrum (Mahon having been authored for the Court by Justice
Holmes)—patiently, and consistently, explained to regulatory agen-
cies that the general legal propriety of their actions and the need to
pay compensation under the Fifth Amendment present different
questions. The need for the latter is not obviated by the virtue of the
former. Emphasizing the point, the dissenting opinion in Mahon ar-
gued the absolute position that a “restriction imposed to protect the
public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a
taking.”116 Eight Justices rejected that proposition. In Loretto,117 New
York’s highest court upheld a statute as a valid exercise of the police
power and therefore dismissed an action seeking compensation for a
taking. The Supreme Court put it this way as it reversed that decision:
The Court of Appeals determined that § 828 serves [a] legitimate
public purpose . . . and thus is within the State’s police power.
We have no reason to question that determination. It is a sepa-
rate question, however, whether an otherwise valid regulation
so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid.118
Similarly, in Kaiser Aetna,119 the Army Corps of Engineers de-
creed that a private marina could be opened to public use without
compensation. The Supreme Court disagreed, and explained the
relationship between justifiable regulatory actions and the just
compensation guarantee of the Fifth Amendment:
In light of its expansive authority under the Commerce Clause,
there is no question but that Congress could assure the public a
free right of access to the Hawaii Kai Marina if it so chose.
Whether a statute or regulation that went so far amounted to a
“taking,” however, is an entirely separate question.120
116. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 417. Note that this was one of the few times that Justice Brandeis
(the lone dissenter) disagreed with Justice Holmes.
117. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
118. Id. at 425 (Marshall, J.) (emphasis added).
119. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
120. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J.) (emphasis added).
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That is why the Court concluded in First English that the Fifth
Amendment was designed “to secure compensation in the event of
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.”121
In a similar vein are cases like Preseault,122 Ruckelshaus,123 Dames
& Moore,124 and the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases.125 In
each of them, the Court was faced with the claim that Congress, in
pursuit of legitimate objectives, had taken private property without
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The govern-
mental goal in each case was plainly legitimate (respectively, creat-
ing recreational hiking and biking trails over abandoned railroad
right-of-way easements, obtaining expert input prior to the licensing
of pesticides to protect the consuming public, dealing with the issue
of compensation in the aftermath of the Iranian hostage crisis, and
handling widespread railroad bankruptcy). Nonetheless, the Court
did not permit those proper legislative goals to trump the constitu-
tional need for compensation when private property was taken in
the process. In each, the Court directed the property owners to the
Court of Federal Claims to determine whether these exercises of
legislative power, though substantively legitimate, nonetheless re-
quired compensation to pass constitutional muster.126
In sum, for a taking to occur, what matters is the impact of the
government’s acts, not the purity vel non of the actors’ motives.
Indeed, if their motives are benign—or done for the best of reasons—
that only fortifies the need for compensation required by the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.127 Thus, it is not enough for Califor-
nia to conclude that—as a matter of state policy—it was a good thing
to allow uncontrolled picketing at the entry to stores like Ralphs
121. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315
(1987) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (first emphasis, the Court’s; second emphasis added).
122. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (Brennan, J.).
123. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (Blackmun, J.).
124. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.).
125. Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974) (Brennan, J.).
126. To this end, the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation guarantee has been held self-
executing. The availability of compensation validates and constitutionalizes the otherwise
wrongful government action. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 714–15
(1999) (Kennedy, J.); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
127. The only potentially contrary Supreme Court voice came somewhat earlier than this
group of decisions in the relatively cosmic language of Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33
(1954), where the Court broadly pronounced: “Once the object is within the authority of
Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine.” To the
extent that this was the law in 1954, it seems to have been seriously reined in since then.
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Grocery. As a matter of federal constitutional policy, such a severe
invasion of protected property rights cannot occur unless compensa-
tion is paid.
Returning to Pruneyard, it is worth noting that the dissent in the
California Supreme Court’s opinion took on directly the idea that the
First Amendment rights of the unions and their picketers could stand
at a higher level than the Fifth Amendment rights of the store owner:
The majority relegates the private property rights of the shop-
ping center owner to a secondary, disfavored, and subservient
position vis-à-vis the ‘free speech’ claims of the plaintiffs. Such
a holding clearly violates federal constitutional guarantees
announced in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.128
Indeed, as the Court put it in Lloyd, “The essentially private
character of a store and its privately owned abutting property does
not change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in
a modern shopping center.”129 In Lloyd, the Supreme Court pre-
vented the distribution of political handbills in a shopping center.
In weighing the Fifth Amendment rights of the shopping center
owner against the First Amendment rights of those who wanted to
distribute leaflets, the Court made the following conclusion:
We do say that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of
private property owners, as well as the First Amendment rights
of all citizens, must be respected and protected. The Framers of
the Constitution certainly did not think these fundamental
rights of a free society are incompatible with each other.130
Likewise, in Central Hardware, decided on the same day as Lloyd,
the Court concluded that care must be taken by courts to avoid the
“unwarranted infringement of long-settled rights of private property
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”131
In other words, “freedom of speech” does not ipso facto override
the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court was blunt
128. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 911 (1979) (dissenting opinion)
(emphasis original) (citation omitted).
129. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972).
130. Id. at 570. See also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (property rights
are not “poor relation” to other constitutionally protected rights).
131. Central Hardware Co., 407 U.S. at 547.
44 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 7:017
in recognizing the inherent constitutional problem of compelling
store owners to provide space for union picketers:
To hold that store owners are compelled by law to supply picket-
ing areas for pickets to drive store customers away is to create
a court-made law wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on
which private ownership of property rests in this country. . . .132
When given the opportunity to clarify the relationship between
the seminal values of the First and Fifth Amendments in Ralphs,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.133 It will surely have another
chance, and it will hopefully make better use of it.
IV. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT INSISTS ON SO MUCH PROCESS THAT
THE PROPERTY OWNER CHOKES ON IT, HAS DUE PROCESS BEEN
DENIED?
Substantive due process is the blood brother of takings law. In
many cases, the two can be used as interchangeable theories for
correcting the same (or, at least, similar) governmental wrong.134 It
thus seems appropriate to include some discussion of due process in
this compendium.
Normally, we think of due process denials as being caused by the
absence of process or, at least, the twisting of process. However, due
process can be denied by too much as well as not enough process—
indeed, too much process can drown any semblance of due process
of law. Years ago, Fred Bosselman, dean of the national land use bar
and one of Callies’s early mentors,135 queried whether “our system
of land use and environmental regulation [can] become so Byzantine
as to deny due process of law to the participants through the sheer
132. Hudgens v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. 424 U.S. 507, 517 (1976).
133. Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 133 S. Ct. 2799
(2013) (No. 12-1162).
134. For an example, see the various opinions in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498
(1998). The plurality struck down the statute as a taking. But that only provided the property
owner with four votes. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, concluding that the
statute deprived the owner of property without due process. The same conclusion is reached
but with different reasoning. The dissent also opted for a due process analysis, but did so
because the lower standard of proof applicable to the government in due process cases would
have allowed the government to prevail.
135. See supra notes 2–3.
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complexity of the system.”136 The precise focus of this discussion is
“finality,” that is, what must a property owner do so that a case is
sufficiently “final” for a court to litigate?137
For illustrative purposes, I am going to use two cases that I keep in
a file marked “Great Cases I Have Lost” (and believe me, I have lost
some wonderful cases). The cases are Charles A. Pratt Construction
Co. v. California Coastal Comm’n138 and Galland v. City of Clovis.139
Pratt involved the potential development of the last portion of an
undeveloped stretch of land in San Luis Obispo County, California.140
The owner planned 149 homes for an 81-acre parcel, and the County
approved the concept. After completion of a neighboring tract, the
owner pared down its plan to forty-one homes and, at the same time,
added forty-three more acres to the tract (to be left undeveloped). The
owner spent nearly a decade in planning and studying, including
examining ten alternative uses in its environmental impact report
(“EIR”). Leaving eighty percent of the land undeveloped exceeded
the County’s official-plan requirement of sixty percent.141
However, after the owner’s specific plan for development was
approved by the County and appealed, the California Coastal Com-
mission overturned the County’s approval, disregarding the decade
of county planning and the voluminous EIR prepared and evaluated
by the County. Not only did the commission reject the plan approved
by the County, it rejected ten alternative plans evaluated in the EIR.
Pratt shows how Bosselman’s fears have materialized. The U.S.
Supreme Court had a valid goal when it sought to restrict its re-
views of local government decisions to those in which the regulatory
agency had reached a “final” determination of how a property owner
136. AM. SOC’Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE RE-
CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 12 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978).
137. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 186 (1985); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001).
138. Charles A. Pratt Construction Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1068
(2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1171 (2009).
139. Galland v. Clovis, 24 Cal. 4th 1003, 103 Cal. Rptr .2d 711, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 826
(2001).
140. Have you noticed how many takings cases involve the “last piece of undeveloped prop-
erty” in the jurisdiction? See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
141. Note the high-handedness of the county’s plan, demanding that sixty percent of the
land remain vacant as the price for developing the other forty percent. Interestingly, the
property owner was willing to donate even more for the chance to make any semblance of
realistic development.
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would be allowed to make use of his or her land. Premature adjudi-
cation serves no one. However, some lower courts have used the
Court’s pragmatic desire for “finality” to launch a quest for some sort
of Holy Grail, thus putting off “finality” indefinitely rather than
viewing the facts—ad hoc—to determine whether enough process has
been completed. Just as the Court disagreed with the contrary conclu-
sions about finality made by the Rhode Island courts in Palazzolo,142
some uniform treatment of this concern seems required.
Pratt is a paradigm of this issue for two reasons, each of which
will be familiar to land developers and their counsel.
First, during the administrative process leading up to the Coastal
Commission’s ruling, Charles Pratt had spent the better part of a
decade intensively working with county officials to produce a devel-
opment plan. As part of that process, an EIR was prepared by the
County (and subjected to full probing at public hearings) that ana-
lyzed ten different alternatives for using this property. The project
that is the subject of the litigation was the preferred choice of both
the county board of supervisors and Pratt.
When the County’s permit issuance was appealed to the Coastal
Commission, the commission had before it the entire record of the
County’s proceedings, including the EIR. The commission not only
rejected the permit the County had approved, it rejected the other
alternatives as well. It did this by concluding that there was “no
way” it could suggest to modify the project (e.g., by using or slightly
altering one of the alternatives) because the “revisions that would
be necessary . . . are so extensive . . . denial . . . is the only appropri-
ate course.”143
Notwithstanding the Coastal Commission’s suggestion that some
alternative must be available that could be approved, the facts belie
that suggestion. The reasons given by the commission for denial
would not change. The water available on site would not increase.144
142. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 619. The state supreme court had required multiple applications
and denials before “finality” could be achieved. The U.S. Supreme Court held that if the
reasoning for the first denial would doom future applications, then finality had been achieved.
143. The administrative record is not published any place. It is in my office and at the
courthouse. Trust me on this.
144. The water-service company for San Luis Obispo County had assured Pratt and the
County that it could provide adequate water for the project. The Coastal Commission simply
did not like the idea of bringing water from off-site (although the County had approved), and
the courts gave short shrift to the water company’s promise.
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The extent of the environmentally sensitive habitat area would not
decrease.145 The utility of the property as a scenic background for
the already developed part of the community would not change. As
the Court held in Palazzolo, once it has been made clear that the
reasons for denial will not change, there is no need to waste time
making additional applications merely for the sake of making appli-
cations: “Ripeness doctrine does not require a landowner to submit
applications for their own sake.”146
In this context, rigid application of a multiple-application rule
makes no more sense than it did in Palazzolo. The Coastal Commis-
sion’s views on the private development of this property are clear.
The rejection of all ten alternatives analyzed in the EIR removes
any doubt. Under the ripeness framework of Williamson County, the
idea is to allow sufficient consideration of alternatives to be able to
conclude that adequate finality has been reached, which in turn
would allow a court to conduct a Fifth Amendment analysis. It should
make no difference whether the various alternatives were consid-
ered seriatim, as part of technically separate permit applications, or
as part of one comprehensive analysis of the property as is the case
here. The point should be to find the answer not to engage in pro-
cess for its own sake.147
Second, the Coastal Commission has only administrative-appel-
late jurisdiction over this property, not plenary land use control. The
latter power is held by San Luis Obispo County. The only time the
Coastal Commission has even the possibility of reviewing the use of
a property is if the County grants a development permit and a
project opponent appeals, as happened in Pratt.148 In no event does
145. The California Coastal Act contains a provision demanding protection of environ-
mentally sensitive habitat areas (“ESHA”). CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30107.5.
146. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 622. The Court of Federal Claims has applied this rule for years
against the federal government. E.g., Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785, 792 (1989);
Beure-Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 42, 49 (1988); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,
15 Cl. Ct. 381, 386 (1988).
147. Saying that, however, brings to mind a period from my dim (and misspent?) past (the
1950s, I believe) when elementary school students were subjected to something called “new
math.” In an effort to clarify the concepts, Harvard mathematics expert Tom Lehrer explained:
“But in the new approach, as you know, the important thing is to understand what you’re
doing, rather than to get the right answer.” TOM LEHRER, New Math, on THAT WAS THE YEAR
THAT WAS (Reprise/Warner Bros. Records 1965).
148. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30603(a).
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Pratt have the ability to present an application directly to the
Coastal Commission.149
Thus, unlike City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,150 it is virtually
impossible for Pratt to receive repeated plan rejections from the
same regulatory body, in this instance the Coastal Commission. As
noted above, however, the scrutiny given by the commission in this
one intense experience was the equivalent of multiple plan applica-
tions and rejections. If the commission cannot be called to account
in this situation, then the Court may as well issue it a certificate of
Fifth Amendment immunity because it is unlikely that any compen-
sation case will ever ripen against it.151
“Ripeness” should not be a game. To Pratt and other land develop-
ers, it feels as though that is what it has become for regulators.152
After three decades of planning efforts, on a project that reduced the
proposed density of the project from 149 homes to 41 homes and from
a design that virtually covered the property with houses to one that
leaves 80% of it undeveloped, the courts held that this case was still
not ripe. On the contrary, litigation may be the only thing it is ripe for.
As Palazzolo puts it, the point of a ripeness investigation is to make
sure that the regulator’s intentions with regard to the property are
known with a “reasonable degree of certainty;”153 not “complete” cer-
tainty but a “reasonable degree” thereof. The law cannot demand
more. It is law after all (or, perhaps, planning), not rocket science.
Pragmatic evaluation must be the hallmark. The facts in Pratt
showed that rigid enforcement of a “more than one” application rule
will neither answer the ripeness question nor achieve a just result.
The Coastal Commission’s hostility to the development of Pratt’s
parcel was clear in the staff report which, among other things,
equated “development” with “habitat degradation” and viewed the
Pratt property as some variety of ecological wallpaper for others to
149. Id. § 30603.
150. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
151. The Coastal Commission’s most famous case, of course, was Nollan, 483 U.S. 825
(1987). It lost on Fifth Amendment grounds but no compensation was sought in that case.
152. Justice Brennan described a famous incident in which a prominent government lawyer
waxed exuberantly over the “gaming” aspects of the ripeness system and over the ability to
keep property owners running like hamsters on a wheel. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City
of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22 (1981) (dissenting opinion). Since Justice Brennan
brought the “games” to light, government lawyers’ public acknowledgment of their gamesman-
ship has gone to ground. But the “games” remain afoot.
153. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001).
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enjoy as “an open space backdrop” for their own homes. It also sought
to “preserve” habitat for species never seen on the property.154
If the concept of ripeness in regulatory takings cases is to have any
meaning, it must be grounded in pragmatism and freed of rigidity.
As Pratt shows, the record of a single permit consideration can be
sufficient to prove there is a “final” determination of what use will
be allowed on the property.
Sometimes you just have to shake your head at some boneheaded
administrative action. And that suffices to clear the cobwebs until
you turn around and find some court approving an action while
agreeing that it is wrong—sometimes, very wrong. Galland was a
very different kind of case. Yet, at its heart, it bore a kinship to all
of the regulatory cases in this category. It was a rent-control case.
The trial court found, on ample evidence, that the process through
which the City of Clovis ground down Mr. and Mrs. Galland for
years—in their futile efforts to obtain city approval for minor rent
increases for their mobile-home park—was so grotesquely unfair
that it violated both procedural and substantive due process, result-
ing in rents that were confiscatory. The Court of Appeal affirmed a
compensatory award under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The California Supreme Court, over two strong dissents, reversed.155
Even the majority opinion conceded that the City’s demands were
“shifting, costly, and at times ill-considered;”156 and the most posi-
tive spin it could put on the City’s actions was to describe them as
“bureaucratic bungling.”157 Nonetheless, the California majority
created a new “relief” process so Byzantine that it was no relief at all.
The Gallands were denied their compensatory award under section
1983 and told to pursue further rent adjustments with the city. They
were directed to resubmit themselves to the same people who had
treated them arbitrarily and ask again for their help. Justice Brown’s
dissent highlighted the perversity:
[F]laws in Clovis’s rent adjustment mechanism are the very basis
of the due process claim. In this circumstance, it defies logic to
impose the remedy of further rent adjustment proceedings. Further
154. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 695 (noting that the City sought to create a habitat
for a butterfly not found on the property).
155. Galland v. City of Clovis, 24 Cal. 4th 1003 (2001).
156. Id. at 1037.
157. Id. at 1036.
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administrative proceedings cannot possibly compensate for an
injury caused by excessive administrative proceedings.158
In a nutshell, the “remedy” devised by the California Supreme
Court requires property owners to jump through the following six (and
likely more) state procedural hoops before they can invoke their federal
section 1983 remedy.159 (1) Seek approval of a rent increase from the
rent-control commission. If dissatisfied, (2) appeal that to the city
council.160 If still dissatisfied, (3) seek a writ of administrative mandate
from the superior court to review the city council’s decision.161 If such
review determined that the denial of a rent increase was confiscatory,
then (4) return to the rent-control commission to seek a “Kavanau
adjustment.”162 If still turned down, then (5) appeal again to the city
council.163 If still dissatisfied, then (6) seek a writ of administrative
mandate from the superior court to determine whether the result
(even with a Kavanau adjustment) is still confiscatory.164 Only after
successful conclusion of this administrative and judicial “remedial”
gauntlet, would the property owners be permitted for the first time to
(7) pursue, in a third lawsuit, a damages remedy under section 1983—
unless, by that time, they have exhausted not only these state precon-
ditions to sue but themselves and their bank accounts, as well.165
V. WHAT’S UP WITH RIPENESS?
I know, I know; what else is there to say about ripeness? But I can-
not ruminate about takings issues without at least touching on this
158. Id. at 1048 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
159. Please recall that, even at that time, it had been settled that “[i]t is no answer that
the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary
to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one
is invoked.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). See also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,
148 (Civil Rights Act remedies “are judicially enforceable in the first instance.”).
160. If the city council remands to the rent-control commission, it would revert the process
back to step one, to begin again and adding more administrative steps.
161. This could, of course, lead to two additional litigation steps, in the court of appeal and
the state supreme court—a process that could consume years.
162. In Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997), the California
Supreme Court created a process for a landlord to seek an upward rent adjustment if the
impact of the regulation was too great.
163. See supra note 160.
164. See supra note 161.
165. This, of course, would provide proof for Bosselman’s theory about the Byzantine
process being the antithesis of due process. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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one. Actually, I don’t think I am constitutionally capable of not
doing so.166 The core ripeness issue is one that has caused confusion
and injustice since the Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank.167 The
issue is whether property owners who claimed that government ac-
tion took their property without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment have the right—like other constitutional
claimants—to have their cases decided on the merits in federal
courts.168 The decisions by lower state and federal courts have been
confusing and unjust. The only consistency about them is that they
have deprived property owners of access to the federal courts, while
saying that they are applying a rule that will “ripen” the cases for
federal court litigation.
For more than three decades, the judiciary in this country has
been hamstrung in its ability to properly adjudicate federal takings
claims because of the decision in Williamson County. Lower federal
166. For more detailed discussion, see my earlier ripeness writings: MICHAEL M. BERGER,
WASH. LEGAL FOUND., REGULATORY TAKINGS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: A CONSTITU-
TIONAL PRIMER, 13–19 (1994); Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39 (1985); Michael M. Berger, The Civil Rights Act: An Alternative for
Property Owners Which Avoids Some of the Procedural Traps and Pitfalls in Traditional
‘Takings’ Litigation, 12 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 121 (May 1989); Michael M. Berger, Happy
Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-Use
Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 786–95 (1988); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need
for Takings Law Reform: A View from the Trenches—A Response to Taking Stock of the
Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837 (1998); Michael M. Berger & Daniel R. Mandelker,
A Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings, 42 LAND USE L.
& ZONING DIG. 3 (Jan. 1990); Michael M. Berger, Property Rights and Takings Law: Y2K and
Beyond, 2002 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN 4–1; Michael M. Berger, The
Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still Forced to Play? 30 TOURO L. REV. 297 (2014); Michael M.
Berger, The “Ripeness” Mess in Federal Land Use Cases or How the Supreme Court Converted
Federal Judges into Fruit Peddlers, 1991 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN 7–1;
Michael M. Berger, “Ripeness” Test for Land Use Cases Needs Reform: Reconciling Leading
Ninth Circuit Decisions Is an Exercise in Futility, 11 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 57 (1988);
Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: Supreme
Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage,
36 URB. LAW. 671 (2004) [hereinafter Berger & Kanner, Shell Game!]; Michael M. Berger,
Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
99 (2000); Michael M. Berger, What Has San Remo Done to the Ripeness Doctrine?, 2006 INST.
ON PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN 4–1.
167. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
168. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681 (1946) (stating that the complaint, which seeks
compensation for violations of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, belongs in the federal
court if the plaintiff so chooses).
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courts have expressed frustration at their inability to adjudicate fed-
eral takings claims, with descriptions running the gamut from “odd”
and “unfortunate,”169 to “draconian,”170 to one concluding that the
situation presents “a Catch-22 for takings plaintiffs,”171 to another
describing the plaintiff as having “already passed through procedural
purgatory and wended [his or her] way to procedural hell.”172 Why
will the Supreme Court not end this national agony? Why, indeed.
Enough cases have been decided to make it clear that the law is
every bit as confusing and unjust as the commentators describe. It
is also clear that lower courts feel unable to solve the problem because
the problem stems from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. How to
bridge the “anomalous gap” in that jurisprudence, as described by
one circuit court, “is for the Supreme Court to say, not us.”173
I have included this abbreviated ripeness discussion as a plea—in
case anyone is listening—to resolve this issue at last. It is time for
the Court to reconsider Williamson County’s state court–litigation
prong, which requires a state court to confirm that there is no state
remedy for a given governmental taking of property. Only when that
occurs will a Fifth Amendment claim be “ripe” for federal court
litigation. The premise of that rule goes beyond the plain language
and meaning of the Fifth Amendment. A municipality’s taking of
private property without just compensation is complete when prop-
erty is taken and compensation is not paid by the government.174 It
does not require a judicial determination to complete, or ripen, the
taking. And, if it did, there is no reason why such a determination
must take place in state court.
The Supreme Court’s cases since Williamson County have shown
the need to disapprove the state court–litigation requirement. First,
in City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons,175 the Court
169. Fields v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1306, 1307 (11th Cir. 1992).
170. Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852, 861 (9th Cir. 1995).
171. Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2003).
172. Front Royal & Warren Cty. Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275,
283–84 (4th Cir. 1998). A collection of the harshly critical analyses directed at Williamson
County, 472 U.S., by commentators from all parts of the jurisprudential spectrum—even those
who agree that the litigation belongs in state court—appears in Berger & Kanner, Shell
Game!, supra note 166, at 702–03.
173. Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002).
174. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 320
n.10 (1987) (stating “an illegitimate taking might not occur until the government refuses to pay”).
175. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
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authorized a municipal defendant who was sued for a taking in
state court to remove the case to federal court, even though removal
would be proper only if the plaintiff could have brought suit in fed-
eral court in the first place176—something Williamson County forbids.
Second, in San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco,177 the
Court held that, once a case is brought and tried in state court—as
commanded by Williamson County—issue preclusion would prevent
prosecuting such a case in federal court. Four concurring Justices
urged reconsideration of Williamson County.178 Third, in Horne v.
United States Department of Agriculture,179 the Court concluded
that, once there has been a taking without payment, a proper consti-
tutional claim has been presented, without the need for further
“ripening.” In these three post–Williamson County opinions, the
Court has eliminated any jurisprudential basis for continuing to
hew to that plainly outmoded precedent.
No other constitutionally protected right is subjected to state
court “ripening” as a condition precedent to sue in federal court. If
the Fifth Amendment’s protection of property is truly no “poor rela-
tion” to the rest of the protected rights, as the Court proclaimed in
Dolan v. City of Tigard,180 then its holders are entitled to equal
access to federal courts. Deferring to state courts is tantamount to
granting states a veto over access to federal court, making them de
facto gatekeepers to the federal courts. The Court has repeatedly
concluded that “Congress surely did not intend to assign to state
courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of
defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause
of action.”181 Mandating suit in state court embeds into the Fifth
Amendment a remedial requirement, when the just compensation
language should be a limitation on the government’s power not an
invitation to sue for payment. In the words of a leading treatise, “[i]f
there is a reason why free speech cases are heard by federal judges
with alacrity and property rights cases receive the treatment indi-
cated above [i.e., the diversion to state courts], it is not readily
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
177. San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
178. Id. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and joined by three others).
179.  Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 n.6 (2013).
180. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
181. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 144 (1988) (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269
(1985)).
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discernible from the Constitution.”182 The Just Compensation Clause
is self-executing.183
There is an additional reason not to require state court litigation
to ripen the federal-constitutional issue. Williamson County was
brought under the Federal Civil Rights Act,184 as many regulatory
takings cases are. Such cases are probably the worst scenarios in
which to inject a state court–litigation requirement. As the Court
has held, the point of the civil rights legislation was to “interpose
the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians
of the people’s federal rights.”185 It was not intended to work the
other way round—by interposing state courts between the federal
courts and the people in order to restrict the people’s federal rights.
Williamson County’s state court–litigation mandate inverted this
basic building block of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: it interposed state courts
to shield municipalities from federal accountability. It is time for the
Court to end this practice.
That property owners have been singled out is clear.186 As one
commentator concluded, “[t]he state compensation portion of [Wil-
liamson County] finds no parallel in the ripeness cases from other
areas of the law”187—no parallel, indeed. The settled rule in other
areas of substantive litigation under section 1983 is that the federal
182. STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 1070 (2d ed. 2001). For a graphic illustration
of the Fifth Amendment/First Amendment differentiation, see National Advertising v. City
of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1991). This case challenged an amortization ordinance
aimed at ridding the city of billboards over a five-year period. The complaint charged
violations of both the Fifth and First Amendments. The property owner lost on all counts, but
the important thing for this discussion is that it took the court many pages of tortured
analysis before it concluded that the Fifth Amendment claim was barred by the statute of
limitations while the court wasted almost no time concluding that the First Amendment claim
could not be so barred.
183. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315
(1987).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
185. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972).
186. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.24, at 2–32 (5th ed. 2003) (“The
Supreme Court has adopted a special set of ripeness rules to determine whether federal courts
can hear land use cases.”); John Delaney & Duane Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up The “Ripe-
ness Mess”? A Call For Reform so Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31
URB. LAW. 195, 196 (1999) (“[T]he ripeness and abstention doctrines have uniquely denied
property owners, unlike the bearers of other constitutional rights, access to the federal courts
on their federal claims.”).
187. Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 23 (1995).
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forum is available at the plaintiff’s demand, regardless of alterna-
tive remedies under state law:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused
before the federal one is invoked.188
Precedents are not cast away lightly. The Court, however, has
done so when scholars have been sharply critical of decisions,189
when the application of a precedent has produced a rule that “stands
only as a trap for the unwary,”190 when necessary to clarify the
implications of earlier decisions,191 when decisions of the Court are
“if not directly . . . [conflicting,] are so in principle,”192 or when “the
answer suggested by [the Court’s] prior opinions is not free of ambi-
guity.”193 It is time for Williamson County to go. It may be that the
Supreme Court agrees. As this Article goes to press, the Court has
granted certiorari in Knick v. Township of Scott194 for the sole (stated)
reason of reconsidering this aspect of Williamson County.
VI. DOES “PROGRESSIVE” PROPERTY THEORY COMPORT WITH THE
CONSTITUTION?
Recently,195 a new group of scholars has arisen. This group views
property not so much as something that can be owned by individuals
and used at their will as something that can be put to generally useful,
societal purposes. They begin, of course, by redefining property, be-
cause control over the meaning of words is paramount to any debate
over their content.196 If I get to tell you to ignore two centuries of
188. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
189. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48 (1977).
190. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
191. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 207 (1967).
192. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 374 (1933).
193. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 136 (1981).
194. Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1262
(2018) (No.17-647).
195. In the context of property law, anything within the last half century qualifies as
“recently.”
196. For an earlier and more expansively critical discussion of this kind of analysis by
definitional ipse dixit, see Berger, To Regulate or Not, supra note 71.
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judicial explications of the meaning and content of “property,” and
to substitute something wholly different in its stead, then I have
gone a long way toward remaking our system of property rights and
perforce their protection. The idea that the affixing of labels is
critical to governance is of ancient lineage:
When the Prince of Wei needed advice on sound governance, he
asked Confucius what is the most important function of govern-
ment. The wise one responded that the most important function
of government is to see to it that things are called by their
proper names.197
As one prominent, scholarly ensemble puts it, “[p]roperty impli-
cates plural and incommensurable values.”198 But that assessment
is argle-bargle, because “incommensurable” necessarily means things
that have nothing in common and no common basis of comparison.199
Thus, instead of dealing with recognized (or at least recognizable)
items, the progressive definition of property has it that property
consists of things that are, by definition, disparate.
Progressive redefining leads to very different analyses of both the
Constitution and the case law interpreting and applying the Consti-
tution. Indeed, at times, it appears to be a different language.200
Let’s be clear. The evident goal of the so-called progressive-property
theorists is to remove protection from individual property owners
and transfer control over property to the state in an ever-increasing
degree. In other words, the “progress” they seek is to eliminate con-
stitutional protections that theorists and courts have historically
viewed as inherent in the Fifth Amendment’s protection of the rights
of property owners. It has been settled for years that the Bill of
197. Gideon Kanner, Confucius Say . . ., GIDEON’S TRUMPET (June 20, 2016), http://gideons
trumpet.info/2016/06/confucius-say (citing CONFUCIUS, ANALECTS, bk. XIII, ch. 4:4–7).
198. Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S.
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009).
199. Incommensurable, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/incommensurable (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). Argle-bargle, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTION-
ARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/argle-bargle (last visited July 24, 2018)
(meaning copious but meaningless talk or writing; nonsense). For legal usage, see United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 799 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. For a recent illustration of the stark differences, compare, for example, Joseph
William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601 (2015), with Berger,
Property, supra note 10.
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Rights was adopted to protect individuals against the government,
the few against the many, individuals against the collective—not
the other way round.201 As Justice Douglas put it, “[t]he Constitu-
tion and the Bill of Rights were designed to get Government off the
backs of the people.”202 This is neither a liberal nor a conservative
proposition, and it applies as much to protecting criminal defendants
as to protecting law-abiding property owners and others.203
It is not that progressives do not understand the concept of prop-
erty ownership. They understand quite well. They just don’t like it
and want to change it because the traditional definition places the
benefits of property ownership with the property owner.204 In place
of that, they would change the slope of the playing field in order to
emphasize values like human dignity, social obligations, democratic
governance, community relationships, and biodiversity.205 All of this
would be crammed into the concept of property ownership. Why?
Because “lawmakers can define ownership in many ways, and
fashioning rules or standards on the meaning of ownership there-
fore inevitably requires lawmakers to make value choices.”206 Here
is how they justify making quick, definitional changes to this funda-
mental concept of our constitutional system: it is just a question of
values, and we are always free to adopt new values. This is how
they put it:
201. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). See JAMES W. ELY, JR.,
THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 4 (3d ed. 2008) (The Fifth Amendment is “designed to
limit the scope of majority rule . . . .”).
202. Letter from Justice Douglas to the Young Lawyers Section of the Washington State Bar
Association (1976), quoted in NAT HENTOFF, LIVING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2 (Harper Collins 1998).
203. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
204. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT 6 (2000) (“If property means
ownership, and if ownership means power without obligation, then we have created a
framework for thinking about property that privileges a certain form of life—the life of the
owner.”); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 747 (2009) (“The core image of property rights, in the minds of most
people, is that the owner has a right to exclude others and owes no further obligation to them.
That image is highly misleading.”). Compare these examples with the CAL. CIV. CODE § 654,
which defines “property” as “the right of one or more persons to possess and use it to the
exclusion of others.”
205. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Ownership and Human Flourishing: An Exploratory
Overview, 24 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 430, 435–40 (2013).
206. Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 162 (2016).
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The current set of property rules resulted from value choices;
therefore, continuing open conversations about the reasons for
preferring one set of rules or standards over the alternatives are
paramount.207
The problem with treating the entirety of “property” as some sort
of fluid concept that can be altered at will is that time tends to vest
rights, and those that have been recognized and protected for many
years are not so easily uprooted as one might think. As Justice
Cardozo remarked: “Deep into the soil go the roots of the words in
which the rights of the owners of the soil find expression in the law.
We do not readily uproot the growths of centuries.”208
Indeed, one of the leaders of the progressive movement had to
redefine the concept of “constitutional” in order to make it fit the
progressive mode. Rather than using the concept of “constitutional”
to refer to the Constitution and those rights vouchsafed by it, the
concept has been transmogrified to this:
By constitutional I do not mean to refer only to constitutional
law, but to the fact that property institutions are fundamental
to social life, moral norms, political power, and the rule of law.209
Those things may all be relevant subjects for a social or political
science seminar, but it transforms (indeed, adulterates) the concept
of a “constitutional” right. It blends the concept with social, moral, and
political issues that inherently vary from time to time and from person
to person, rather than allowing the concept to remain rooted in our
founding document. While each definition of “property” has an impor-
tant role in American society, the individual notions of creative
professors should not be used to describe other people’s “property.”
207. Id. at 162; see Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Takings of Sensitive Lands, 43
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 77, 120 (1995) (Courts “must at all times keep one eye on the community and
its evolving norms and expectations.”).
208. Techt v. Hughes, 128 N.E. 185, 191 (N.Y. 1920); see also Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v.
Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1920) (Black, J.) (“Concepts of real property are deeply rooted
in state traditions, customs, habits, and laws.”); City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212
U.S. 1, 18 (1909) (“[O]ur social system rests largely upon the sanctity of private property, and the
State or community which seeks to invade it will soon discover the error in the disaster which
follows.”); Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904) (Holmes, J.) (“[P]roperty is protected because
such protection answers a demand of human nature, and therefore takes the place of a fight.”).
209. Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1299
(2014).
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Nor are such definitions part of legal “constitutional” analysis be-
cause the terms can become so malleable that they can mean virtu-
ally anything the speaker wants them to. When Keats wrote “beauty
is truth, truth beauty,”210 it was a lyrical use of language, but not
very explanatory, as each term is too pliant to pin down.
This progressive theory may not actually be so new after all. Lewis
Carroll derided it more than a century and a half ago, sarcastically
putting these words in Humpty Dumpty’s mouth:
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor
less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean
so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—
that’s all.”211
How is continuously looking for ways to change the rules a “pro-
gressive” or even a proper or worthwhile thing to do? Particularly
when rule changes are sought in ways that cause harm to those whose
rights were stable under the old rules, one would think that theorists
who profess to be concerned about “individuals” and “democratic” pre-
cepts would be wary.212 A prime rule of American civilization is that
we don’t change the rules while the game is in progress.213 There are
good reasons for that, but they have their origins in the idea that peo-
ple should be able to rest secure that what is theirs when they go to
sleep will still be theirs when they wake up. As Professor Callies put
210. John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, 15 ANNALS OF FINE ARTS, Jan. 1820, reprinted
online under John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, POETRY FOUNDATION, https://www.poetry
foundation.org/poems/44477/ode-on-a-grecian-urn (last visited June 6, 2018).
211. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (Macmillan 1872).
212. E.g., Gregory S. Alexander et al., supra note 198 at 743–44; Rashmi Dyal-Chand,
Pragmatism and Postcolonialism: Protecting Non-Owners in Property Law, 63 AM. U. L. REV.
1683, 1742–45 (2014); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Progressive Property Moving Forward, 5 CALIF.
L. REV. CIR. 349, 354 (2014); Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE
L.J. 1287, 1299 (2014); Joseph William Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society
Needs Law, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 142 (2012); Andre van der Walt, The Modest
Systemic Status of Property Rights, 1 J.L. PROP. & SOC’Y 15, 92 (2014).
213. Do you really need a citation of authority for this?
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it, “The point is simple: the Constitution, not ever-evolving policy
considerations, should inform the Court’s opinions.”214
We are talking about rules that are so basic that most children
are able to understand them. Distinguishing between the concepts
“mine” and “not mine” is something that is supposed to occur in the
preschool years. Sometimes some of us forget those early play-
ground lessons. The concept is easy: if it is “mine,” I get to play with
it and you don’t, unless I approve. Professor Kochan has compared
the traditional definitions of rights and duties, devised by Professor
Hohfeld, with the basic precepts of child psychology and has found
much commonality:
Sharing starts to seem more acceptable to a child when a child
understands their reciprocal claims and obligations regarding
owned things. In other words, we are more willing to share once we
know three things: (1) we can get our things back; (2) we can set
the terms and conditions of sharing; and (3) the sharee must accept
the bitter with the sweet in sharing and abide by the owner’s
terms if the sharee wishes to have the benefit of using, possessing,
or accessing the property of another. We are more willing to share
when there are strong property norms, backed by the confidence
generated by strong property rights enforcement mechanisms.215
If you insist on taking it from me, then you need to pay me.216 When
that concept gets tangled up with emotional issues like endangered
species, climate change, or equal access to facilities, however, some
people’s vision tends to glaze over. They wrap themselves in global
homilies and talk as though what is “mine” is actually not.217 But
that is a revolutionary thought.
Our constitutional system is based, in significant part, on the idea
that property can be privately owned—and can be used by its own-
ers. But it seems hard for some people to remain clear about it or
214. David Callies & Calvert G. Chipchase, Moratoria and Musings on Regulatory Takings,
25 U. HAW. L. REV. 279, 282 (2003).
215. Donald J. Kochan, I Share, Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 909, 924 (2017)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
216. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
217. Ironically, people who do so are often wealthy and tend to scream bloody murder were
someone to interfere with their ample assets. See BERNARD FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION HUSTLE (1979); William Tucker, Environmentalism and the Leisure Class,
HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Dec. 1977, at 49.
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content with it, at least as long as the property in question belongs
to somebody else.
CONCLUSION
One of the things that demonstrates how far David Callies has
come since those self-styled, pro-environmental “screeds” of the 1970s
is that he has been publicly attacked by environmentalists for having
the nerve to express in print his beliefs about the rights of property
owners. I will close with this quote from him that I found in a Hono-
lulu newspaper responding to one such attack:
I make no apologies for attempting to defend the rights of all
landowners to use their property. The U.S. Supreme Court has
equated protection of such rights with civil rights like freedom
of press, expression, and security against unreasonable search and
seizure. I agree. The use of land is not a privilege but a right.218
That is the real David Callies. I am proud to have been part of the
symposium in his honor.
218. David Callies, Environmental Lawyers Off Target with Criticism of Callies, HONOLULU
CIVIL BEAT, Mar. 6, 2013, http://www.civilbeat.org/2013/03/18533-environmental-lawyers-off
-target-with-criticism-of-callies/.

DAVID CALLIES AND THE FUTURE OF LAND USE
REGULATIONS
JAMES W. ELY JR.*
It is a privilege to acknowledge the enormous contribution of
David L. Callies to our understanding of property rights and land
use regulations. He has long wrestled with the relationship between
the rights of individual owners and the concerns of the community,
and has given thoughtful attention to current environmental issues
such as hydraulic fracking.1 Moreover, the range of his scholarship
has been impressive and far-reaching. In addition to numerous legal
articles, Callies has authored innovative books2 and remained active
in bar association and law reform affairs. As I was preparing for the
first edition of The Guardian of Every Other Right,3 I came across
his 1988 article with the plaintive title “Property Rights: Are There
Any Left?”4 This piece has always resonated with me, perhaps be-
cause it captured my mood at the time. Despite the then-recent
Supreme Court decisions in Loretto5 and Nollan,6 Callies was skepti-
cal that the Court had meaningfully checked the erosion of private
property rights. But he bravely concluded:
Although we probably must regulate, it is worth taking care that
in this period of critical examination of our constitutional values
* Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law, Emeritus, and Professor of History, Emeritus,
Vanderbilt University. This article is an expanded version of remarks presented at the
Fourteenth Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at the College of William
& Mary on October 12, 2017. I am grateful to Jon W. Bruce for helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this essay.
1. David L. Callies & Chynna Stone, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 1 J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1 (2014).
2. E.g., FRED BOSSELMAN, DAVID CALLIES, & JOHN BANTA, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
THE TAKINGS ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROLS
(1973); DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
(2006); DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & SHELLEY SAXER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LAND USE (7th ed. 2017); TAKING LAND: COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND LAND USE REGULATION
IN ASIAN-PACIFIC COUNTRIES (Tsuyoshi Kotaka & David L. Callies, eds., 2002).
3. JAMES W. ELY JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2008).
4. David L. Callies, Property Rights: Are There Any Left?, 20 URB. LAW. 597 (1988).
5. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that
any permanent physical occupation of property amounted to a compensable taking).
6. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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and protections, we do not lose by degrees what our founding
fathers sought to protect in a more simple time and more rural
place. There are many values enshrined in that Constitution.
Lest we forget, private property is one of them.7
My purpose, however, is not just to praise Callies for his fine schol-
arship but to build upon his work to assess future developments in
the land use field. This, of course, is a hazardous assignment. I am
skeptical that persons like myself, trained in history, possess any
unique crystal ball to read the future. This challenge is compounded,
moreover, by the fact that in 2014 Callies authored a comprehensive
article in which he offered predictions for future developments in
the field of land use law.8 It is a daunting task to compete with that
erudite piece.
Throwing caution to the winds, I will start by considering some of
Callies’s predictions in light of subsequent decisions. He maintained
that the Nollan-Dolan-Koontz line of cases, limiting land-develop-
ment conditions, such as exactions and impact fees, would prompt
continued judicial scrutiny.9 That would certainly seem to be the case.
Litigation abounds on the constitutionality of imposed conditions.
A few examples must suffice. At issue in Horne v. Department of
Agriculture was a marketing order under a 1937 agricultural mar-
keting act, which required the growers of raisins to deliver a portion
of their crop to the government, free of charge.10 The Ninth Circuit
7. Callies, supra note 4, at 645.
8. David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use Takings
Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43 (2014).
9. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (1987) (determining that building permit conditions must have
an “essential nexus” to the impact of the proposed project); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 391 (1994) (holding that there must be “rough proportionality” between exactions and
proposed development); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013)
(ruling that Nollan-Dolan apply when a building permit is denied as well as when permit is
granted with conditions, and that monetary exactions are subject to the same heightened
scrutiny). This trilogy of cases establish the parameters governing exactions that may be
constitutionally required of developers.
On remand in Koontz, the Florida District Court of Appeal found that conditioning the
grant of a land use permit upon the landowner funding an offsite mitigation project
constituted a taking of property. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 183 So. 3d 396, 397 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2014), rev. denied, 2016 WL 688284 (Fla. 2016). For a helpful analysis
of Koontz, see Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the ‘Poor Relation’ of Constitutional Law:
Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, 2012–2013 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 215, 226–41.
10. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
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Court of Appeals upheld the validity of this scheme against a takings
challenge, determining that personal property received less protec-
tion than land under the Takings Clause, and analyzing the set-aside
requirement as akin to a government-imposed condition on the grant
of a land use permit.11 Rejecting this analysis, the Supreme Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, ruled that the government’s
action amounted to the physical appropriation of personal property
and was therefore a per se taking of property.12 The Horne decision
not only confined the application of the land use–exaction cases to
regulatory takings but rejected the bizarre contention that personal
property was somehow afforded less protection than real property
under the Fifth Amendment against physical dispossession.13
Rental practices provide another example. In 2014, a federal dis-
trict court in California considered yet another in a long line of San
Francisco ordinances purporting to deal with rental-housing short-
ages and high market values by placing financial burdens on land-
lords.14 Before the court was an ordinance requiring landowners who
wished to withdraw rent-controlled properties from the housing
market—which was their right under state law—to pay hugely en-
hanced payments, potentially involving hundreds of thousands of
dollars, to the displaced tenants. The district court held that the
ordinance ran afoul of the Nollan-Dolan nexus and proportionality
tests, and emphasized that under Koontz monetary exactions must
also satisfy these tests. It found no nexus between the enhanced
payments and the owner’s proposed change in land use, concluding
that the ordinance “seeks to force the property owner to pay for a
broad public problem not of the owner’s making.”15 The real-world
impact of Nollan-Dolan-Koontz on exactions has been mixed, but in
this instance they had some bite.
11. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014).
12. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2428, 2430–31.
13. Id. at 2426–28. See 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED STATES 51 (3d ed. 1909) (“The Constitution protects personalty as fully as real estate.”).
14. Levin v. City & County of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2014), appeal
dismissed as moot, 2017 WL 957211 (9th Cir. 2017), and declining to vacate judgement, 2017
WL 2335358 (N.D. Cal. 2017). While the appeal was pending, the city sufficiently amended
the ordinance to present a different controversy from the one originally adjudicated. A
California court ruled that the revised ordinance imposed a “prohibitive price” on the right
of a landlord to exit the residential housing market by mandating relocation payments to
displaced tenants, and was preempted by state law. Coyne v. City & County of San Francisco,
9 Cal. App. 5th 1215, 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589 (1st Dist. 2017) (review denied June 28, 2017).
15. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1086.
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An allied issue relates to the spread of inclusionary zoning. As
land values and housing costs have increased markedly in many
urban areas, a number of cities are facing a shortage of affordable
housing. They have responded by adopting policies to create less
expensive housing.16 Inclusionary zoning requires developers to set
aside a number of residential units for sale or rent at below-market
prices or to contribute to a fund for the construction of such housing.
A threshold question is whether such requirements are exactions
subject to Nollan-Dolan-Koontz limitations.17 One obvious problem
is that the private developer is not responsible for the lack of afford-
able housing in the community, and so the “essential nexus” test
may not be satisfied. Callies argues convincingly that inclusionary
zoning should be viewed as a type of exaction, which would pass con-
stitutional muster only if the municipality can demonstrate a clear
nexus between the proposed development and the affordable hous-
ing shortage and the developer receives a meaningful incentive,
such as a density bonus or tax abatement.18 He cautions that unduly
onerous requirements are likely to discourage development and thus
render any inclusionary program meaningless. To date there has
been relatively little litigation challenging inclusionary zoning,
much of it from California. Still, inclusionary zoning is bound to
trigger increasing judicial scrutiny. Given the uncertainty about the
application of the nexus and proportionality tests, as well as the
unsettled ramifications of Koontz, exactions will no doubt provide a
fertile field for future litigation.
In this connection, Callies also considers whether the constitu-
tional limitations on exactions should apply when imposed by general
legislation on property as well as when imposed by administrative
determinations on individual projects. The Supreme Court has never
squarely addressed this question, and lower courts remain sharply
divided on this point.19
16. See, e.g., Scott Calvert & Laura Kusisto, Newly Hot Locals Battle to Curb Cost of
Housing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2018.
17. Audrey G. McFarlane & Randall K. Johnson, Cities, Inclusion and Exactions, 102
IOWA L. REV. 2145, 2168–84 (2017) (considering whether inclusionary zoning should be
treated as ordinary land use regulation or as exaction).
18. Callies, supra note 8, at 55–60; David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land
Development Conditions, 42/43 URB. LAW. 307, 312–28 (2011).
19. Christina M. Martin, Nollan, Dolan and Koontz—Oh My! The Exactions Trilogy
Requires Developers to Cover the Full Social Costs of Their Projects, But No More, 51
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A number of courts have declined to apply Nollan-Dolan-Koontz
to conditions imposed legislatively.20 California courts, for instance,
have confined the reach of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
to burdens imposed by ad hoc administrative decisions.21 In 2016, a
California appellate court upheld the validity of an in-lieu-fee exac-
tion imposed on a developer under the state’s Mitigation Fee Act.
The purpose of the in-lieu fee was to help address the shortage of
affordable housing in the community, not to defray the increased
public costs arising from the specific development project.22 Adher-
ing to the prevailing rule in California, the court found that Nollan-
Dolan-Koontz limitations were inapplicable because the fee was
imposed legislatively.23 The effect of this decision, of course, is to
limit the protective shield against the imposition of unconstitutional
conditions.
In contrast, other courts have applied the Nollan-Dolan-Koontz
standard to conditions imposed legislatively.24 The Supreme Court
of Texas sharply challenged the distinction between legislative de-
terminations and individualized decisions in the context of exactions.
The court declared:
While we recognize that an ad hoc decision is more likely to con-
stitute a taking than general legislation, we think it entirely
possible that the government could “gang up” on particular groups
to force exactions that a majority of constituents would not only
tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens they would otherwise
bear were shifted to others.
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 39, 57–58 (2014) (noting disagreement as to whether Nollan and Dolan
apply to legislatively mandated exactions).
20. See, e.g., Parking Ass’n of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 264 Ga. 764, 450 S.E.2d 200 (1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (three dissenting judges would have applied Nollan-Dolan).
21. For California’s position on the standard for the review of prescribed conditions, see
California Building Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal.4th 435, 459 n.11, 351 P.3d 974,
990 n.11 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).
22. This distinction highlights the concern that exactions may be wholly unrelated to the
impact caused by developers’ activities, and designed to impose the costs of other government
projects on developers rather than taxpayers. Martin, supra note 19, at 43–44.
23. 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood, 3 Cal. App. 5th 621, 629, 207 Cal. Rptr.
3d 729, 736 (2nd Dist. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017).
24. See, e.g., N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. Cty. of Du Page, 165 Ill. 2d 25, 649 N.E.2d 384
(1995); Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 89 Ohio
St. 3d 121, 729 N.E.2d 349 (2000).
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Nor are we convinced that a workable distinction can always be
drawn between actions denominated adjudicative and legislative.25
Applying Nollan-Dolan scrutiny, the court found that a road improve-
ment project attached as a condition for plat approval amounted to
a compensable taking of property. Such a severe split of authority
surely warrants Supreme Court review.
It is noteworthy that Justices Thomas and O’Connor have ex-
pressed their view that Nollan-Dolan should apply to both adminis-
trative and legislative determinations. They declared:
It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn upon the
type of governmental entity responsible for the taking. A city
council can take property just as a planning commission can. . . .
The distinction between sweeping legislative takings and partic-
ularized administrative takings appears to be a distinction
without a constitutional difference.26
Along the same lines, Callies concluded, correctly to my mind, that
courts should find the legislative/administrative distinction irrele-
vant.27 The purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent landowners
from being singled out to bear a burden that should be appropriately
placed on society as a whole.28 Consistent with this principle, the
judicial focus, I submit, should be upon the impact on the landowner,
not on the vehicle by which the exaction was imposed. It makes no
sense to allow localities to impose exactions legislatively that could
not pass muster if done by an administrative body.
25. Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641 (Tex. 2004).
26. Parking Ass’n of Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117–18 (1995) (dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Justice Thomas adhered to this view in California Building Industry
Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (concurring in denial of certiorari).
27. Callies, supra note 8, at 44–45, 48–51.
28. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (Black, J.) (“The Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation
was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”). See also Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (Brewer, J.) (explaining that the
just compensation principle “prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than
his just share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public
something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the public,
a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him”).
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Callies’s prediction that the Supreme Court “will soon re-exam-
ine” the controversial Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New
London29 seems more questionable.30 He is surely on sound ground
in pointing out that “the Public Use Clause is virtually eliminated
in federal courts” and that “government may once more acquire pri-
vate property by eminent domain on the slightest of public purpose
pretexts.”31 Much as I wish the Supreme Court would reconsider the
constitutionality of allowing the exercise of eminent domain for
economic development by private parties, I doubt that the Justices
will revisit the meaning of “public use” in the near future. Three of
the dissenters in Kelo have left the bench, and it is uncertain how
their replacements would vote in a “public use” case.
To be sure, as Callies noted, there was a substantial public uproar
over Kelo. Many states, by legislative enactment or constitutional
amendment, purported to reign in the exercise of eminent domain
for economic development purposes.32 The efficacy of these measures
varies widely but some appear to constitute meaningful reform.33
Moreover, state constitutional law can provide additional safeguards
against eminent domain abuse.34 A number of state constitutions
contain explicit restrictions on the exercise of eminent domain.35 In
29. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
30. Callies, supra note 8, at 45.
31. Id. at 67.
32. ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 135–80 (2015); James W. Ely Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass Half Full
or Half Empty?, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127–50 (2009).
33. See, e.g., City of Marietta v. Summerour, 807 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. 2017) (holding that the
Landowner’s Bill of Rights and Private Property Protection Act sets forth policies designed
to increase due process protections for property owners, that such statutory procedures were
binding on the city, and that the condemnation petition be dismissed for failure to comply
with statute); St. Louis Cty. v. River Bend Estates Homeowners’ Ass’n, 408 S.W.3d 116,
135–38 (Mo. 2013) (upholding the statute providing for additional compensation for taking
homesteads or property held within the same family for fifty or more years, and stating that
the statutes “promote the legislature’s intended policy of providing additional benefits to
certain property owners whose real property is taken for public use”); State of Missouri ex rel.
Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 478–82 (Mo. 2013) (construing Missouri statutes pro-
hibiting the exercise of eminent domain “for solely economic development purposes,” and
finding that the proposed condemnation by the port authority violated statute).
34. Clint Bolick, State Constitutions: Freedom’s Frontier, 2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
15, 21–22 (2017).
35. For example, the Arizona Constitution, art. 2, § 12, provides: “Whenever an attempt
is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the
contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question.” There is similar language in
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addition, state constitutional guarantees may be construed to afford
more expansive protection for property owners than their federal
counterparts.36 Indeed, some state supreme courts, invoking state
constitutional provisions, have invalidated the exercise of eminent
domain for economic development purposes, and have even looked
skeptically on so-called “blight” takings.37 I submit, therefore, that
the states are likely to emerge in the near future as the most fertile
source of efforts to curtail the reach of eminent domain.
Likewise, Callies’s optimistic insistence that the Supreme Court
“needs to, and will, resolve the so-called ‘relevant parcel’ or denomi-
nator issue, both with respect to partial and total regulatory takings,”
seems to have been wide of the mark.38 At issue in Murr v. Wisconsin
was application of a Wisconsin law that treated two adjacent sub-
standard lots with a common owner as a single lot, and barred the
separate sale or improvement of one substandard lot.39 The law, in
effect, drastically reduced the economic value of one lot. Speaking
for the Court, Justice Kennedy set forth a list of considerations to
determine the relevant parcel for regulatory takings analysis. In so
doing, he blurred the distinction between two discrete inquiries—
what is the relevant parcel and whether the regulation constitutes
several other state constitutions. See, e.g., MISS. CONST., art. 3, § 17; OKLA. CONST., art, 2, § 24;
WASH. CONST., art. 1, § 16.
36. For a classic argument urging increased reliance on state constitutional law, see
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1977).
37. See, e.g., Gallenthin Realty Dev. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344, 924 A.2d 447
(2007) (invalidating a “blight” condemnation); City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353,
853 N.E.2d 1115 (2006); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cty. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639 (Okla.
2006); Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 2006); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 471 Mich.
445, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004). This is not to suggest that all state courts are prepared to restrict
the reading of “public use” or to limit the condemnation of private property. The New York
Court of Appeals, for instance, has endorsed a broad exercise of eminent domain. In Goldstein
v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 13 N.Y.3d 511, 921 N.E.2d 472 (2009), the court
upheld the condemnation of the Atlantic Yards section in Brooklyn as a blighted area for the
purpose of transfer to a private developer to construct a sports stadium. See also Violet Dock
Port, LLC v. St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist., 239 S. 3d 243 (La. 2018) (upholding
the exercise of eminent domain to acquire a privately-owned port facility for a one-to-one
transfer to a state agency with plans to lease the acquired property to favored businesses
outside of a comprehensive redevelopment plan).
38. Callies, supra note 8, at 45.
39. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). For the background of this case, see
Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed to Clean Up
Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIB. 151, 154–61 (2017).
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a taking of that parcel. Kennedy expressly rejected reliance on state
property-law definitions to identify the property at issue for regula-
tory takings purposes.40 Viewing the parcels as merged for takings
purposes, Kennedy held that the owners were not deprived of all
economically beneficial use and that no regulatory taking occurred.
His malleable cluster of factors requires an ad hoc factual inquiry
for each case, thus providing no guidance or certainty to buyers or
landowners concerning regulatory risk. As Richard A. Epstein has
convincingly observed: “[I]t is hard to see how massive levels of ad
hocery advance any conception of fairness and justice.”41
I argue that the murky multifactor test adopted in Murr falls well
short of providing the clarification that Callies sought, and indeed
compounds the confusion in identifying the relevant parcel for regu-
latory takings analysis. Surely reliance on parcel boundaries as
defined by state law would better accord with the settled expecta-
tions of owners and would provide a readily ascertainable test for
regulatory takings purposes. Instead, Kennedy offers an amorphous,
multifactor balancing test that is virtually worthless and is likely to
disadvantage individual owners. The impact of Murr, therefore, is
to weaken the protective function of the Takings Clause.42 As Nicole
Stelle Garnett cogently pointed out, Murr “further undermined the
already enfeebled constitutional rights enjoyed by property owners
against regulatory excess.”43
There is a partial silver lining to the Murr saga. In 2017, the
Wisconsin legislature enacted a law which effectively overturned the
Supreme Court decision with respect to that jurisdiction. The law
provides that localities cannot enforce an ordinance prohibiting a
property owner from conveying or developing a substandard parcel
40. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945–47. In sharp contrast, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for three
dissenters, insisted that “[s]tate law define[ ] the boundaries of distinct parcels of land, and
those boundaries should determine the ‘private property’ at issue in regulatory takings cases”.
Id. at 1950.
41. Epstein, supra note 39, at 178.
42. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority’s
definition of the parcel “undermines the effectiveness of the Takings Clause as a check on the
government’s power to shift the cost of public life onto private individuals”).
43. Nicole Stelle Garnett, From A Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, 2016–2017
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 131 (2017). See also Stewart E. Sterk, Dueling Denominators and the
Demise of Lucas, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 90 (2018) (“But for that small group of landowners who
claim that regulation has denied them all economically productive use of land, Murr makes
their already steep uphill climb even steeper.”).
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that was of legal size when created, and bars localities from requir-
ing the merger of lots for any purpose without the consent of the
owners.44 It gives no relief, of course, to the application of the unfor-
tunate Kennedy opinion in Murr in other jurisdictions. Perhaps the
lesson is that landowners should not overlook the possibility of a
legislative remedy from onerous regulations.
Callies also takes aim at the ripeness doctrine, which often serves,
as a practical matter, to prevent claimants from litigating regulatory
takings claims on the merits in federal court. As Steven J. Eagle has
cogently explained: “Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has
established many doctrinal and procedural barriers that landowners
must confront in ascertaining and protecting their rights. Some bar-
riers are of Byzantine complexity.”45 A centerpiece in this obstacle-
labyrinth is the Supreme Court decision in Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank.46 The Court ruled
that a regulatory takings claim against a state or local government
was not “ripe” for adjudication in federal court until the claimant
was denied compensation in the state court. This requirement alone
imposed a substantial hurdle for claimants, but the Court com-
pounded the difficulty in San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San
Francisco, holding that by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Statute
takings claimants were precluded from relitigating in federal court
issues that were raised in state court actions.47 Consequently, takings
claimants are effectively denied any access to a federal forum. No
other constitutional rights are treated in such a dismissive manner.
This problematic outcome speaks volumes about the Supreme
Court’s disinterest in protecting the rights of property owners.48
Based on his review of the case law, however, Callies suggests that
the Supreme Court is in the process of weakening the ripeness
requirement, characterizing the doctrine as “prudential” rather than
“jurisdictional.”49 A recent Supreme Court decision concerning the
44. 2017–2018 Wisc. Legis. Serv. Act 67 (2017 A.B. 479) (West).
45. Steven J. Eagle, Advancing Judicial Review of Wetlands and Property Rights De-
terminations: Army Corps v. Hawkes Co., 2015–2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 257 (2016).
46. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
47. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) (construing
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-132)).
48. James W. Ely Jr., ‘Poor Relation’ Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing
Rights of Property Owners, 2004–2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 66–69 (2015) (criticizing San
Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. 323 (2005)).
49. Callies, supra note 8, at 45, 92–103.
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judicial review of a determination by the Army Corps of Engineers
under the Clean Water Act provides some indirect support for Callies’s
assessment. Called upon to review an order that stated the subject
property contained “waters of the United States,” the Supreme Court
reiterated its “pragmatic” approach to the issue of final agency action.
It rejected the government’s contention that the landowner either
must run the risk of severe criminal and civil penalties for violating
the order or must pursue an “arduous, expensive, and long” permit-
ting process before having a right to judicial review.50 This decision
should make it easier for landowners to challenge wetlands designa-
tions and might prove a harbinger for a more general review of when
takings claims can be heard in federal court.51 Indeed, in March of
2018 the Supreme Court granted review of a case raising the ques-
tion of the application of the ripeness doctrine as a bar to takings
claims in federal court.52
These brief comments hardly do justice to the balance of the 2014
article by Callies. But I would now like to offer some additional com-
ments about the future direction of property rights and land use law.
First, regulation of land use is not about to disappear. In fact, the
developmental pressure on land will almost certainly increase,
sparking calls for more controls. Indeed, I would maintain that land-
owners themselves, especially in our heavily zoned suburbs, are often
the driving force for more regulations. I detect little interest in a
free market in land. On the contrary, many residential owners seek
to escape the vicissitudes of the real estate market, valuing stability
and protection against change more highly than the right of individ-
uals to use and develop their property as they see fit. As a rule, they
are highly risk adverse. The popularity of planned communities,
which commonly place intrusive restrictions on the use of land, at-
test to the widespread acceptance of this norm.
Second, even a supposedly conservative Supreme Court has done
relatively little to safeguard property rights against regulation.53
50. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1815–16 (2016).
51. Eagle, supra note 45, at 264–65 (noting the trend toward the removal of procedural
barriers in environmental cases).
52. Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1262
(2018).
53. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN
271 (2011) (observing that by the end of the twentieth century “property rights clearly re-
ceived more protection from government regulation than they had a few decades before, but
exactly how much more was a matter of debate”).
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Perhaps this should not be a surprise. In 1987 Justice Scalia bluntly
observed: “I do not detect the sort of national commitment to most of
the economic liberties generally discussed that would enable even an
activist court to constitutionalize them.”54 He urged those interested
in the rights of property owners to remind modern society of the im-
portance of private property as a fountainhead of individual liberty.
Yet to reclaim the property-centered constitutional vision of the fram-
ers will not be an easy task. Consequently, I predict that the Supreme
Court will continue to move cautiously in this area, incrementally
strengthening the rights of owners and invalidating egregious regula-
tions but stopping short of an aggressive revival of property rights.
Third, in assessing the judicial reaction to land use controls, one
must not overlook the role of state courts. They in fact do much of
the heavy lifting. As discussed above, state courts are more likely
than their federal counterparts to put some teeth into the “public
use” limitation on the exercise of eminent domain. Now, I fully recog-
nize that state court handling of property rights claims is a mixed
bag.55 They provide little solace if you live in California. Indeed, in
1999, Callies perceptively pointed out that a number of state courts
narrowly construed the Supreme Court decisions in Nollan, Dolan,
and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,56 and rejected takings
claims.57 This melancholy trend has continued. A Lucas takings claim
can be defeated by a finding that the subject property retains some
economic value, however slight or speculative.58 Indeed, a recent
54. Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE
JUDICIARY 31, 37 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987).
55. For problematic results, see Violet Dock Port, Inc., LLC v. St. Bernard Port, Harbor
& Terminal District, 239 So. 3d 243 (La. 2018) (upholding the exercise of eminent domain to
acquire a privately-owned port facility for a one-to-one transfer to a state agency with plans
to lease the acquired property to favored private businesses outside of a comprehensive re-
development plan), and Bay Point Properties, Inc. v. Mississippi Transportation Commission,
201 So. 3d 1046 (Miss. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2002 (2017) (holding that the state agency
effected a taking of property by exceeding the scope of an express easement for highway pur-
poses to construct a public park, but denying just compensation for the unencumbered value
of the land so taken based on a state statute governing termination of highway easements).
56. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (finding that regulation that
deprived owners of “all economically beneficial or productive use of land” constituted a per se
taking of property).
57.  David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on
Property Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal
Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523, 551–74 (1999) (“Clearly, state (and some
lower federal) courts are not hearing (or not wanting to hear) the U.S. Supreme Court.”).
58. See Leone v. County of Maui, 141 Haw. 68, 404 P.3d 1257 (Haw. 2017) (reaching the
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study has pointed out that the Lucas test for a categorical regulatory
taking has been successfully invoked in only a handful of cases.59
Yet there are heartening developments as well. The practice of
state agencies, pursuant to state law, of mapping vacant lands for
possible future projects and barring the owners from developing the
designated land has long been controversial. Courts have looked
skeptically upon such mapping laws, reasoning that they deprive
the owner of the right to develop and use his or her land.60 Following
in this pattern, in 2016 the Supreme Court of North Carolina struck
a blow for property rights when it invalidated the Transportation
Corridor Official Map Act that restricted an owner’s right to im-
prove, develop, or subdivide property within a highway corridor map
for an indefinite period. Not surprisingly, it was very difficult to sell
land within a designated corridor. Designed to hold down the cost
of acquiring land for future development by freezing the status quo,
the Map Act clearly privileged the state’s budgetary concerns over
the severe economic loss inflicted on private owners. In an inverse
condemnation action, the North Carolina court determined that the
Map Act constituted a taking of property requiring the payment of
compensation. It is striking that in reaching this conclusion, the
court quoted William Blackstone, John Locke, and James Madison,
and characterized property as a “fundamental right.”61
dubious conclusion that although regulations prevented the owners from building a single-
family residence on their land such controls did not deprive them of all economically viable
use, and finding no regulatory taking).
59. Carol Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lucas:
Making or Breaking the Takings Claim, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1862–63 (2017). See also Luke
A. Wake, The Enduring (Muted) Legacy of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 28 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 40 (2017) (“At best, Lucas has proven to be only a modest gain for the
property rights movement. Even as originally conceived, the Lucas rule would only apply in
an extreme case. But, subsequent developments have significantly winnowed the field of
viable Lucas claims in many jurisdictions—both in narrowly conceiving the test and in ap-
plying the background principles exception broadly.”).
60. Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 584–85, 32 N.E. 976, 977–78 (1893) (declaring that as
the landowner “was virtually deprived of the right to build upon his lot by the statute in
question, and as this circumstance obviously impaired its value and interfered with his power
of disposition, it was to that extent void as to him”). The New York Court of Appeals adhered
to this position in Jensen v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 1079, 369 N.E.2d 1179 (1977). See
also LEWIS, supra note 13, at 431–32.
61. Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 368 N.C. 847, 786 S.E.2d 919, 923–26 (2016). See Craig
J. Richardson, Is This North Carolina or Zimbabwe? How Property Rights in North Carolina
Deteriorated to the Level of a Third-World Country, 21 INDEPENDENT REV. 587 (2017). See also
Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 563 So. 622, 623–28 (Fla. 1990) (holding that the
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One, of course, cannot assign undue significance to a single judi-
cial opinion. Nonetheless, it is promising that at least some state
courts recognize that property is a “fundamental right,”62 a position
surely in harmony with the views of the framers of the Constitution
and Bill of Rights.63 Whether such recognition will produce more
stringent judicial protection over the rights of property owners re-
mains to be seen. I submit that any broad revival of property rights
in our constitutional system must begin by reclaiming the under-
standing that private property plays a vital role in safeguarding
individual liberty. As David Callies has reminded us, “Property rights,
and in particular rights in land, have always been fundamental to
and part of the preservation of liberty and personal freedom in the
United States.”64
statute prohibiting the development of property subject to a map of reservation amounted to
an unconstitutional taking of property).
62. See also City of Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 363, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1129
(2006) (“Ohio has always considered the right of property to be a fundamental right.”).
63. Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the Legal
System of the Early American Republic, 4 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1136 (1980) (“Perhaps the most
important value of the Founding Fathers of the American constitutional period was their
belief in the necessity of securing property rights.”).
64. Callies, supra note 57, at 526. There is a large body of scholarly literature linking
private property and individual liberty. See, e.g., ELY JR., supra note 3; RICHARD PIPES, PROP-
ERTY AND FREEDOM (2000); Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic Rights and
Personal Liberty, 2003–2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 19 (“Economic rights, property rights, and
personal rights have been joined, appropriately, since the time of the founding.”).
EXACTIONS AND IMPACT FEES
SHELLEY ROSS SAXER*
INTRODUCTION
I first met Professor David Callies at a land use conference at
Chapman Law School, organized by Professor Craig “Tony” Arnold.
As a relatively new law professor, I had switched to using David’s
land use casebook for my class.1 I was delighted to meet one of the
authors of the casebook I was using. Professor Callies was one of my
legal “rock stars,” along with Professors Jesse Dukeminier, Carol
Rose, Grant Nelson, Dale Whitman, Gideon Kanner, Holly Doremus,
Joe Sax, Bob Ellickson, Richard Epstein, and others. I have since
added more “rock stars” to my list, many of whom spoke at the
Fourteenth Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference.
Because of all of those in attendance, and most of all because of
David Callies, I was honored to be a part of the conference and
journal publication.
From the beginning, David supported my work as a junior scholar
and encouraged me by introducing me to other greats, like Steve
Eagle and Michael Berger. Professor Callies and I co-authored an
article and talked about exchanging teaching assignments and houses
so that I could go to Hawai‘i and he could visit family in Los Angeles.
Although the exchange has not worked out yet, David arranged for
me to visit for a semester at University of Hawai‘i while he was on
sabbatical in 2013. During that visit, I discovered that he and I dis-
agree about one topic in land use, and I will address that issue in
this Essay. I was using Professor Callies’s property book (as agreed
in advance),2 and when covering impact fees, I discovered that he
thinks they should be subject to the Nollan/Dolan test and I do not.
This was in 2013, right before Koontz was decided. Of course, I let
* Laure Sudreau Endowed Chair, Pepperdine University School of Law. The author
thanks the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference for its support of this publication.
I would like to extend special thanks to my research assistant, Melissa Corona, who helped
edit this Essay.
1. DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & SHELLEY ROSS SAXER, CASE AND MATERIALS
ON LAND USE (7th ed. 2017).
2. DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY LAW (1st ed. 2011).
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the students know about this difference of opinion, but because I
would be grading their exams, I suggested they adopt my view for
purposes of the class. This Essay suggests that any future review by
the U.S. Supreme Court of this issue should determine that while
monetary exactions are subject to Nollan/Dolan, legislatively en-
acted impact fees are not.
I. BACKGROUND: THE NOLLAN/DOLAN/KOONTZ TRILOGY
Before discussing how courts, practitioners, and academics have
interpreted the judicial scrutiny requirements for exactions and, by
extension, for impact fees, this section will focus on the major U.S.
Supreme Court cases addressing the issue. In addition to Nollan,
Dolan, and Koontz, I will also discuss Horne and Lingle as they re-
late to the Court’s takings jurisprudence for exactions.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Nollans submit-
ted a permit application for coastal development to the California
Coastal Commission, where they proposed to demolish their current
property to rebuild a new property.3 The commission recommended
that the permit be granted, subject to the condition that the Nollans
allow the public an easement to pass laterally across their property.4
The Nollans objected to the condition, but the commission overruled
the objections and granted the permit subject to the Nollans’ recorda-
tion of a deed restriction granting the easement.5 The Supreme Court
noted that the commission could not require the Nollans to convey
this easement without paying just compensation but that it could deny
the permit “outright if their new house (alone, or by reason of the
cumulative impact produced in conjunction with other construction)
would substantially impede” legitimate state interests.6 Therefore,
if the commission required the Nollans to convey the easement as
a condition for obtaining a land use permit, then such “a permit con-
dition that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a re-
fusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the
refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking.”7 However,
3. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 835–36.
7. Id. at 836.
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a permit denial that “would interfere so drastically with the Nollans’
use of their property as to constitute a taking” would be compensa-
ble under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.8 The
Nollan Court explained:
[T]he Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the
Nollans their permit outright if their new house (alone, or by
reason of the cumulative impact produced in conjunction with
other construction) would substantially impede [legitimate state]
purposes, unless the denial would interfere so drastically with
the Nollans’ use of their property as to constitute a taking.
The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the
same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the
permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue
the permit would not constitute a taking. We agree. . . . More-
over (and here we come closer to the facts of the present case),
the condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the
requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their
property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their
new house would interfere. Although such a requirement, consti-
tuting a permanent grant of continuous access to the property,
would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached to
a development permit, the Commission’s assumed power to for-
bid construction of the house in order to protect the public’s view
of the beach must surely include the power to condition construc-
tion upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of
property rights, that serves the same end. If a prohibition de-
signed to accomplish that purpose would be a legitimate exercise
of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange to
conclude that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibi-
tion which accomplishes the same purpose is not.
The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the
condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the
end advanced as the justification for the prohibition. . . . In short,
unless the permit condition serves the same governmental pur-
pose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid
regulation of land use but “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”9
8. Id. (referencing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
9. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835–37 (1987) (footnotes omitted) (citations
omitted) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584 (1981)).
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In Nollan, the Court held that because the demand for an ease-
ment was a condition for granting a development permit that the
government could otherwise deny the easement condition would not
be a taking so long as it satisfied the same purpose achieved by a per-
mit denial.10 This “essential nexus” requires that in order to substi-
tute the exaction for the permit denial, the exaction must “further
the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.”11
The Dolan v. City of Tigard12 decision used the same premise as
Nollan “that, had the government simply appropriated the easement
in question, this would have been a per se physical taking.”13 The
Dolan Court refined the Nollan “essential nexus” test to require
“that an adjudicative exaction requiring dedication of private prop-
erty must also be ‘“rough[ly] proportiona[l]’ . . . both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”14
In Dolan, Florence Dolan submitted an application to expand her
store and parking lot.15 The city planning commission conditioned
the approval upon her agreement to set aside land for a public green-
way that would minimize flooding in the nearby lake and to place a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway that would relieve traffic congestion.16
The Supreme Court held that the City’s requirements constituted an
unconstitutional taking.17 The Court distinguished the City’s actions
against Florence Dolan from other situations involving “legislative
determinations classifying entire areas of the city, [because] here the
city made an adjudicative decision to condition [the] petitioner’s ap-
plication for a building permit on an individual parcel.”18 In addition,
the City imposed conditions that went beyond limitations on the use
of Ms. Dolan’s parcel, instead requiring “that she deed portions of
the property to the city.”19 The Court relied on
10. Id.
11. Id. at 837.
12. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
13. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005).
14. Id. at 547 (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, and City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) (emphasizing that we have not extended this standard
“beyond the special context of [such] exactions”).
15. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 385.
19. Id.
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the well-settled doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions,” [under
which] the government may not require a person to give up a
constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation
when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a dis-
cretionary benefit conferred by the government where the bene-
fit sought has little or no relationship to the property.20
In determining “whether the degree of exactions demanded by
the city’s permit conditions bears the required relationship to the
projected impact of petitioner’s proposed development,” the Dolan
Court turned to state court decisions since they “have been dealing
with this question a good deal longer than we have.”21 The Court em-
ployed the “Goldilocks” test. They found that the state court standard
using “very generalized statements as to the necessary connection
between the required dedication and the proposed development” was
too lax, while the standard requiring “a very exacting correspondence,
described as the ‘specifi[c] and uniquely attributable’ test” was too
strict.”22 Instead, the state court standard “requiring the municipality
to show a ‘reasonable relationship’ between the required dedication
and the impact of the proposed development” was an intermediate
standard that was “just right.”23 However, the Court described this
test as “rough proportionality” instead of “reasonable relationship” to
avoid confusion with the similar “term ‘rational basis’ which describes
the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.”24
The Court in Dolan expanded the justification for treating land-
use permit conditions as an exception to the per se physical taking
rule by relying on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.25 Dolan
also stressed two differences between the land use regulations that
were sustained against constitutional challenges in Village of Euclid
and Pennsylvania Coal from the exactions that were asserted against
Florence Dolan.26 The Court explained:
20. Id. at 385 (noting that “the city has forced her to choose between the building permit
and her right under the Fifth Amendment to just compensation for the public easements”).
Id. at 385–86 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 388–89.
22. Id. at 389.
23. Id. at 390.
24. Id. at 391.
25. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388 (1994).
26. Id. at 384–85 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
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First, they involved essentially legislative determinations classi-
fying entire areas of the city, whereas here the city made an
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a
building permit on an individual parcel. Second, the conditions
imposed were not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might
make of her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed por-
tions of the property to the city.27
Courts across the country applied the Nollan/Dolan standard to
physical exactions for more than twenty years. Some courts also
applied this standard to in-lieu monetary exactions.28 In Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Management District,29 the U.S. Supreme Court
directly addressed the issue of whether monetary exactions should
be subject to review under the Nollan/Dolan test. It recognized that
lower courts divided over this question of federal constitutional law
and resolved the conflict by holding that monetary exactions should
be subject to the Nollan/Dolan test.30
Coy Koontz had applied for a permit to develop 3.7 acres of his
14.7 acre property.31 To offset the environmental impact of this devel-
opment on existing wetlands, one of the alternatives suggested by the
water district required Koontz to fund offsite mitigation work that
would enhance fifty acres of wetlands owned by the water district.32
The Court noted that “in lieu of” fees “are functionally equivalent to
other types of land use exactions” and held that “so-called ‘monetary
exactions’ must satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality require-
ments of Nollan and Dolan.”33 Therefore, when the government de-
mands property from a permit applicant, this demand “must satisfy
the requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the government
denies the permit and even when its demand is for money.”34
The Koontz Court explained the reasoning for protecting owners
applying for land use permits:
27. Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
28. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 854, 876, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 911 P.2d
429, 444 (1996); Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. Partnership,135 S.W. 3d 620, 640–41
(Tex. 2004).
29. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
30. Id. at 2594.
31. Id. at 2592.
32. Id. at 2593.
33. Id. at 2599.
34. Id. at 2603.
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Nollan and Dolan “involve a special application” of this doctrine
that protects the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation
for property the government takes when owners apply for land-
use permits. Our decisions in those cases reflect two realities of
the permitting process. The first is that land-use permit appli-
cants are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits because the gov-
ernment often has broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth
far more than property it would like to take. By conditioning a
building permit on the owner’s deeding over a public right-of-
way, for example, the government can pressure an owner into
voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment
would otherwise require just compensation. So long as the build-
ing permit is more valuable than any just compensation the owner
could hope to receive for the right-of-way, the owner is likely to
accede to the government’s demand, no matter how unreasonable.
Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment
right to just compensation, and the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine prohibits them.
A second reality of the permitting process is that many proposed
land uses threaten to impose costs on the public that dedications
of property can offset. Where a building proposal would substan-
tially increase traffic congestion, for example, officials might con-
dition permit approval on the owner’s agreement to deed over the
land needed to widen a public road. Respondent argues that a
similar rationale justifies the exaction at issue here: petitioner’s
proposed construction project, it submits, would destroy wetlands
on his property, and in order to compensate for this loss, respon-
dent demands that he enhance wetlands elsewhere. Insisting that
landowners internalize the negative externalities of their con-
duct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have
long sustained such regulations against constitutional attack.35
Prior to Koontz, the Court’s discussions about the need for in-
creased scrutiny of exactions under Nollan and Dolan emphasized
the special context of “adjudicative exaction” as an exception to what
would otherwise be considered a per se physical taking.36 However,
35. Id. at 2594–95 (citations omitted).
36. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546–47 (2005); City of Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702–03 (1999).
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in Koontz the majority did not specifically address the distinction be-
tween legislative action and adjudicative action and instead focused
on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine first applied to land use
permits by the Court in Dolan. Justice Kagan’s dissent in Koontz
noted the lack of clarity in regards to this distinction:
Perhaps the Court means in the future to curb the intrusion into
local affairs that its holding will accomplish; the Court claims,
after all, that its opinion is intended to have only limited impact
on localities’ land-use authority. The majority might, for example,
approve the rule, adopted in several States, that Nollan and Dolan
apply only to permitting fees that are imposed ad hoc, and not to
fees that are generally applicable. Dolan itself suggested that lim-
itation by underscoring that there “the city made an adjudicative
decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building per-
mit on an individual parcel,” instead of imposing an “essentially
legislative determination[ ] classifying entire areas of the city.”
Maybe today’s majority accepts that distinction; or then again,
maybe not. At the least, the majority’s refusal “to say more” about
the scope of its new rule now casts a cloud on every decision by
every local government to require a person seeking a permit to
pay or spend money.37
Following Koontz, the Supreme Court again addressed a takings
challenge involving personal property as opposed to real property. In
Horne v. Department of Agriculture, raisin growers brought a tak-
ings claim under the Fifth Amendment because the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 required them to turn over a por-
tion of their raisins to ensure an orderly raisin market.38 Under this
Act, the California Raisin Marketing Order demanded that the grow-
ers physically set aside a percentage of their crops for transfer to the
government, which “then sells, allocates, or otherwise disposes of
the raisins in ways it determines are best suited to maintaining an
orderly market.”39 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s challenged
decision “viewed the reserve requirement as a use restriction, simi-
lar to a government condition on the grant of a land use permit”
and subjected it to the Nollan/Dolan test because the government
37. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
38. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015).
39. Id.
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“imposed a condition (the reserve requirement) in exchange for a
Government benefit (an orderly raisin market).”40
After applying the test, the Ninth Circuit “found that the reserve
requirement was a proportional response to the Government’s in-
terest in ensuring an orderly raisin market, and not a taking under
the Fifth Amendment.”41 The Supreme Court instead addressed
“[w]hether the government’s ‘categorical duty’ under the Fifth Amend-
ment to pay just compensation when it ‘physically takes possession
of an interest in property,’ applies only to real property and not to
personal property.”42 The Court responded “no” and held that the
reserve requirement was a physical taking because it required that
the growers transfer actual raisins to the government.43 Such a re-
quirement is the “classic taking in which the government directly
appropriates private property for its own use.”44
Thus, the Horne Court viewed the federal legislative requirement
to set aside raisins and transfer them directly to the government as
a physical taking under the Loretto per se doctrine. Because the set-
aside was not in exchange for a permit that the government could
otherwise deny, it was not analogous to the land-use permit condi-
tion. Therefore, the Court did not treat it as an exception to the per
se physical taking rule that might be constitutionally allowable so
long as it survived Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. Just as the Loretto Court
required just compensation for the per se physical taking of space
on Jean Loretto’s apartment building for a cable line, the Horne
Court required just compensation for the per se physical taking of
the Hornes’ raisins.45
Before Koontz, but subsequent to Nollan and Dolan, the Court in
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.46 addressed the “long recognized” prin-
ciple from Agins v. Tiburon that “land-use regulation does not effect
a taking if it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’ and
40. Id. at 2425.
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518
(2012)).
43. Id. at 2425–26.
44. Id. at 2425 (quoting Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 324 (2002)).
45. Id. at 2426 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
426–35 (1982)).
46. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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does not ‘den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.’”47 The
Nollan Court relied on the Agins principle in addressing the scrutiny
required for exactions.48 The Lingle Court held that the “substan-
tially advances” prong of the two-prong Agins test was, in actuality,
a substantive due process argument not a takings test.49
In Lingle, Chevron brought suit challenging Hawai‘i’s statute that
limited the rent that oil companies could charge dealers who were
leasing company-owned service stations.50 Chevron sought a decla-
ration that the rent cap constituted a taking under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.51 The Court held
that Chevron was not entitled to summary judgment since it “ar-
gued only a ‘substantially advances’ theory in support of its takings
claim.”52 The Court noted that the “substantially advances” test was
derived from substantive due process decisions, not takings.53
Instead of addressing a challenged regulation’s effect on private
property, the “substantially advances” inquiry probes the regula-
tion’s underlying validity. But such an inquiry is logically prior
to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a
taking, for the Takings Clause presupposes that the government
has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose. The Clause ex-
pressly requires compensation where government takes private
property “for public use.” It does not bar government from inter-
fering with property rights, but rather requires compensation “in
the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.”
Conversely, if a government action is found to be impermissible—
for instance because it fails to meet the “public use” requirement
or is so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the
inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such action.54
To set the stage before addressing the Agins’s “substantially ad-
vances” prong, the Court described its regulatory taking precedents.55
47. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
48. Id.
49. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545.
50. Id. at 533.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 545.
53. Id. at 544.
54. Id. at 543 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 538–42.
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These precedents established “two relatively narrow categories (and
the special context of land-use exactions . . . )” of per se takings for
Fifth Amendment purposes, and noted that outside of these catego-
ries the factors set forth in Penn Central would govern regulatory
takings challenges.56 The two categories of per se takings arise from
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., finding a taking
“where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical
invasion of her property,”57 and from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, where “regulations that completely deprive an owner of ‘all
economically beneficial us[e]’ of her property” constitute a taking.58
The Court explained that these three tests focus on the severity of the
burden that the government places on property rights.59 First, a per-
manent physical invasion “eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude
others” and justifies finding a per se taking.60 Second, the total depri-
vation of economically viable use is the same as a permanent physical
occupation and results in a per se taking.61 Finally, the Penn Central
test examines the “magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and
the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.”62
After finding that the “substantially advances” prong of Agins was
a substantive due process challenge and not a takings challenge, the
Lingle Court addressed the impact that its decision might have on pre-
vious cases.63 The Court recognized that its decisions in Nollan and
Dolan “drew upon the language of Agins,” but explained that both
of these decisions were takings challenges to “adjudicative land-use
exactions” and did not apply the “substantially advances” test.64
In neither case did the Court question whether the exaction would
substantially advance some legitimate state interest. Rather, the
issue was whether the exactions substantially advanced the same
interests that land-use authorities asserted would allow them to
deny the permit altogether. As the Court explained in Dolan,
56. Id. at 538.
57. Id.; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
58. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
59. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 539–40.
62. Id. at 540.
63. Id. at 541–46.
64. Id. at 546.
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these cases involve a special application of the “doctrine of ‘uncon-
stitutional conditions,’” which provides that “the government may
not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the
right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a
public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by
the government where the benefit has little or no relationship to
the property.” That is worlds apart from a rule that says a regu-
lation affecting property constitutes a taking on its face solely
because it does not substantially advance a legitimate government
interest. In short, Nollan and Dolan cannot be characterized as
applying the “substantially advances” test we address today, and
our decision should not be read to disturb these precedents.65
In Lingle, the Court explained that its decision to reclassify the
Agins’s “substantially advances” test from a takings challenge to a
substantive due process challenge did not affect the principles de-
veloped in Nollan and Dolan.66 Although the Court used language
from Agins in these two cases, it did not rely on the “substantially
advances” test but instead applied a Fifth Amendment takings
analysis.67 “Both Nollan and Dolan involved Fifth Amendment tak-
ings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically, gov-
ernment demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing
public access to her property as a condition of obtaining a develop-
ment permit.”68
The Supreme Court precedent briefly discussed above establishes
that the per se physical taking category from Loretto requires just
compensation whenever the government effects a permanent physi-
cal occupation (no matter how minor) of either real property or per-
sonal property.69 However, when the government demands either real
or personal property from a landowner in exchange for a permit to de-
velop her land, such demands are exactions subject to the Nollan/
Dolan test for constitutional validity. The exaction sought must have
an “essential nexus” to the anticipated impact of the development on
the community, and the magnitude of the exaction sought must have
“rough proportionality” to the magnitude of the potential impact.70
65. Id. at 547–48 (citations omitted).
66. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425–26 (2015).
70. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317–19 (1994).
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The government may deny the permit because of its anticipated ex-
ternalities, unless such denial would constitute a taking under the
Penn Central factors test because of its severe impact on the land-
owner’s property interest. However, so long as the government is
entitled to deny the permit without effecting a taking, the Nollan/
Dolan scrutiny serves as a check against the government imposing
unconstitutional conditions (“the government may not deny a bene-
fit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right”) on the
landowner’s right to assert a Fifth Amendment takings claim.71
The issue of whether impact fees, even though legislatively enacted,
will require Nollan/Dolan scrutiny—just as adjudicative actions in-
volving physical or monetary exactions do—is a continuing debate
after the Koontz decision. Justice Thomas concurred in denying cer-
tiorari to a subsequent case involving this issue, California Building
Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose.72
This case implicates an important and unsettled issue under the
Takings Clause. The city of San Jose, California, enacted a hous-
ing ordinance that compels all developers of new residential de-
velopment projects with 20 or more units to reserve a minimum
of 15 percent of for-sale units for low-income buyers. . . . Peti-
tioner, the California Building Industry Association, sued to en-
join the ordinance. A California state trial court enjoined the
ordinance, but the Court of Appeal reversed, and the Supreme
Court of California affirmed that decision.
Our precedents in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n and Dolan
v. City of Tigard would have governed San Jose’s actions had it
imposed those conditions through administrative action. In those
cases, which both involved challenges to administrative conditions
on land use, we recognized that governments “may not condition
the approval of a land-use permit on the owner’s relinquishment
of a portion of his property unless there is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough
proportionality’ between the government’s demand and the ef-
fects of the proposed land use.”
For at least two decades, however, lower courts have divided over
whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies in cases where the alleged
71. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013) (quoting
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983)).
72. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).
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taking arises from a legislatively imposed condition rather than
an administrative one. That division shows no signs of abating.
The decision below, for example, reiterated the California Supreme
Court’s position that a legislative land-use measure is not a tak-
ing and survives a constitutional challenge so long as the mea-
sure bears “a reasonable relationship to the public welfare.”
I continue to doubt that “the existence of a taking should turn on
the type of governmental entity responsible for the taking.” Until
we decide this issue, property owners and local governments are
left uncertain about what legal standard governs legislative ordi-
nances and whether cities can legislatively impose exactions that
would not pass muster if done administratively. These factors
present compelling reasons for resolving this conflict at the ear-
liest practicable opportunity.
Yet this case does not present an opportunity to resolve the con-
flict. The City raises threshold questions about the timeliness of
the petition for certiorari that might preclude us from reaching
the Takings Clause question. Moreover, petitioner disclaimed
any reliance on Nollan and Dolan in the proceedings below. Nor
did the California Supreme Court’s decision rest on the distinc-
tion (if any) between takings effectuated through administrative
versus legislative action. Given these considerations, I concur in
the Court’s denial of certiorari.73
As mentioned above in his concurrence to the denial of certiorari
in California Building Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose, Justice
Thomas dissented to the denial of certiorari in Parking Ass’n of
Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta based on the same issue. He noted
that “[t]he lower courts are in conflict over whether Dolan’s test for
property regulation should be applied in cases where the alleged
taking occurs through an Act of the legislature.”74
Practitioners and scholars anticipate that this issue will come be-
fore the Court once litigation presents the appropriate case to allow
73. Id. at 928–29 (citations omitted) (respectively quoting Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (describing Nollan/Dolan framework); Cal. Bldg.
Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435, 456–59; Parking Ass’n of Ga v. City of
Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117–18).
74. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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the Court to give guidance to state and federal courts.75 I am hopeful
that some of the ideas presented in this publication as well as in my
article, When Local Government Misbehaves, might help convince
the Court to treat judicial scrutiny of legislative impact fees as a
land use regulation. Instead of subjecting such fees to the Nollan/
Dolan test, applicable state standards should govern judicial scrutiny.
These state standards range from a deferential rational basis test
in California to a searching inquiry in North Carolina.76 The Court
should distinguish legislative action from adjudicative action and
give states the opportunity to apply their own standard of judicial
review to legislative land use regulations.
Unlike most legislative actions, exactions pose a special concern
because
land-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the type
of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohib-
its because the government often has broad discretion to deny a
permit that is worth far more than property it would like to
take. . . . [and] [e]xtortionate demands of this sort frustrate the
Fifth Amendment right to just compensation.77
Therefore, it is appropriate to apply a federal test (Nollan/Dolan)
to physical and in lieu exactions—situations where it is necessary
to “provide important protection against the misuse of the power of
land-use regulation.”78 However, state and local legislative actions
should receive deference, and any claim of a taking based on legisla-
tive action should be subject to Penn Central if it constitutes a partial
75. See, e.g., Dabbs v. Anne Arundel Cty., No. 18-54 (July 6, 2018) (petition of certiorari filed
presenting the question of “whether legislatively proscribed monetary exactions on land use
development are subject to scrutiny under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine”). Compare
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE LIABILITY § 12:10 (2017) (“Following Koontz, the
U.S. Supreme Court is likely to apply Nollan/Dolan in the same manner as the California
Supreme Court interpreted in Ehrlich and San Remo. . . . The Nollan and Dolan heightened
scrutiny tests apply only to development fees imposed on an individual, ad hoc basis in a
discretionary permit granting process, and not to general legislatively formulated fees.”), with
BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION § 3:45
(2017–2018 ed. 2017) (stating that “the majority’s decision [in Koontz] to extend Nollan/Dolan
to monetary exactions can be construed to include both ad hoc monetary exactions as well as leg-
islated exactions such as impact fees and even mandatory affordable housing requirements”).
76. Shelley Ross Saxer, When Local Government Misbehaves, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 105
(2016); see Etheridge v. Cty. of Currituck, 762 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
77. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594–95 (2013).
78. Id. at 2591.
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taking, Loretto if it is a permanent physical occupation not associ-
ated with a permit request, or Lucas if it deprives a landowner of all
economically viable use.
II. JUDICIAL, PRACTITIONER, AND ACADEMIC
VIEWS AS TO IMPACT-FEE SCRUTINY
In his article, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Condi-
tions,79 Professor Callies notes that even courts that do not apply
heightened scrutiny to legislatively imposed fees do apply some form
of Nollan’s essential nexus test. I agree that courts should apply a
rational nexus test to legislative impact fees to make sure there is
a rational connection between the fee collected and the project’s
impact that the fee will mitigate. As Professor Callies discusses in
his article, such was the case in both the California Supreme Court’s
decision in San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco80 and
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Holmdel Builders Ass’n
v. Township of Holmdel.81 He points out that the only part of the
Nollan decision that these two cases did not apply was the act of
shifting the burden to the government to prove the nexus.82 The rea-
son is that the burden of proof was unclear until the U.S. Supreme
Court “clarified in Dolan that the burden of proof shifts to the gov-
ernment. There, the Court cited to Nollan when it said that ‘the bur-
den properly rests on the city.’”83 What is important, however, is that
all jurisdictions require some form of nexus between the harm caused
by the development and the interest that the exaction purportedly
serves. Thus, even under the California or New Jersey approach,
Nollan’s requirement that the “‘same’ interest be served by the ex-
action still applies, albeit in different terms.”84 It seems we do agree
on the need to apply a rational nexus test to impact fees. However,
it is at this point that we part company. Professor Callies would apply
the Dolan requirement of rough proportionality, while I would apply
79. David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Conditions, 42/43 URB.
L. 307 (2010).
80.  San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 27 Cal. 4th 643, 41 P.3d 87 (2002).
81. Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990).
82. Callies, supra note 79, at 318–20.
83. Id. at 320.
84. Id.
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a second rational nexus test that examines whether the government
uses funds obtained from the impact fees for the purpose collected.
Professor Callies concludes his article by noting that most local
government-inclusionary housing programs provide substantial den-
sity bonuses and other advantages to developers who are required
to provide affordable housing. He advises that if local government
wishes to mandate affordable housing set-asides or fees on develop-
ment, it should make sure that they only apply to development that
creates the need for affordable housing and are “set low enough to
survive a proportionality challenge.”85 I agree that any legislatively
adopted set-asides or impact fees, whether for affordable housing or
other infrastructure needs, should only apply to development proj-
ects that adversely impact the public needs for which the fees were
intended. However, requiring proportionality of the fee collected
does not make sense in the case of legislatively imposed impact fees.
The municipality has already calculated these fees based upon the
needs of the community and upon an assessment of how different
types of development activity affect those needs.
When a city council adopts an ordinance to establish impact fees,
it calculates the legislative impact fee after an in-depth analysis of
the impact that certain development activities will have on city ser-
vices. For example, an ordinance setting wastewater impact fees will
likely define the relevant factors in calculating these fees—such as
the equivalent residential unit (“ERU”), plumbing fixture unit, ser-
vice unit (“SU”), connection charge, strength factor, flow factor, etc.—
based on the type of unit and the expected wastewater discharge
from that particular use.86 Various formulas will employ these factors
to calculate an impact fee based on general information about the
expected impact of particular uses. The municipality builds propor-
tionality into the formula based on these factors. For example, in
2012 the City of Thousand Oaks, California, set a connection charge
rate per service unit for wastewater at $10,168 and set the formula
to determine service unit as SU = [(ERU) x (strength factor) x (flow
factor)] or [(ERU) x (combined factor)].87
Applying the Dolan proportionality test to legislatively determined
impact fees would require a court to review the city council’s formulas
85. Id. at 329.
86. See, e.g., CITY OF THOUSAND OAKS, 2011 USER FEE MANUAL, FISCAL YEARS 2011–2012
AND 2012–2013, 321–42 (2012), http://www.toaks.org/home/showdocument?id=2468.
87. See id. at 317.
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and calculations to determine whether it had calculated these fees
in proportion to the anticipated impact of the development activity.
Such judicial scrutiny would be excessive, particularly when review-
ing a legislative action. Instead, the dual rational nexus test requires
the court to ask whether the city has used these collected funds to
maintain and improve the wastewater collection system to ensure
that these fees are not taxes collected and deposited into the city’s
general revenues.
The outcome from the Nollan/Dolan scrutiny over legislative im-
pact fees may be the same as applying the dual rational nexus test,
used in many states before the advent of the Nollan/Dolan test for
exactions. Here, Professor Callies and I agree that distinguishing be-
tween legislative and administrative actions over impact fees may be
a distinction without a big difference—but there are differences. The
dual rational nexus test, applied to impact fees in many states, re-
quires scrutiny—to make sure not only that the fees are related to
the development’s potential impact, but also that they are not a tax
in disguise by requiring that the fees collected go to the specified
purpose and are not deposited as general revenue. This test has a
very different rationale for the scrutiny of impact fees than does the
Dolan review for rough proportionality. The legislative process deter-
mines whether the impact fee is rationally related and proportional
to the anticipated impact based on studies, formulas, calculations,
etc., that are unconnected to the actual project proposed. Finally,
treating exactions differently than impact fees preserves the distinc-
tion between legislative and adjudicative decisions. This distinction
is an important part of land use jurisprudence and provides a check
on the greater potential for governmental abuse of power when deci-
sions are individualized.88
In his subsequent article, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the
Future in Land Use Takings Cases, Professor Callies suggested that:
(1) Land development conditions will continue to come under
even more strict scrutiny for nexus and proportionality to the
problems and needs generated by the development/developer so
charged. This is particularly true with respect to affordable, work-
force housing exactions—so-called “inclusionary zoning”—where
the connection to market-priced housing projects has always been
88. Saxer, supra note 76, at 167.
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virtually non-existent. Only commercial developments generating
a demonstrated need for low-income workers will successfully
generate such mandatory housing set-asides.
(2) Courts will continue to be confused by the difference, if any,
between legislative and administrative/quasi-judicial exactions in
the application of Nollan-Dolan-Koontz. If this last unresolved land
development conditions issue reaches the United States Supreme
Court, the Court is likely to find the distinction irrelevant.89
Professor Callies examined the ramifications of the Court’s decision
in Koontz and concluded “[w]hat the Supreme Court clearly decided”
was as follows:
(4) Impact Fees. The [Koontz] decision by its terms also applies
to impact fees imposed by government to pay for public facilities
such as schools, public parks, and wastewater treatment plants.
There is no reasonable distinction among in-lieu fees, mitigation
fees, and impact fees, since all are fees charged by government
as a condition for land development approval (as distinguished
from charges such as user fees and taxes, discussed below). All
are embraced by the Court’s term “monetary exaction,” and thus
all are now subject to the nexus and proportionality require-
ments of Nollan and Dolan.
(5) Other “Exactions” vs. Taxes and User Fees. The dissent in
Koontz makes much of the confusion between impact fees, on the
one hand, and property taxes and user fees, on the other, that
will become more significant as a result of the decision. . . .
(6) Legislative vs. Non-Legislative Conditions. A key remain-
ing issue with respect to land development conditions is whether
different standards apply if the land development condition is
legislatively, rather than administratively or quasi-judicially,
imposed. While at least one sitting Justice on the Court has
opined in a certiorari petition denial dissent that there is no
defensible difference, other judges have suggested that deference
to legislative determinations should lower the level of scrutiny
applied to such legislative exactions as compared with adminis-
trative or quasi-judicial, one-off exactions.90
89. David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use Takings
Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 44–45 (2014).
90. Id. at 46–48.
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Professor Callies discusses whether to apply the Nollan/Dolan
test to legislative actions.91 He asserts that until the Supreme Court
addresses the question of whether Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz apply
to more generalized exactions, “it is likely that government entities
will endeavor to adopt more generalized exactions that look like leg-
islation” and argue that exactions challenged by landowners are not
subject to heightened scrutiny because they are more legislative than
adjudicative.92 Professor Callies also addresses the potential for a
“lose-lose” outcome if local government finds it easier to deny requests
for permits outright rather than negotiate with applicants and face
the heightened standard of Nollan and Dolan. Instead of encourag-
ing negotiations that would allow landowners to trade property or
money to obtain a permit, the bargains “w[ould] fail to occur because
of the government’s fear that [their] offer, even if rejected, w[ould]
attract the heightened scrutiny that Koontz now requires.”93
In his article Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, Pro-
fessor Timothy Mulvaney addresses this debate about the level of
judicial scrutiny applied to administrative exactions and legislative
impact fees in takings cases (although he calls both exactions).
He notes that there are three choices as to how to approach this
debate:
(1) Subject both categories to a level that is deferential to the
government—rational basis.
(2) Subject both categories to heightened scrutiny—Nollan/
Dolan.
(3) Subject only administrative actions to heightened scru-
tiny—Nollan/Dolan.94
I would add a fourth category, which is the one that I advocate.
(4) Subject administrative actions (exactions) to Nollan/Dolan
scrutiny and legislative impact fees to a dual rational nexus
test.
91. Callies, supra note 89.
92. Id. at 48.
93. Id.; see also Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2611 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“If every suggestion could become the subject of a lawsuit under Nollan
and Dolan, the lawyer can give but one recommendation: Deny the permits, without giving [the
developer] any advice—even if he asks for guidance.”).
94. Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 138 (2016).
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This fourth category contains the same first prong from Nollan but has
a second prong that requires courts to scrutinize whether the munic-
ipality uses the impact fee for the purpose stated in support of the first
prong, and not as a general revenue-raising device. If the municipality
uses the fees it collects for general revenues, we should treat the im-
pact fee as a tax, which may not be within the municipality’s authority
to enact. Applying this dual rational nexus test to impact fees retains
the distinction between legislative and administrative actions—a dis-
tinction that runs throughout the land-use law framework.
Professor Mulvaney asserts that scholars who adopt the category
three view (legislative exactions should be immune from heightened
takings scrutiny) should be aware that “such a position could produce
some second-order consequences that actually undercut the goals of
progressive conceptions of property.”95 He goes on to state,
In this Part, I identify and assess two potential anti-progressive
secondary consequences of recognizing the legislative-adminis-
trative distinction in exaction takings law. I contend in the first
section that pressing the idea that legislative exactions are signif-
icantly less likely to abuse property owners than administrative
exactions (and thus deserve greater judicial deference) necessarily
risks marginalizing case-by-case administration more generally,
which could have important ripple effects on takings law outside
the exactions context. I assert in the second section that formal
acceptance of the legislative-administrative distinction in the ex-
actions context could prompt governmental entities to retreat from
employing administrative exactions and other administrative
measures, a move that could come with substantial costs given
that in many contexts only administrative processes can respond
comprehensively to the heterogeneous impacts of a given develop-
ment project and afford crucially important attention to the af-
fected parties’ personal, social, political, and economic identities.96
While I appreciate Professor Mulvaney’s perceptive observations
about the potential for second-order consequences when distinguish-
ing between legislative and administrative actions, I assert that using
the distinction between administrative action and legislative action
in regards to impact fees and exactions is intellectually honest and
95. Id. at 140.
96. Id. at 152.
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is not intended to achieve any particular political outcome. Courts
have applied this distinction throughout the framework of land use
law as a way to protect against local government overreach.97
The decision whether to recognize the distinction between legisla-
tive and administrative actions should not depend upon whether or
not it promotes progressive property objectives. As a proponent of
robust property rights, I support this distinction and argue that the
outcome in this debate should not depend upon how it fits into any
particular political or theoretical mindset. Professor Mulvaney con-
tends that “cabining the application of Nollan and Dolan scrutiny to
administrative exactions amounts to a pragmatic effort to halt expan-
sion of what is perceived as an ill-conceived and dangerous roadblock
to government regulation in the land use arena.”98
As an advocate of not applying Nollan and Dolan scrutiny to legis-
lative impact fees, I do not consider this heightened scrutiny applied
to administrative exactions to be “an ill-conceived and dangerous
roadblock.” In fact, I support this heightened scrutiny, as it provides
a much-needed check on the potential for government abuse in the
individualized permitting process. I also support applying height-
ened scrutiny to other individualized actions such as eminent domain,
both under the Fifth Amendment and under the RLUIPA (Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act) protections for reli-
gious institutions.99
The Koontz majority subjected in-lieu monetary exactions to the
heightened scrutiny test of Nollan/Dolan. This approach fits within
the existing state and federal judicial framework used to prevent
land use regulatory abuse.100 However, legislatively determined im-
pact fees are not monetary exactions and should not be subject to
Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny. Instead, courts should evaluate
impact fees under existing state standards, which range from ratio-
nal basis scrutiny to more exacting reviews.
Much debate and scholarship has followed the Koontz decision.
Some have predicted that the consequences will be dire for local
governments if the Court’s holding is applied to any monetary
97. Saxer, supra note 76, at 115.
98. Mulvaney, supra note 94, at 141.
99. Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land Uses,
69 MO. L. REV. 653 (2004).
100. Saxer, supra note 76.
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fee demanded of developers and possibly to environmental regu-
lation as well. Justice Kagan’s dissent, which disagreed with the
majority’s extension of Nollan and Dolan to the payment or ex-
penditure of money in government permitting, expressed this
concern by avowing that the uncertainty of this rule “threatens
to subject a vast array of land-use regulations, applied daily in
States and localities throughout the country, to heightened con-
stitutional scrutiny.” Others assert varying views including that
1) the Koontz decision is a “big yawn” that will have little effect,
particularly on environmental regulation, which is already gov-
erned by environmental impact review; 2) the Koontz majority
was wrong to extend the Nollan/Dolan inquiry to monetary ex-
actions and instead should have recognized that the claim ulti-
mately rests on substantive due process that should be governed
by the deferential rational basis standard; 3) similar to the impact
of Nollan/Dolan, after Koontz, planners and local officials will do
a better job of “justifying and documenting the rationale for ex-
acting money or land from developers”; 4) Koontz created a per
se taking when a government attaches a monetary obligation to
property that cannot be classified as a tax; 5) the Court’s Nollan/
Dolan limitations on land-use negotiations “run counter to the
economic idea that takings jurisprudence makes governments
face a higher cost for regulation”; and 6) the courts should differ-
entiate between fees and expenditures such that heightened
scrutiny should apply to fees only where the permit applicant is
required to directly transfer money to the government, but not
to expenditures that “require a permit applicant to spend money
to carry out mitigation activities.” This Article, with the support
of others, proposes that in-lieu exactions that are individually
assessed as part of the permitting process should be treated
differently than the impact fees that are developed through the
legislative process and applied equally to all developers without
regard to the specific project.101
In Takings and Extortion, Professor Daniel P. Selmi rejects what
he calls the “extortion narrative,” which underlies the Court’s recent
exaction cases and “sees local governments not as acting in good
faith in the public interest, but as fixed on extorting concessions out
of developers.”102 Professor Selmi first reviews the Court’s takings
101. Id. at 108–09 (citations omitted).
102. Daniel P. Selmi, Takings and Extortion, 68 FLA. L. REV. 323, 325 (2016).
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cases on exactions to show how the Court developed and endorsed
the extortion narrative beginning in 1987 with the Nollan decision.
Selmi notes that Koontz in its holding and reasoning “fully reflect[s]
the extortion narrative in the context of exactions takings.”103 He
then examines the “basis for [t]his fundamental premise that gov-
ernments are prone to misuse their land use power”104 and finds
that the following theories may explain the basis:
1. The economic theory, particularly the public choice theory
“proposes that, like individuals acting in the private sector,
regulators will act largely in their self-interest” and that poli-
ticians will seek to extract benefits for voters from proposed
projects to gain re-election from the voters who outnumber
developers;105
2. The impacts addressed by exactions are believed to have ex-
panded to include environmental degradation, housing, and ad-
ditional conditions negotiated by development agreements;106
3. Development interest groups are believed to use the narra-
tive as “an important vehicle both for attracting the Court’s
attention to appeals and for articulating a theme in briefing
them;”107
4. The narrative is believed to be aligned “with the personal po-
litical ideologies of the individual Justices who make up the
majority in the exactions cases” based mainly on the “distrust
of local government efforts at environmental protection.”108
Professor Selmi asserts that “the extortion narrative does not rest
on literal proof of extortion” but rather on whether the imposed or
proposed exactions fail the Nollan/Dolan test.109 Even if the local
103. Id. at 327–33.
104. Id. at 338 (noting that the Court did not explain the basis for this narrative in Nollan,
Dolan, or Koontz).
105. Id. at 338–39 (noting that this theory fails to take into account the studies that have
examined conditions placed on projects by the government and found that government has not
overreached, as well as the fact that developers have the ability to exit those jurisdictions that
overreach and instead use the economic power of development interests at the local level).
106. Id. at 340–41.
107. Id. at 341.
108. Id. at 341–42.
109. Id. at 362.
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government acted in good faith when imposing conditions, courts will
automatically assume extortion if the exactions fail the test.110 In
addition, Selmi notes “the Court now has fully linked its exactions
jurisprudence to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,” which is
“nowhere reflected in the text of the Constitution,” and thus dis-
tances the Court’s jurisprudence from the actual language of the
Fifth Amendment.111 Professor Selmi concludes by suggesting that,
while “[a] majority of the Court has endorsed the extortion narrative,”
there are critical flaws in this narrative such that it will not provide
a convincing and sustainable foundation for exactions takings law.112
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine creates an analytical “fly
in the ointment” for takings jurisprudence and is an unnecessary dis-
traction from the language of the Fifth Amendment. Without using
this doctrine, the Nollan decision created an exception to the per se
taking rule for physical occupations under Loretto when the govern-
ment imposed an exaction in exchange for granting a permit, even
though the government would be justified in denying the permit en-
tirely unless such denial resulted in a taking under the Penn Central
test. In my view, it was unnecessary to add the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine to the takings analysis in the Dolan case, which
established the degree of nexus needed under Nollan to avoid the
per se physical taking claim from Loretto. Extending this test to in-
lieu monetary exactions in Koontz did not require the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine. The Nollan case had already established
the exception to Loretto for exactions demanded in exchange for per-
mit approval when the government could constitutionally deny the
permit without paying just compensation.
The concern about overreach or government abuse of power in
local land use regulation has driven the development of varying de-
grees of judicial scrutiny in our land-use law jurisprudence long be-
fore the Court raised the “extortion narrative” in the Nollan decision.
My article, When Local Government Misbehaves, addresses the “vari-
ous levels of scrutiny applied to land-use decisions and shows how
these levels are designed to prevent the abuse of power, particularly
when actions are exercised at the individualized level.”113 I compare
110. Id.
111. Id. at 373–75.
112. Id. at 376.
113. Saxer, supra note 76, at 110.
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the scrutiny levels applied to land use actions[—]such as: legis-
lative versus administrative actions; spot zoning challenges;
consistency with the general plan; impermissible delegation of
legislative authority; initiative and referendum authority; emi-
nent domain challenges; and constitutional challenges, both facial
and as applied[—]to corroborate the theme that abuse of power is
controlled through increased judicial scrutiny when appropriate.114
It is this consistent framework, not the “extortion narrative,” that
supports subjecting ad hoc in-lieu exactions to heightened scrutiny
when a developer applies for a permit. However, this rationale should
not apply to uniform monetary fees imposed legislatively.
State courts have been uncertain as to whether they should sub-
ject legislatively enacted impact fees to the Nollan/Dolan test. Courts
in California, Arizona, Georgia, and Colorado have found that it does
not apply,115 while courts in Washington, Illinois, South Dakota, and
Oregon have applied the Nollan/Dolan test to legislative actions.116
After the Koontz decision, the Washington Court of Appeals in an
unpublished decision rejected the unconstitutional conditions chal-
lenge by the Common Sense Alliance against a county ordinance re-
quiring the dedication of property by owners applying for permits to
develop shoreline parcels.117 Relying on an earlier “Washington appel-
late court decision that characterized Nollan and Dolan as establish-
ing a due process test, subject only to minimal scrutiny,” as well as
the dissent in Koontz, “the lower court concluded that a landowner
may not challenge a legislative exaction under the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions.”118 Instead, “the lower court applied a rule that
excludes legislatively-imposed exactions from heightened Nollan/
Dolan scrutiny.”119
The Utah Supreme Court in Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West
Jordan adjudicated property developers’ allegations that the City
violated regulations requiring a municipality to spend the impact fees
114. Id.
115. See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Andrew Gowder, Jr., Recent Developments in Land Use
Planning and Zoning Law Relating to Exactions, 36 URB. LAW. 519 (Summer 2004).
116. Callies, supra note 89, at 49–50.
117. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Common Sense Alli. v. San Juan Cty., 137 S. Ct. 58
(2016) (No. 15-1366), 2016 WL 2754833 *8–9 (writ of certiorari denied).
118. Id. at *8–9 (citing Kitsap Alliance of Prop. Owners v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt.
Hearings Bd., 160 Wash. App. 250, 273–74 (2011)).
119. Id. at *9.
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collected on specific categories of expenditures within six years.120 The
court held that “[t]he developers’ allegations here that West Jordan
either failed to spend impact fees within six years or spent the fees
on impermissible expenditures are inadequate to support a takings
claim.”121 The court explained that “[t]he manner in which a city
spends impact fees does not affect the constitutionality of the initial
demand for fees, which is the focus of the Koontz monetary exactions
analysis.”122 However, the Utah court’s analysis seems to confirm
that it would subject impact fees to the Nollan/Dolan test. It stated,
“In the context of a city’s demand for impact fees in exchange for a
land-use permit, the applicant may challenge the fee by asserting
that it lacks either an essential nexus or rough proportionality to
the anticipated external impacts of the proposed development.”123
The California Court of Appeal in 616 Croft Ave. v. City of West
Hollywood relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in
California Building Industry Ass’n v. City of San Jose to resolve a
challenge to an affordable housing ordinance.124 The appellate court
held that a city ordinance, requiring developers “to sell or rent a por-
tion of their newly constructed units at specified below-market rates
or, if not, to pay an ‘in-lieu’ fee designed to fund construction of the
equivalent number of units the developer would have otherwise been
required to set aside,” was not an exaction.125 Therefore, the restric-
tion was not subject to Nollan and Dolan scrutiny and was instead
“a municipality’s permissible regulation of the use of land under its
broad police power.”126
Federal courts have also struggled with the level of scrutiny re-
quired for legislatively enacted impact fees. A federal district court
in Illinois reviewed state and federal constitutional challenges to an
ordinance enacted by the City of Chicago to increase the availability
of affordable housing in Chicago. In Home Builders Ass’n of Greater
Chicago v. City of Chicago, a real estate developer was required to
120. Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 845 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (2017).
121. Id. ¶ 29.
122. Id.
123. Id. ¶ 28 (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595,
2603 (2013)).
124. 616 Croft Ave. v. City of West Hollywood, 3 Cal. App. 5th 621, 628 (2016) (citing Cal.
Bldg. Indus. Ass’n. v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435, 443–44 (2015)).
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th at 457).
104 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 7:077
“set aside two housing units for rent or sale to low-income residents,
or pay a $200,000 fee.”127 The developer paid the fee and then filed
a takings claim in state court. The City of Chicago removed the case
to federal court and the court dismissed the claim.128 The court dis-
cussed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine applied in Nollan,
Dolan, and Koontz, and noted that although the Koontz Court held
that monetary fees imposed in lieu of a requirement to dedicate prop-
erty are subject to the Nollan/Dolan test, it “did not hold . . . that all
fees related to property regulation must meet the ‘essential nexus’
and ‘rough proportionality’ requirements.”129 Explaining that a re-
striction on the use of property is different from a seizure of prop-
erty, the court noted that such a restriction is not a taking requiring
compensation “unless it goes so far as to be a regulatory taking under
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.”130 These recent
state and federal court decisions illustrate the debate and the need
for guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court.
In addition to litigating these issues and preparing amici briefs
in support of one side or another, practitioners have weighed in on
whether the U.S. Supreme Court will require legislatively imposed
monetary exactions to be subject to heightened scrutiny under the
Nollan/Dolan test. For example, a Sacramento lawyer, Glen Hansen,
suggests, “the Court should find that neither the heightened scrutiny
of Nollan/Dolan, nor the Penn Central factored analysis, should gov-
ern legislative exactions that (1) are generally applied, and (2) are
based on a set legislative formula that provides no meaningful discre-
tion to administrators in its application to specific properties.”131 In-
stead, he recommends that such legislative exactions should be subject
to a reasonable-relationship test, adopted by state governments such
as California, Colorado, and Ohio.132 Mr. Hansen acknowledges that
his recommendation is to follow Justice Kagan’s suggestion in her
Koontz dissent “that the Court ‘approve the rule, adopted in several
127. Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago 213 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1021
(2016).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1023–24.
130. Id. at 1024 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
131. Glen Hansen, Let’s Be Reasonable: Why Neither Nollan/Dolan Nor Penn Central
Should Govern Generally-Applied Legislative Exactions After Koontz, 34 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
237, 291 (2017).
132. Id.
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States, that Nollan and Dolan apply only to permitting fees that are
imposed ad hoc, and not to fees that are generally applicable.’”133
I agree that legislatively imposed monetary exactions, which I
would call impact fees, should not be subject to the Nollan/Dolan
test, but should instead be subject to the appropriate state standard.
However, Hansen would substitute the reasonable-relationship state
standard for existing state tests, such as the dual rational nexus test,
and use this reasonable-relationship test as a new takings standard
in place of Penn Central. Here we disagree as to the scrutiny that
courts should apply to what Hansen calls legislative exactions. I
submit that impact fees should be subject to the appropriate state
standard, such as the dual rational nexus test, the reasonable-
relationship test, or other existing state tests to distinguish these
fees from unauthorized taxes. However, if the impact fee passes the
applicable state test but “goes too far” in the impact the regulation
has on the landowner’s property, the landowner should still be en-
titled to bring a takings challenge and have it evaluated under the
Penn Central analysis.134
A real estate partner at Sheppard Mullin offered helpful commen-
tary about this issue in her article, Nollan, Dolan, and the Legislative
Exception.135 Deborah Rosenthal explained, “Most state courts ad-
dressing the issue have held that heightened scrutiny under Nollan
and Dolan does not apply to legislatively adopted exactions.
Instead, they opine, fees and other exaction programs are subject
to the same deferential ‘rational basis’ test applied to land use reg-
ulation under the police power.”136 Rosenthal predicts that “the leg-
islative exception will be rejected by the Supreme Court, at least in
its most extreme forms.”137 She argues that “both Nollan and Dolan
resulted from generally applicable legislative programs” and that
the easements required to obtain coastal development permits were
neither ad hoc nor negotiated.138
133. Id. at 254 (quoting Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting)).
134. But see id. at 281–85 (explaining why Penn Central should not be applied to legislative
exactions).
135. Deborah M. Rosenthal, Nollan, Dolan, and the Legislative Exception, 66 PLAN. & ENVTL.
L., Mar. 2014, at 4.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Rosenthal contends that Nollan and Dolan analysis asks three
questions: 1) whether the exaction would be a Fifth Amendment
taking if imposed as a stand-alone requirement; 2) whether there is
an “essential nexus” between the exaction and the project impacts;
and 3) whether the exaction is “roughly proportional” to the project
impacts.139 She suggests “heightened scrutiny is appropriate when
courts are making fundamentally legal decisions about the charac-
ter and nature of an exaction under the first two Nollan inquiries.”140
The time to challenge these decisions is during the adoption of the
generally applicable, legislative-exaction programs, and “[h]eightened
scrutiny is not appropriate when a legislatively adopted, generally
applicable exaction is challenged under ‘rough proportionality’ at the
individual permit level.”141
Rosenthal’s approach is similar to mine in that we agree that leg-
islatively imposed impact fees should be subject to Nollan scrutiny
because if the fees were requested unconnected to a permit applica-
tion, they would be a per se taking. In order to be an exception to
the per se physical taking of money under Loretto, the request must
be in exchange for the granting of a permit. In addition, there needs
to be an “essential nexus” between the fee required and the project’s
impacts. However, I contend that applying the “rough proportional-
ity” test from Dolan is not appropriate at the individual permit level
because the legislature has already determined the “rough propor-
tionality” when it developed the generally applicable formula, as
discussed above in the example from Thousand Oaks, California.142
CONCLUSION
Until the U.S. Supreme Court speaks directly to the distinction be-
tween adjudicative exactions for individual development permitting
and legislative impact fees designed to offset the general externalities
created by land development, local governments, courts, litigators,
and scholars will continue to struggle with whether to apply the
Nollan/Dolan test to these municipal requirements. I give due def-
erence to Justice Thomas’s recognition of this ongoing debate and
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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his view that there should be no distinction between adjudicative and
legislative actions. However, I assert that this distinction governs land
use jurisprudence and guides the judicial scrutiny of local government
action.143 The Court should recognize this distinction to determine
when the judicial branch should give deference to local legislative
actions and when the courts should subject individualized govern-
ment actions to heightened scrutiny to control the abuse of power.
Legislatively enacted impact fees should have a rational nexus
(the “essential nexus” required by Nollan) between the impact that
a particular type of development is expected to create and the fee
that is generally imposed. However, courts should not subject these
fees to the Dolan test for rough proportionality because the legisla-
ture has already monetarily assessed the impact caused by proto-
typical development projects. Studies, past experiences, formulas, and
guidance from other municipalities will be the basis for these legis-
lative determinations, which should be entitled to judicial deference.
Instead, states should be free to apply the appropriate level of judicial
scrutiny, ranging from a rational basis level to a more searching in-
quiry, which could include the dual rational nexus test that reviews
whether the local jurisdiction is using the fees collected to offset the
actual impact the development imposes.
We should not ignore the distinction between legislative and admin-
istrative actions in the context of exactions and impact fees, as this
distinction is a bedrock principle of land use law. If the Court finds the
distinction to be meaningless in this context, it will threaten the estab-
lished land use framework that applies heightened scrutiny to local ac-
tion only when there is concern that government abuse is more likely
because of an individualized determination. Subjecting legislative im-
pact fees to the heightened Nollan/Dolan scrutiny has the potential
to erode the separation of judicial and legislative power by diminish-
ing the degree of judicial deference given to state and local legislative
action. Instead, states should retain the right to establish the level
of judicial scrutiny applied to local land use regulation. If such regu-
lation is so onerous as to constitute a taking under state or federal
constitutional law, landowners should be entitled to bring a takings
challenge under Penn Central as a partial deprivation of property
based on legislative action, or under Lucas or Loretto, if applicable.
143. See generally Saxer, supra note 76.

BACK TO THE FUTURE OF LAND USE REGULATION
ROBERT H. THOMAS*
INTRODUCTION
As always, I bring you greetings from the land of Midkiff,1 the
land of Kaiser Aetna,2 the jurisdiction in which the legislature thought
it was a good idea to try and drive gasoline prices lower by adopting
a rent-control statute for certain gas stations on the theory that the
station owners would naturally pass on the savings to consumers.3
As you recall, the United States Supreme Court in Lingle held that
this scheme should not be analyzed under the Just Compensation
Clause, but under the Due Process Clause.4 The Court concluded
that as a question of due process and government power, Hawaii’s
scheme survived the rational basis test,5 even though in reality—
and predictably—the statute did not come anywhere close to accom-
plishing what it purportedly set out to accomplish: Hawaii continues
to have some of the highest gasoline prices in the nation, thank you
very much.6
I raise all this both as an introduction to my remarks and as
background for the panel, “The Future of Land Regulation: A Trib-
ute to David Callies.”7 But before we can talk about land use law’s
future, we must delve into its past. As we all know, the rational basis
* Robert H. Thomas, LL.M., Columbia University and J.D., University of Hawaii,
practices with Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert in Honolulu, Hawaii. He writes about
takings and property law at www.inversecondemnation.com. This Essay is a slightly modified
version of the remarks he delivered at the Fourteenth Annual Brigham-Kanner Property
Rights Conference in Williamsburg, Virginia.
1. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
2. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
3. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
4. Id. at 540 (“We conclude that this formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due
process, not a takings, test, and that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.”).
5. Id. at 544.
6. See Top 10 Lowest Gas Prices in Hawaii, GASBUDDY, https://www.gasbuddy.com/Gas
Prices/Hawaii (last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
7. Robert Thomas, Remarks at Panel 1, “The Future of Land Regulation: A Tribute to
Callies,” at the Fourteenth Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference (Oct. 13,
2017). For the presentation by my fellow panelist Professor James W. Ely Jr., see James W.
Ely Jr., David Callies and the Future of Land Use Regulations, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS.
CONF. J. 63 (2018).
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test had its genesis in zoning and land use law and over the years
has inexorably crept into takings and eminent domain law. Today,
I’ll focus on two cases, one old, one new.
I. MR. J.C. HADACHECK GETS PLAYED
We usually identify Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.8 as the first con-
stitutional land use case, and, indeed, it was the first Supreme Court
decision to uphold “everything in its place” and separation-of-uses
zoning.9 This is what we now refer to as Euclidean zoning, quite
naturally. But I like to think that modern land use jurisprudence
really began a decade earlier at the height of the Progressive Era at
a nondescript corner of what could be just about any city street in
America. The property is now part of the Arlington Heights neighbor-
hood in Los Angeles. The area contains little of overwhelming inter-
est, just the usual commercial buildings, residences, traffic signals,
and small businesses. It contains a self-storage facility, pretty typical
in a commercial district (here, the “C-4 District”).10 There is nothing
at all, in fact, to indicate that just over a century ago this was the
site of what was to become one of the most important land use cases
in U.S. history—the place that gave us the first Supreme Court deci-
sion that dealt with how the expanding power to regulate the use of
property meshes with private property rights. This area—the block
southeast of the corner of Pico and Crenshaw Boulevards—was once
a brickyard at the edge of the city, owned by Joseph C. Hadacheck.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Hadacheck v. Sebastian11—
upholding Hadacheck’s conviction for violating a newly adopted
ordinance that prohibited brickyards in certain districts and deny-
ing his request for a writ of habeas corpus—does not give the real
flavor of the case. This neighborhood was once outside of the city
limits. Indeed, the title of Hadacheck’s property predated the city
8. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9. See CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN
AMERICA (1977).
10. See Zoning Information and Map Access System, ZIMAS, http://zimas.lacity.org/ (last
visited June 1, 2018). C-4 zoning permits commercial and some residential uses. See Generalized
Summary of Zoning Regulations City of Los Angeles, (Jan. 24, 2006), https://planning.lacity
.org/zone_code/Appendices/sum_of_zone.pdf.
11. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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itself and went back to the original Mexican land grant—as most
central and southern California land titles do—to a former alcalde
of the Los Angeles Pueblo. This parcel was originally a part of the
massive Rancho Los Cienegas. Eventually, the rancho was subdi-
vided and parceled off, and Hadacheck purchased a parcel in 1902
because the clay deposits made it an ideal place to manufacture the
bricks needed to build the rapidly expanding metropolis. California,
you see, “did not have great paving brick manufacturers like other
states mainly because of the scarcity of good vitrified clay depos-
its.”12 This property was prime: as the Court noted, the “clay upon
his property is particularly fine, and clay of as good quality cannot
be found in any other place within the city where the same can be
utilized for the manufacture of brick.”13
Brickmaking, as you might expect, was a messy affair, involving a
large hole in the ground to dig out the clay and fire-stoked drying
kilns. When Hadacheck’s manufacturing plant was far from down-
town, the noise, dust, and smoke it produced was not a big problem.
But Los Angeles was growing, and in 1909 the Hadacheck property
was annexed by the City and became subject to its jurisdiction. The
surrounding land—the site of at least one other brickyard—came into
the sights of the land speculators and developers. In the midaughts,
the nearby area was developed as single-family homes. Some of these
homes were, and remain today, pretty nice. They were mostly in the
arts-and-crafts style. One of these developments—built by “a syndi-
cate of a dozen prominent business men”—was an area they labeled
“Victoria Park.”14 That had a nice ring to it, and today the area is
still called Victoria Park.
To residences nearby, a noisy, smoke-and-dust-belching industrial
site was not a recipe for the status quo. Victoria Park, you see, was
just a few blocks from the Hadacheck site and was even closer to
another brickyard, Hubbard & Chamberlain, located across the street
from the residential development. And over a hundred years ago,
this meant the same thing it would mean today: a conflict between
an existing, possibly undesirable use and late-coming residents (whom
12. Dan L. Mosier, History of Brickmaking in California, CALIFORNIA BRICKS (2003),
http://calbricks.netfirms.com/brickhistory.html.
13. Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 405.
14. Victoria Park, L.A. HERALD, Jan. 20, 1907, at IV-1.
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today we might label “NIMBYs”).15 This conflict could have resulted
in a run of the mill tort or nuisance case, with a claim by the residen-
tial owners that Hadacheck’s use of his property interfered with
theirs and with a defense by Hadacheck that he was there first (thus
they “came to the nuisance”).16
But it didn’t play out that way. The City Council of Los Angeles,
over the veto of Mayor George Alexander, used its police powers to
adopt an ordinance prohibiting brickyards in certain districts.”17 By
that, the council pretty much meant this area because the only two
brickyards subject to this ordinance were Hadacheck’s and Hubbard
& Chamberlain, located directly across from the entrance to Victoria
Park on Pico Boulevard.
Remember that “syndicate of a dozen prominent business men”
who developed Victoria Park, whose residents were now overwhelmed
by the nearby brickyards? One of those “business men” was none
other than Josias J. Andrews, who just so happened to be a member
of the Los Angeles City Council and who chaired the council’s Legis-
lative Committee.18 According to a contemporary account:
[Mr. Andrews] is a Progressive and he is altogether progressive
in profession and practice in the broadest sense of the word. He
was twice elected to the city council and during the time of his
service was active in procuring the passage of various progressive
measures. He was a strenuous advocate of the law which later
as incorporated in the city charter limiting the height of new
buildings, and was instrumental in having it passed.19
Brickyards in other parts of Los Angeles where Councilman Andrews
didn’t have investments were not subject to similar ordinances, and
15. “NIMBY,” an acronym for “not in my back yard,” is used to describe those who object
to development primarily on the grounds that it is too close to their own property. See Michael
B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994).
16. See, e.g., Sturges v. Bridgman (1879) LR 11 Ch D 852 (Eng.) (demonstrating a private
nuisance claim not defeated by the fact that the plaintiff moved to the area and that the
defendant’s noxious use predated the plaintiff’s arrival).
17. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY—A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN
185 (2011).
18. 3 JAMES MILLER GUINN, A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA AND AN EXTENDED HISTORY OF LOS
ANGELES AND ENVIRONS: ALSO CONTAINING BIOGRAPHIES OF WELL-KNOWN CITIZENS OF THE
PAST AND PRESENT, 695–96 (1915).
19. Id.
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even where there were conflicts with residences, existing brickyards
were given several years to wind down.
But not in this case. The ordinance, prohibiting brickyards in cer-
tain districts, made it a crime to continue to operate. Apparently,
Mr. Hadacheck tried to use his land in other ways. He obtained a
building permit for a two-story residential building on Pico, and
there’s evidence he allowed the use of the clay pit as a dump site. But
he kept up the brickmaking, because he was charged with a misde-
meanor, convicted under the ordinance, and was remanded to the
custody of the Los Angeles police chief.
You already know the rest of the story. Hadacheck brought a
habeas corpus action challenging the constitutionality of his confine-
ment. He argued that he was being singled out and that the regula-
tions severely devalued his property (he argued that before the
regulations the property was worth eight hundred thousand dollars
but after, only sixty thousand dollars).20 He also argued that the land
was not really useful for anything but brick manufacturing, a claim
belied in hindsight by the future use of the site as blocks of single-
family homes. The residences there today are modest and not up to
the Victoria Park standard, mind you, but they are still pretty nice.
Even though the courts accepted Hadacheck’s argument that he
was not creating a nuisance, he lost in the California Supreme
Court and eventually in the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that it
did not matter that the brickyard was not a common-law nuisance
because the City could exercise its police power to prohibit uses,
even where those uses predated the regulation:
It may be that brickyards in other localities within the city where
the same conditions exist are not regulated or prohibited, but it
does not follow that they will not be. That petitioner’s business
was first in time to be prohibited does not make its prohibition un-
lawful. And it may be, as said by the supreme court of the state,
that the conditions justify a distinction. However, the inquiries
thus suggested are outside of our province.
There are other and subsidiary contentions which, we think, do
not require discussion. They are disposed of by what we have said.
It may be that something else than prohibition would have satisfied
20. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915).
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the conditions. Of this, however, we have no means of determining,
and besides, we cannot declare invalid the exertion of a power which
the city undoubtedly has because of a charge that it does not exactly
accommodate the conditions, or that some other exercise would have
been better or less harsh. We must accord good faith to the city in
the absence of a clear showing to the contrary and an honest exer-
cise of judgment upon the circumstances which induced its action.21
In short, the Court used the “rational basis” test to evaluate the
validity of an exercise of police power. The Court doubted its ability
as mere judges to question what the City said it needed and what
counted as a good-faith attempt to keep the city beautiful, absent a
clear showing of dirty pool. (This sounds a lot like Justice Kennedy’s
test for identifying a pretextual public use in Kelo v. City of New
London22 some ninety years later; but more on that in a minute.)
The rest, as they say, is history: the Hadacheck decision became
the foundation on which the constitutionality of all zoning law is
built. Today, we still have yet to resolve completely the tension be-
tween the police power to regulate property and the rights of private
property owners.
But what of Mr. Hadacheck? After he lost his brickyard business,
what became of him? We don’t exactly know for certain. But we do
know that in nearby Rosedale Cemetery, there’s a grave for one
“J.C. Hadacheck” who died in 1916 at the young age of forty-eight,
less than seven months after the Court issued its opinion. Is this the
same “J.C. Hadacheck” who petitioned the Supreme Court? We’re not
sure, but we wouldn’t be surprised. Not knowing for sure, our imagi-
nation wanders to a fanciful conclusion in which Mr. Hadacheck—
having been played by the city council, the NIMBYs, and the
courts—simply gave up the ghost after realizing that even though
he made the bricks that had built the city, his usefulness and his
time had passed.
II. REASON AND LAND USE REGULATION
Unlike Mr. Hadacheck, the rational basis test, in one form or
another, has survived the ninety-plus years in between. It even has
21. Id. at 413–14.
22. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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been transported into eminent domain law, first by Midkiff, the case
from my home turf that equated the power to appropriate property
for public use upon payment of just compensation, with the power to
regulate it, without compensation.23 Then, in Kelo, the Court for-
mally “Eucidized” eminent domain by concluding that if a taking could
conceivably be considered part of a comprehensive plan, the public
use of the property was, in the words of Justice Douglas in Berman
v. Parker, “well-nigh conclusive,”24 even if the specific transfer was
to take property from “A” and give it to “B.”25 Professor Charles Haar
would no doubt approve.26
The reasonableness test has also crept into regulatory takings law,
most recently in Murr v. Wisconsin,27 the case in which the Court
addressed the “denominator” or “larger parcel” issue by defining
property for takings purposes. It did so by applying a confusing stew
of mostly undefined factors, which did not focus on a property owner’s
expectations and actual use of her land but shifted the inquiry to
the reasonableness of the regulation. That inquiry involved looking
at things like the “treatment of the land” under state law, the “physi-
cal characteristics” of the properties (which includes the parcels’
topography and “the surrounding human and ecological environ-
ment”), and, most strangely, “the value of the property under the
challenged regulation.”28 Owners are not limited to knowing existing
regulations also charged with anticipating possible future regula-
tions, especially if the parcels are located in areas presenting “unique
23. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (“The ‘public use’ requirement
is thus coterminous with the scope of the sovereign’s police powers.”).
24. Berman v. Parker, 349 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Subject to specific constitutional
limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive.”).
25. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 (“Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough
deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate
for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a
piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that plan unquestionably
serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the
Fifth Amendment.”).
26. See Charles M. Haar, “In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan”, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1154 (1955) (the comprehensive plan is the foundation of zoning and the basis of judicial
deference to such exercises of the police power).
27. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). For my initial thoughts on Murr, see Robert
H. Thomas, Restatement (SCOTUS) of Property: What Happened to Use in Murr v. Wisconsin?,
87 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
28. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1938.
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concerns” or “fragile land systems.”29 The majority faulted the Murrs
for not realizing that merger provisions are common in zoning
schemes—and therefore, in the Court’s view, reasonable.30 Underly-
ing the majority’s opinion was its belief that regulation of the Murrs’
property is a good thing. But the reasonableness of a regulation is not
supposed to be part of the takings calculus—especially after the
unanimous Court in Lingle rejected the “substantially advance” test
as one of takings31—because, to even get to the takings question,
either the property owner must concede the validity of the regula-
tion, or a court must have concluded it was reasonable.32 As I argued
in an amicus brief in Lingle, this is the “public use” half of the
regulatory takings equation, since, if a regulation does not benefit
the public, the court should invalidate it not require compensation.33
Unreasonable regulations cannot be enforced, and this is a separate
question from whether an otherwise reasonable regulation results
in a regulatory taking and requires compensation, a point Justice
Kennedy has made in both condemnation and regulatory takings
cases.34 But Murr made this the central question in determining the
preliminary question of defining what “property” is protected by the
Takings Clause, because the measure of the owner’s expectation and
property right is the “reasonableness” of the regulation.35
29. Id. at 1946 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
30. Id. at 1947.
31. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005) (The Court explained that
the Takings Clause is not designed to prohibit government action but to secure compensation
“in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.” (emphasis added)).
32. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“What
is not at issue is whether the Government can lawfully prevent a property owner from filling or
otherwise injuring or destroying vital wetlands. The importance of preserving the environment,
the authority of state and federal governments to protect and preserve ecologically significant
areas, whether privately or publicly held, through appropriate regulatory mechanisms is not here
being questioned. There can be no doubt today that every effort must be made individually and
collectively to protect our natural heritage, and to pass it to future generations unspoiled.”).
33. See Brief for Charles W. Coupe et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
15–16, Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (No. 04-163), https://www.jdsupra
.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=76a1ff2c-b4bb-4891-b016-fadeed60cd89.
34. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lingle,
544 U.S. at 548–49 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Whether a regulation is reasonable or whether
an exercise of eminent domain is for public use are questions under Due Process and not the
Takings Clause).
35. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017) (“A reasonable restriction that predates
a landowner’s acquisition, however, can be one of the factors that most landowners would
reasonably consider in forming fair expectations about their property.”).
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III. THE FUTURE OF “PROPERTY”
Now that we’ve covered the past, we turn to the future and our
second case. As background, you might think that as a property
rights lawyer I’d be downright tickled when my home court—which,
as Professor Callies noted, may not be the friendliest court in the
land for property owners and property rights—went against the
grain and actually recognized a new constitutional property right.
It was a right that, as far as I can tell, no other court, state or federal,
has ever recognized. But, despite the Hawaii Supreme Court’s recog-
nition of the new right, I cannot say I am on board. In In re Maui
Electric Co.,36 the court concluded that the Sierra Club possessed a
constitutional property right in a “clean and healthful environment,”
entitling the organization to due process protections.37 This allowed
it to intervene in a Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”) petition
regarding a power purchase agreement for a by-then defunct electric
plant on Maui.
First, some background should be provided. Maui Electric Com-
pany filed an application with the state PUC, seeking the commis-
sion’s approval of an agreement between the utility and the Hawaiian
Commercial and Sugar Company. If approved, it would allow a rate
increase to account for the additional production charges associated
with the Puunene Power Plant, a coal-powered facility on former
sugar lands in central Maui, which transformed bagasse, the by-
product of sugar production, into electric power. Sierra Club asked
to intervene in the administrative process under the PUC’s rules,
seeking to assert its own claims as well as several of its Maui-based
members. The power plant, the petition asserted, would “impact
Sierra Club’s members’ health, aesthetic, and recreational interests.
Sierra Club also asserted its organizational interest in reducing
Hawaii’s dependence on imported fossil fuels and advancing a clean
energy grid.”38 It argued that its members were concerned that the
Puunene Plant relied too heavily on coal in order to meet its power
obligations under the existing agreement and also that its members
were concerned “about the public health and visibility impacts of
burning coal.”39
36. In re Maui Elec. Co., 408 P.3d 1 (Haw. 2017).
37. Id. at 23.
38. Id. at 4–5.
39. Id.
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That’s pretty vague stuff and seems more like a policy question
than something best resolved by an adjudicative proceeding. But
under existing judicial-standing rules in similar cases of original
jurisdiction actions brought in Hawaii courts, there was nothing too
outside the norm in this type of environmental-policy cases: there’s
little doubt that, if this were a case brought in a Hawaii trial court,
Sierra Club adequately alleged judicial standing. Anyone question-
ing that conclusion needs only to recall the so-called Superferry
case.40 In this case, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that Sierra Club
had standing to raise an environmental challenge to the subsequently
defunct interisland ferry because the ferry would threaten the
organization with four types of injury: (1) endangered species could
be adversely impacted by a high-speed ferry; (2) the Hawaii Super-
ferry could increase the introduction of alien species across the
islands; (3) surfers, divers, and canoe paddlers who used the Maui
harbor could suffer adverse impacts; and (4) there was the threat of
increased traffic on the road next to the harbor entrance. Again,
that’s a vague connect-the-dots logic to gain standing, but, for better
or worse, that is the current state of Hawaii’s standing doctrine.41
However, the Maui Electric case was not an original jurisdiction
action. It was an administrative proceeding of the PUC under the
agency’s administrative rules, governed by a different standard, one
that was based on the Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”).42 Under the APA, an outsider may intervene in a “contested
case” (a quasi-judicial, adjudicative administrative process) when an
agency rule or a statute gives the party a seat at the table, or when
intervention is required by law because the agency is determining
that party’s rights. In this case, Sierra Club claimed that allowing
the power agreement jeopardized its statutory rights and that it
possessed a constitutional property right. Thus, the Hawaii Constitu-
tion’s due process clause gave Sierra Club the right to intervene in
the PUC proceedings.43
40. Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 320 (Haw. 2007) (noting the “lowering
of standing barriers” in environmental cases).
41. See Stewart A. Yerton, Procedural Standing and the Hawaii Superferry Decision: How
a Surfer, a Paddler, and an Orchid Farmer Aligned Hawaii’s Standing Doctrine with Federal
Principles, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 330 (2010).
42. Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act, HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 91 (2017).
43. See Kaleikini v. Thielen, 237 P.3d 1067, 1082–83 (Haw. 2010).
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Neither the PUC nor the court of appeals bought Sierra Club’s
theory. The commission denied intervention and decided Maui Elec-
tric’s application without Sierra Club’s presence. The Club appealed
to the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals, which agreed with
Maui Electric and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It
concluded that because Sierra Club was not “aggrieved” by the PUC’s
decision (because the PUC correctly excluded the Club from the case),
the appellate court did not have jurisdiction.44 This issue had been
brewing in Hawaii’s agencies and lower courts for some time, and
presenting the Hawaii Supreme Court the opportunity to make this
ruling had been on wish lists at least since former Governor Neil
Abercrombie appointed the majority of the members of the five-justice
court back in 2014. But until the Maui Electric case, the issue (and
other cases which recognize certain rights that are set out in the
Hawaii Constitution as property) had never secured the necessary
three votes.
It was not so this time. The three-justice majority rejected two
arguments that could have avoided this difficult and ground-breaking
result. First, by the time the case reached the court, the Puunene
Plant was offline, a victim of Hawaii’s loss of the sugar industry. The
last sugar plantation had been shuttered, which meant no bagasse
and therefore no power plant. Maui Electric thus argued that Sierra
Club’s appeal was moot and that the supreme court should dismiss
it. Second, the majority might have avoided the constitutional issue
by combing through the PUC’s enabling statutes and concluding that
Sierra Club possessed a statutory (and not a constitutional) right to
intervene. But the majority rejected both arguments, first conclud-
ing that the case, even though moot, was nonetheless crying out for
resolution by the court (the so-called “public interest” exception to
the usual mootness rules), and then rejecting Sierra Club’s claim for
a statutory right to intervene.45
Having disposed of these preliminaries, the court reached the con-
stitutional question: does the Hawaii Constitution recognize Sierra
Club’s environmental concerns as a “property” interest entitling it to
procedural due process? Three justices said yes. The majority based
its conclusion on article XI, section 9 of the Hawaii Constitution:
44. In re Maui Elec. Co., 408 P.3d 1, 13 (Haw. 2017).
45. See Maui Elec., 408 P.3d at 8–9, for the majority’s mootness analysis, and 9–12 for its
rejection of the statutory argument.
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Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment,
as defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including
control of pollution and conservation, protection and enhance-
ment of natural resources. Any person may enforce this right
against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal
proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as
provided by law.46
The majority held that this provision created a legitimate claim of
entitlement to a clean and healthful environment, and thus such
claims qualified as “property.”47 It “is a substantive right guaranteed
to each person,” and thus could be enforced by any person, including
the Sierra Club.48 The majority noted that the court had earlier held
that Native Hawaiian rights—rights also set out in the Hawaii
Constitution—are “property” rights, and that environmental con-
cerns are no different.49
Interestingly, the majority seemed to anticipate criticisms of its
conclusion by noting that the constitutional text itself limited this
property right to being exercised within the framework of existing
environmental statutes, rules, and ordinances. This will, the major-
ity reasoned, keep things in check, and the slope would not be
slippery. What made the majority’s reasoning interesting is that it
concluded the very PUC statutes, which it had earlier rejected as
providing Sierra Club with the right to intervene, were environmen-
tal statutes that recognized Sierra Club’s constitutional property
right to intervene:
46. HAW. CONST. art XI, § 9.
47. Maui Elec., 408 P.3d at 13.
48. Id. at 12–13. Lovers of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), rejoice: in Hawaii’s
courts, corporations are persons entitled to constitutional rights. The constitutional provision
at issue here provides,
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by
laws relating to environmental quality, including control of pollution and
conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources. Any person may
enforce this right against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal
proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 9 (emphasis added). The Maui Electric majority held that Sierra Club,
a corporation, has a property right under this provision, meaning that Sierra Club is a
“person.” Maui Elec., 408 P.3d at 23.
49. Maui Elec., 408 P.3d at 16 (citing In re Îao Ground Water Mgmt. Area High-Level
Source Water Use Permit Applications, 287 P.3d 129, 142 (Haw. 2012)).
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We therefore conclude that HRS Chapter 269 is a law relating
to environmental quality that defines the right to a clean and
healthful environment under article XI, section 9 by providing
that express consideration be given to reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions in the decision-making of the Commission. Accordingly,
we hold that Sierra Club has established a legitimate claim of
entitlement to a clean and healthful environment under article
XI, section 9 and HRS Chapter 269.50
After reaching the conclusion that Sierra Club owns property in a
clean and healthful environment, the majority held this interest was
sufficiently important that the PUC had a duty to provide a hearing
before it deprived the Club of its property:
The risks of an erroneous deprivation are high in this case absent
the protections provided by a contested case hearing, particularly
in light of the potential long-term impact on the air quality in the
area, the denial of Sierra Club’s motion for intervention or par-
ticipation in the proceeding, and the absence of other proceed-
ings in which Sierra Club could have a meaningful opportunity
to be heard concerning HC&S’s performance of the Agreement.51
Finally, in a critical footnote, the majority made it clear that the
result is immune from future legislative tinkering. This is a ruling
based on the Hawaii Constitution, and thus no mere legislature can
mess with it too much.52
I’m not going to walk through the complete rationale of the two-
Justice dissent, because it is a relatively short 20 pages. In sum, Chief
Justice Recktenwald concluded that neither the PUC statutes nor
Hawaii’s due process clause gave Sierra Club the property right to in-
tervene in the power plant’s PUC application. The dissenters warned
of unintended consequences, which will flow from this decision:
Respectfully, the Majority’s expansive interpretation of what
constitutes a protected property interest in these circumstances
may have unintended consequences in other contexts, such as
50. Maui Elec., 408 P.3d at 16.
51. Id. at 18.
52. Id. at 19 & 19 n.33 (“Our ultimate authority is the Constitution; and the courts, not
the legislature, are the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution.” (quoting State v. Nakata,
878 P.2d 669, 709 (Haw. 1994)).
122 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 7:109
statutes where the legislature has mandated consideration of spe-
cific factors by executive agencies when implementing a statute.53
The dissenters concluded that the majority didn’t need to under-
take a constitutional analysis, because if denied administrative
intervention in the PUC, Sierra Club simply could have employed
those loose standing rules, which I mentioned earlier, and instituted
an original jurisdiction action. Same result, without blurring lines
and calling it a “property” right. Consequently, the dissenters viewed
the recognition of a property right in the environment as unneces-
sary, and a result driven by the majority’s policy determinations.
My biggest question about the majority’s conclusion is this: if the
most fundamental aspect of owning “property” is the right to ex-
clude others from the res, how in the world do members of the public
have the right to exclude other members of the public from a clean
and healthful environment? As the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,54 “We have repeatedly held
that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, ‘the right
to exclude [others is] “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle
of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”’”55 (Or maybe
Stevie Wonder said it better when he sang, “This is mine you can’t
take it.”56)
Either way, the ability to keep others off what you own—and have
the law back you up—is one of the defining sticks in the bundle of
rights that we call property. Thus, I think the majority didn’t confront
the real, foundational question built into the arguments: could Sierra
Club’s environmental concerns even be shoehorned into a concept of
“property” as that term has been used for thousands of years? Doesn’t
“property” as used in the Hawaii Constitution’s due process clause
mean private property? After all, as far as I can tell, every other
time the court has dealt with property in Hawaii’s due process
clause, it has either expressly defined or implicitly assumed that the
property interest at stake was private property, and not a right that
looks more like something “owned” collectively by everyone. Yes, the
court’s ruling was only that environmental concerns are property
53. Maui Elec., 408 P.3d at 28–29 (Recktenwald, C.J., dissenting).
54. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
55. Id. at 831 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
56. STEVIE WONDER, FOR ONCE IN MY LIFE (Motown Records 1968).
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rights in the context of procedural due process (“new” property), but
there’s no reason to distinguish due process property from other forms
of property.57 Essentially, what the majority accomplished was a subtle
redefinition of “property” from a private right to a public resource.
I appreciate the Hawaii Supreme Court’s commitment to opening
court-house doors to resolve claims, especially when the claims in-
volve the environment and are made by those who profess to protect
it. As I noted earlier, the court’s standing doctrine for original
jurisdiction cases sets the bar so low that it is, for all practical pur-
poses, a mere pleading speed bump and not a realistic barrier to
courts becoming embroiled in political and policy questions perhaps
best left to the political branches. The standing rule—as our courts
have held—is a “prudential rule of judicial self-governance”58 for
courts exercising their original jurisdiction, and does not, technically
speaking, govern their appellate jurisdiction in appeals under the
Administrative Procedures Act. But as a result of the Maui Electric
case, the barn doors are wide open for both types of cases. On that
point, I think the dissenting opinion got it right when it concluded
that rejecting administrative standing would mean only that Sierra
Club could have instituted an original action in a Maui trial court.
Thus, the court-house door could remain open without needlessly
undermining the concept of property.
As I noted earlier, this decision was a long time coming, and any-
one paying attention has been expecting this shoe to drop whenever
the Justice Pollack-led branch of the court could garner that critical
third vote. Now that it has happened, this naturally leads to the
follow-up question: what could be next? It stands to reason that the
next candidate for the other shoe drop is “public trust” rights, which
in the recent telescope cases just missed a third vote.59 There, Justice
Pollack and Justice Wilson concurred, concluding that both Native
Hawaiian and public trust interests are “property” interests. They
argued that article XI, section 1, of the Hawaii Constitution created a
property interest in natural resources, which are to be administered
for public benefit.60 Now that this same telescope case is back in the
57. See Robert H. Thomas, “Property” and Investment-Backed Expectations in Ridesharing
Regulatory Takings Claims, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 301, 311 (2017).
58. Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 623 P.2d 431, 438 (Haw. 1981).
59. Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 363 P.3d 224 (Haw. 2015).
60. See id. at 355 (Pollack, J., concurring).
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Hawaii Supreme Court, I would not be surprised if the same three
justices who found that environmental concerns are property take
a hard look at extending that rationale.61
But despite this mission creep into eminent domain and takings
law, traditional Euclidean zoning as the primary tool for regulating
land use—and, therefore, restricting property rights—isn’t as in vogue
as it once was. A new set of tools is being employed to restrict, justi-
fiably or not, an owner’s ability to exercise property rights and use
her land as she sees fit. Thus, we see “form-based codes,” the resur-
rection of planned unit developments (both of which are mixed-use,
not-quite-Euclidean land use regulations).62 We have the rise of
environmental law as an additional limitation on property rights (in
our jurisdiction, as Professor Callies has pointed out in a study,
certain claimants have enjoyed a nearly ninety percent success rate
in the Hawaii Supreme Court over a ten-year stretch63). And, as
Professor Callies has also pointed out, areas on the cutting edge—
native rights, religious and cultural rights, sea-level rise, and
“sustainability”—are the new frontiers in property rights.64 Thus,
we’ve seen the concept of public trust expanded from its traditional,
Roman-law roots to cover all sorts of things, not only regarding
navigable waters and riparian property but also finding that the
public trust applies to wildlife65 and all natural resources, including
61. If environmental concerns grounded in the Hawaii Constitution are property, if Native
Hawaiian interests are property, and if public trust principles are property, are there other,
similar interests in the constitution where “property” might be discovered? There is at least
one provision that deserves a hard look, because it reads a lot like sections 1 and 9: “The State
shall conserve and protect agricultural lands, promote diversified agriculture, increase agri-
cultural self-sufficiency and assure the availability of agriculturally suitable lands. The
legislature shall provide standards and criteria to accomplish the foregoing.” HAW. CONST. art.
XI, § 3. Farmers and ranchers may want to consider raising arguments similar to those that
carried the day in Maui Electric. After all, we don’t have a hierarchy of state constitutional
rights—where some rights are more equal than others—do we?
62. See Daniel R. Mandelker, New Perspectives on Planned Unit Developments, 52 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TRUST L.J. 229, 231 & N.3 (2017).
63. See David L. Callies, Emily Klatt & Andrew Nelson, The Moon Court, Land Use, and
Property: A Survey of Hawaii Case Law 1993–2010, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 635, 636–37 (2011)
(The Hawaii Supreme Court’s “record on preserving private property rights guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the face of regulatory challenges is,
on the other hand, appalling, particularly given the increasing emphasis on preserving such
rights in our nation’s highest court.”).
64. David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use Takings
Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43 (2014).
65. See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588,
595–96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“While the public trust doctrine has evolved primarily around
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water.66 Thus, the Hawaii Supreme Court could conclude that our
state constitution’s public trust provision—added only recently, and
which purported to transform all water rights and natural resources
into public property—did not interfere with property rights or upset
existing expectations. Because, lo and behold, the century-plus of
existing jurisprudence, which recognized private rights in water and
natural resources, was simply mistaken and those property owners
never actually owned anything at all.67 As a consequence, we have
the public trust doctrine compelling decades’ worth of study before
a Kauai family can bottle and sell 645 gallons of water per day—an
amount roughly equivalent to a single, residential household in
usage.68 This is a decision that a past Brigham-Kanner Prize winner,
who is an expert in the public trust, has characterized as a very
unusual application of the public trust doctrine.69 Thus, my predic-
tion, for what it is worth, is that the public trust doctrine will be-
come the preferred tool for land use control because it can be so
powerful, and it takes only a court majority to adopt it and not a
legislative majority.
CONCLUSION
Allow me to conclude by noting that Professor Callies’s work and
scholarship have been ahead of the practicing bar in the public trust
arena, and that (unlike a lot of legal scholarship) we lawyers actually
find his writings useful to the practice of law. It reminds me that
the rights of the public with respect to tidelands and navigable waters, the doctrine is not so
limited. ‘[T]he public trust doctrine is not just a set of rules about tidelands, a restraint on
alienation by the government or an historical inquiry into the circumstances of long-forgotten
grants.’” (quoting Joseph Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical
Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 186 (1980))).
66. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (“The State has an obligation to protect, control and
regulate the use of Hawaii’s water resources for the benefit of its people.”).
67. See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1973). In Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Haw. 1987), the U.S. District Court held that the Hawaii
Supreme Court’s decision in McBryde was a judicial taking.
68. See Kauai Springs, Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Kauai, 324 P.3d 951, 983 (Haw. 2014)
(Hawaii’s public trust doctrine requires that when considering whether to issue zoning per-
mits to allow an industrial use on land zoned for agriculture the Hawaii Planning Commission
determines whether the applicant’s use of water would affect “the rights of present and future
generations in the waters of the state.”).
69. See Thomas Merrill, The Public Trust Doctrine: Some Jurisprudential Variations and
Their Implications, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 261 (2015).
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this is where we come in as property lawyers: to shape and develop
the law in such a way that the paramount importance of property
rights is not forgotten but celebrated. It may be an uphill climb but
one that is worth pursuing.
Finally, I have a reminder: you don’t need to be a true believer in
order to engage, and Professor Callies is a prime example. He cer-
tainly didn’t start his career on the side of light. Indeed, one of his
first, major scholarly publications, The Taking Issue,70 has been called
by one of the people for whom the Brigham-Kanner Prize is named
a “propaganda screed” to attack the concept of regulatory takings.71
But the road to Damascus can be a long one, and Professor Callies
eventually—and rightly—came around. A lifetime of teaching and
practicing in Hawaii can do that to you.72 As they say in golf, “It’s not
how you drive, it’s how you arrive,” and Professor David Callies cer-
tainly has arrived. Land use regulation is here to stay, and its reach
is expanding. But, thanks to Professor Callies, so has the notion that
property rights are a bulwark of liberty and individual rights and an
essential part of the land use calculus. Congratulations, David.
70. FRED BOSSELMAN, DAVID CALLIES & JOHN BANTA, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE
TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL (1973).
71. Gideon Kanner, Helping the Bear, or “The Taking Issue” Was a Failed Propaganda
Screed. So Why Is It Being Celebrated?, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Sept. 8, 2013), http://gideons
trumpet.info/2013/09/helping-the-bear-or-the-taking-issue-was-a-failed-propaganda-screed-so
-why-is-it-being-celebrated/.
72. See, e.g., Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cty. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246,
1268 (Haw. 1995) (The Hawaii Constitution allows Hawaiians to exercise traditional practices,
even on private property, and “[o]ur examination of the relevant legal developments in Hawaiian
history leads us to the conclusion that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally
applicable in Hawaii.”).
A BRIEF REBUTTAL FROM CALLIES
PANELIST
David L. Callies, FAICP, Benjamin A. Kudo Professor of Law, William
S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai‘i at Mânoa
CALLIES. I learned the hard way not to rebut early in my career, when
I was opposite an assistant attorney for a city. He got a really “rough
going” by the three-judge panel. What I should have done (and what
I learned to do several years later in Hawai‘i) was get up, introduce
myself, ask the court if they had any questions, and then sit down. I
didn’t do that. I decided to guild the lily, and the result was that the
judges took pity on my opponent. They really dragged me over the
coals for thirty-five minutes for so obviously winning, and then get-
ting up there and making things worse. I’m not going to do that,
except to say I agree with everything that was said.
But since this is about the future of land use, I would like to men-
tion to everybody, and maybe to alert some of you, that something
extremely important is going on right now in another part of the
country, in Philadelphia. The America Law Institute (“ALI”) has
taken upon itself a Restatement Fourth of the law of property. It’s
going to be a ten-year operation; the project is in its third year. There’s
going to be six volumes, which is a pretty big Restatement. And
there’s going to be an entire volume on land use. So, seven years
from now, that makes it about 2025, the ALI will be done with its
work. Judges tend to pay some attention to Restatements. It’s likely
to have a huge impact on the law of property. Now some of us will
be hopefully, or not so hopefully, retired and out of the business. But
a lot of folks out there are going to still be in the business of prop-
erty, property rights, litigation, and teaching, and the Restatement
is going to be an important piece of work when it’s done. So watch
carefully seven years from now when the ALI finally disgorges the
Restatement of Property Fourth, which is likely to have a lot of in-
fluence on the law of property, generally. And with that, I suggest
that it is likely to have as much impact as anything we will say
about property rights here at the Conference, and probably in the
next six to seven years.
Thanks very much.
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WATER AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF
HYDROCLIMATE INSTABILITY
ROBERT HASKELL ABRAMS*
Stationarity—the idea that natural systems fluctuate within
an unchanging envelope of variability—is a foundational con-
cept that permeates training and practice in water-resource
engineering.1
Changes in extreme weather events are the primary way that
most people experience climate change. Human-induced climate
change has already increased the number and strength of some
of these extreme events. Over the last 50 years, much of the
United States has seen an increase in prolonged periods of ex-
cessively high temperatures, more heavy downpours, and in
some regions, more severe droughts.2
Playing off a famous and provocative 1966 cover story from Time
Magazine that asked “Is God Dead?” a group of scientists pro-
claimed in 2008 in Science Magazine that “Stationarity is Dead.”3
They uttered that phrase as it pertains to water infrastructure plan-
ning and management. Their point was that anthropogenic changes
in climate had already rendered invalid the assumptions regarding
the extremes in water shortage and abundance on which America’s
* Professor of Law, Florida A&M University, College of Law. The author would like to
thank Lauren Robertson, Florida A&M University, College of Law class of 2020, for her
research assistance.
1. P.C.D. Milly, Julio Betancourt, Malin Falkenmark, Robert M. Hirsch, Zbigniew W.
Kundzewicz, Dennis P. Lettenmaier & Ronald J. Stouffer, Stationarity is Dead: Whither Water
Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573 (2008).
2. JERRY M. MELILLO ET AL., U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 15 (2014)
[hereinafter NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT], http://s3.amazonaws.com/nca2014/high/NCA3
_Climate_Change_Impacts_in_the_United%20States_HighRes.pdf?download=1.
3. Milly et al., supra note 1. For the 1966 cover, see “Time Magazine Cover: Is God Dead?”
TIME, Apr. 8, 1966.
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water projects had been based. The events of the last decade have
proved their thesis. Climate extremes are now far greater than those
that generations of water experts had planned for—more frequent
and extended droughts, more intense rainfall events and floods—
with the consequence that a new paradigm of water planning and
management is needed.
Events in the physical world are playing out in many ways, cre-
ating new occasions for the interplay of governmental action and
property rights. This Article will identify two such situations, both
related to the operation of major water control facilities, where cur-
rent and potential alterations to past operational regimes are giving
rise to protestations that the governmental responses to changed
climatic conditions are takings of private property rights.
I. THE NEW “NORMAL”
As a technical, definitional matter, it may be fair to quibble about
whether stationarity is really dead4 and, similarly, there likely will
continue to be some people who remain climate change skeptics.
What is not open to dispute is the empirical reality that the expected
operating parameters of the large water supply and flood control
projects in the United States, almost all of which were planned and
built forty or more years ago, have not accounted either for the more
extreme weather patterns—the intensity of droughts and storms—
experienced in the most recent forty-year period, or for the frequency
with which the extremes are being felt in many different regions of
the nation. These changes in the norms are concisely depicted using
maps rather than words. One of the maps depicts changes in flood
magnitude over time, and two sets of maps depict predicted mid-
twenty-first century water shortage and water consumption patterns,
4. See Harry F. Lins, A Note on Stationarity and Nonstationarity, WORLD METEORO-
LOGICAL ORG. (2012), http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/hwrp/chy/chy14/documents/ms/Stationarity
_and_Nonstationarity.pdf. Dr. Lins is the president of the World Meteorological Organization
Commission for Hydrology and a hydrologist at the U.S. Geological Survey. After making a
strong argument that the frame of reference affects the characterization of a system, as
stationary or not, one of Dr. Lins’s major conclusions is that even stationary systems are not
static. Id. at 5.
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with and without climate change. All of the graphics are selected
from the 2014 National Climate Assessment.5
Trends in Flood Magnitude
Figure 1. Trend magnitude (triangle size) and direction (upward pointing
arrow = increasing trend, downward pointing arrow = decreasing trend) of
annual flood magnitude from the 1920s through 2008. Local areas can be af-
fected by land-use change (such as dams). Most significant are the increasing
trend for floods in the Midwest and Northeast and the decreasing trend in
the Southwest.6
5. NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2.
6. NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 40 fig.2.21 (“Trends in Flood
Magnitude”), https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/our-changing-climate/extreme-weather
#tab1-images.
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Water Supplies Projected to Decline
Figure 2. Climate change is projected to reduce the ability of ecosystems
to supply water in some parts of the country. This is true in areas where
precipitation is projected to decline, and even in some areas where precipi-
tation is expected to increase. Compared to 10% of counties today, by 2050,
32% of counties will be at high or extreme risk of water shortages. Projec-
tions assume continued increases in greenhouse gas emissions through 2050
and a slow decline thereafter (A1B scenario). Numbers in parentheses indi-
cate number of counties in each category.7
Project Changes in Water Withdrawal
Figure 3. The effects of climate change, primarily associated with increasing
temperatures and potential evapotranspiration, are projected to significantly
7. NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 198 fig. 8.1 (“Water Supplies Pro-
jected to Decline”), https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/sectors/ecosystems, reprinted with
permission from Roy et al., Projecting Water Withdrawal and Supply for Future Decades in
the U.S. Under Climate Change Scenarios, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2545, 2553 (2012). Copyright
(2012) American Chemical Society.
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increase water demand across most of the United States. Maps show percent
change from 2005 to 2060 in projected demand for water assuming (a) change
in population and socioeconomic conditions based on the underlying A1B
emissions scenario, but with no change in climate, and (B) combined changes
in population, socioeconomic conditions, and climate according to the A1B
emissions scenario (gradual reductions from current emission trends begin-
ning around mid-century).8
Hydroclimate instability threatens to throw into chaos the nation’s
water management system, particularly water supply for reclama-
tion projects and lack of storage capacity for flood control.9 Unless or
until those recent extreme weather patterns go quiescent, operators
of major water projects have to review and revamp their operating
procedures to deal with more frequent extreme weather events.10 With
that awareness even inaction has to be considered a conscious choice
among alternatives, as water managers chart the way in which the
facilities under their control will respond to the threats and stresses
of too little and too much water.
II. HYDROCLIMATE FALLOUT FOR WATER
MANAGEMENT AND WATER USERS
The ramifications of hydroclimate instability reach beyond the op-
eration of water supply and control facilities to encompass regulatory
choices and legal doctrines and decisions. One of the essential func-
tions of government is to respond to natural disasters and, when pos-
sible, to prevent or minimize their effects. Floods and droughts are
prime territory for both proactive and reactive governmental inter-
ventions.11 The police power authority over health, safety, and welfare
8. NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 85 fig 3.11 (“Projected Changes in
Water Withdrawals”), https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/sectors/water.
9. There are also significant water quality effects that will not be considered in this
Article attributable to hydroclimate instability. These include increased sedimentation, nitrogen,
and other pollution loading. See, e.g., NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 70.
10. To be sure, some reviews are underway, but it remains uncertain (and in many set-
tings, doubtful) whether the authorities under which water managers operate are sufficiently
broad to allow the managers to consider all of the ramifications of their choices. See, e.g., Reed
D. Benson, Reviewing Reservoir Operations: Can Federal Water Projects Adapt to Change?,
42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 353 (2017). See generally KATHRYN FIRSCHING, U. S. Army Corps of
Engineers, in LAW OF WATER RESOURCE UTILIZATION: IMPACT OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS (Am. Bar Ass’n, Robert Abrams & Latravia Smith, eds., forthcoming 2018).
11. Wildfire mitigation and response is likewise a threat of changed dimension in the most
recent decade. Although not an intended topic in this Article, wildfire policies are another
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provides the groundwork for laws and regulations addressing the sub-
ject. Similarly, numerous laws charge federal and state officials with
responsibilities related to the protection of natural resources for the
public benefit. A considerable number of those laws, such as the fed-
eral Clean Water Act (“CWA”) or state minimum levels and flows
legislation, directly address governance of the water resource. Other
laws, such as the federal Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)12 and state
counterparts, address water indirectly, as critical habitat that must
be maintained to avoid jeopardy to listed species.
The reach of the myriad of laws promoting the public interest
often overlaps the sphere of the project-specific authority granted to
water managers, and the directives of the two sets of laws are not
always unitary. Officials of the United States Bureau of Reclama-
tion (“Bureau of Reclamation”) and the United States Army Corps
of Engineers (“USACE” or “Corps”) are required to operate their
projects in conformity with the congressional authorizations pursu-
ant to which the projects were funded and built. Concurrently, those
same officials are required to obey the CWA, ESA, and a host of other
laws. State officials, such as those in departments of natural resources,
are similarly constrained: many of the dictates of those federal laws
circumscribe what state officials can do in pursuance of their organic
state-law mandates. In addition, their state constitutions and legis-
lation frequently will prescribe other general duties in relation to
water resources and the public’s interest in those resources.
A second constituency affected by the ramifications of hydroclimate
instability is water rights holders, both riparians and appropriators.
Their interests are affected by the threats of water shortages or over-
abundance and, necessarily, by the water managers’ responses to
those conditions. Changes in the water management status quo af-
fects rights holders’ interests.
On the shortage end of the scale, the most obvious example of
adverse impacts falls on those having rights to divert and use water
whose diversions are curtailed or limited in times of water shortage.
There is a considerable controversy regarding governmental responses
area in which governmental choices are likely to have far-reaching impacts on affected prop-
erty owners. Historically, that area has given rise to legal doctrines that offer comparisons
to water facility operations that suggest a broad range of governmental activity, including the
extreme action of destroying property to protect other property, should be shielded from takings
liability. See infra text accompanying notes 46–48.
12. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A., § 1531–44 (2018).
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to climate instability that results in reductions in water availability
to holders of water rights. Legally, this translates into claims that
such actions constitute a taking of property, or whether they are per-
missible, noncompensable, regulations. On the superabundance end
of the scale, the class of interested property holders extends far be-
yond water users to include those living in the flood plains of rivers
who are protected by dams and levees. Still farther, it includes the
class of people owning property in communities whose water supply
is linked to storage in a reservoir, where dam operators’ responses to
particular hydroclimate threats can alter the reliability or force a re-
duction of that supply. Although less frequent, these more diffusely
affected parties also have pursued takings claims.13
Before going forward, return for a moment to the initial point
about the incorrect assumptions that undergird most of America’s
water impoundment and control facilities. The engineers were not
the only ones who predicated their structures on incorrect assump-
tions: the legal community did as well. Water laws that allocate the
use of water and the property rights spawned by those laws relied
on similarly flawed assumptions regarding stationarity and water
availability. The cause of the changed circumstance, whether an-
thropogenic14 or not, is immaterial to the claim that the laws were
established with flawed assumptions.15 Present water laws have their
13. A high visibility example of such a takings claim due to downstream inundation was
presented in Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012). This Article will
not consider issues of municipal and industrial water supply.
14. Consider, for now, two quick examples of anthropogenic changes that radically shift the
historic patterns of use that were expected when the relevant legal doctrines developed. At
the time U.S. water laws were formed and became the foundational doctrines of riparianism
and prior appropriation, who could have foreseen the technological and economic advances,
such as the centripetal pump, electrification of the countryside, and the rise of agribusiness
serving international as well as local, domestic markets? In combination, those developments
have created the basin-wide overdraft of the massive Ogallala Aquifer. Similarly, who would
have expected that urbanization, by hardening and encroaching on flood plains, would double
hundred-year flood peaks? See G. E. MOGLEN & D. E. SHIVER, METHODS FOR ADJUSTING RURAL
PEAK DISCHARGES IN AN URBAN SETTING, U. S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. SCI. INVESTIGATIONS REP.
55 (2006), https://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2006/5270/.
15. The human role in the changed conditions has relevance in assessing the relative
strength of claimed entitlements based on property rights. For example, in some instances the
changes being considered are not those having to do with climate. They are instead human
exacerbations that cause flooding through development and channel sedimentation and cause
dewatering of riverine environments through diversions and consumptive water use on a scale
that was unimaginable at the time when key elements of American water laws were established.
The law of property has always recognized, in numerous forms, the doctrine of changed
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genesis in the distant past. Riparian doctrine predates the founding
of the nation, having been carried to the New World with the colo-
nists as a doctrine having a long English history. Prior appropria-
tion is often thought to have its roots in the pragmatic, customary
rules of the mid-nineteenth-century gold rush mining camps, but it
also has deeper roots in the Spanish settlement of the American
Southwest, which can be traced back from there to the time when
the Moors ruled in Spain.16 Today’s far more volatile hydroclimate
is not the one they considered when they developed legal rules for
the allocation and use of the water resource.
Both riparianism and prior appropriation have demonstrated a
considerable ability to adapt to changing conditions and modes of
water use. This is most pronounced in regard to integrating ground-
water and surface water law doctrines as the science of hydroge-
ology provided an ever more nuanced understanding of the physical
interconnection of the two types of water sources.17 However, like
the engineers, the legal community, which created the laws govern-
ing the use and allocation of water, can hardly be expected to have
a more foresighted view of water availability than climatologists,
hydrologists, and other physical science and engineering experts. The
law will adapt to these changes as well, and with that in mind, this
Article will consider whether some of the currently claimed property
rights should continue to receive unchanged recognition, given the
changed state of the system in which the doctrines operate. To the
extent that legal norms incorporate moral norms, the water resource
entitlements and expectations that the law condoned and promoted
in an earlier era and under a more stable hydroclimate may have
lost the footing on which their continued validity stands.
conditions. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 7.10 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
16. See MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A SOCIAL AND LEGAL
HISTORY, 1550–1850, 20–21 (1984).
17. See, e.g., Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., 269 Mich.
App. 25, 709 N. W.2d 174 (2005), aff’d in relevant part, 479 Mich. 280, 737 N.W.2d 447 (2010)
(riparian doctrine applied to treat the interference with surface water use by groundwater ex-
traction under unified surface water principles); BARTON THOMPSON, JR., JOHN LESHY & ROBERT
ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 513–34 (5th ed. 2013) (describing groundwater-
surface water integration in several prior appropriation jurisdictions). More generally, the
author is a proponent of the view that water law is a prime example of a legal doctrine that
adapts over time to meet the needs of the society. See, e.g., Robert H. Abrams, Charting the
Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist Theory of Change, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381 (1989).
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III. A CAPSULE REVIEW OF TAKINGS OF PROPERTY DOCTRINE, AND
HOW WATER-RELATED TAKINGS CLAIMS ARISE
Cases raising claims that private property has been taken without
just compensation fall into three major categories: regulatory takings,
physical invasion takings, and exactions. After an initial inquiry to
ascertain that the claimant has a “cognizable property interest” af-
fected by a governmental action,18 the issue turns to whether a com-
pensable taking has occurred. At that point, the legal analysis applied
in each of these instances is distinctive, and the result in terms of
likelihood of success for the claimant vary greatly. When the facts
of a case demonstrate either a permanent physical invasion or a reg-
ulatory “wipeout,” the claimants have a high probability of success,
assuming ripeness19 and the absence of other defenses. The analysis
of non-wipeout regulatory takings and exactions both proceed under
multifactor rubrics that make a claimant’s position more difficult to
sustain. Exactions have a largely distinctive doctrine and, although
mentioned and summarized, that analysis has yet to find its way into
the scenarios being considered here.
A. Physical Invasion Takings: Permanent and Temporary
These claims arise when the government has physically taken pos-
session of the property of a claimant either by invasion of the parcel
or by taking away or depriving the claimant of a tangible interest. In
the various water contexts, the invasion could be by flooding, and the
deprivation of the tangible interest could be denying the claimant
a water use to which the claimant has a protected property right.20
18. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 722, 729 (2016). In a later
phase of that litigation, the irrigator claimants were found to lack water rights that would
entitle them to receive water, due to the presence of a senior right that required the water to
support tribal fishery. Baley v. United States, 2017 WL 4342771 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 29, 2017).
19. ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31796, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
(ESA) AND CLAIMS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS “TAKINGS” 5–6, (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc
/RL31796.pdf. In ESA takings-of-property challenges, Meltz makes a seldom-observed point
that many of those cases fail due to a lack of ripeness because there are additional steps that
can be taken in agency proceedings before the loss of the property interest is attributable to
governmental action. Id.
20. Most water rights are usufructuary in nature, and ownership of the corpus of the
water remains in the state, although the use, such as bottling spring water, may convert the
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The doctrine here is pretty simple—if the owner is permanently de-
prived of the property, it is a taking; if the owner is temporarily de-
prived of the property, the case is analyzed using the test applied in
cases of claimed regulatory takings. The Supreme Court in Arkansas
Game & Fish Commission (“AG&FC”) stated:
True, we have drawn some bright lines, notably, the rule that a
permanent physical occupation of property authorized by gov-
ernment is a taking. So, too, is a regulation that permanently
requires a property owner to sacrifice all economically beneficial
uses of his or her land. But aside from the cases attended by
rules of this order, most takings claims turn on situation-specific
factual inquiries.21
The Court further notes that “temporary limitations are subject to
a more complex balancing process to determine whether they are a
taking.”22
In the water rights area, cases involving takings of property based
on a reduction in water rights are, up to this time, very few. In the
only such case that has produced an opinion at the circuit court level,
Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States,23 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit treated a reduction in allow-
able use of water as a physical invasion case, and treated any depri-
vation of water as a permanent taking of that quantum of water,24 a
position that the dissenting judge found untenable.25 In most instances
contained water to private property. As a fairly recent development, Texas appears to rec-
ognize the right of the overlying owners to groundwater. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day,
369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).
21. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31–32 (2012) (citations
omitted). See also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
322–23 (2002) (indicating that regulatory takings generally require balancing and “complex
factual assessments,” utilizing the so-called Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York test).
22. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 36 (2012) (quoting Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)).
23. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
24. Id. at 1295–96.
25. The dissent stated:
For this to be a physical taking requires expanding the definition to the point of
erasing the line between physical and regulatory takings. Indeed, any property
use restriction—whether on land, air, or water, and whether temporary or per-
manent—deprives the owner of a pre-existing right to develop at least a portion
of his property for certain economic uses. Yet in Tahoe-Sierra, the Supreme
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thereafter, the Court of Federal Claims would be erroneous to con-
tend that the position is well-established,26 especially in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in AG&FC to remand and have the lower
court analyze the non-permanent invasions by flooding using the
regulatory takings test.27
B. Regulatory Takings: “Wipeouts” and Lesser Restrictions
These claims arise when governmental action limits the uses that
an owner may make of his or her burdened property. As noted above,
a similar analysis is used when physical invasions are temporary.
This type of takings claim is similarly bifurcated between so called
“wipeouts,” in which the regulation is so burdensome that the regu-
lated parcel as a whole has no remaining value,28 and impositions
which may still be found to be takings, but are evaluated using a
multifactor balancing test. The balancing test that is the contempo-
rary standard is drawn from the Penn Central case, which involved
development restrictions placed on Grand Central Station under
New York City’s historic preservation laws.29 The Court found:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have partic-
ular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the
Court nevertheless reaffirmed the constitutional distinction between physical
acquisitions and regulatory restrictions. 535 U.S. at 321–22, 122 S. Ct. 1465.
Here, compliance with Section 9 of the ESA ultimately requires Casitas to leave
more water in the river, thus augmenting the downstream river flow essential
for protection of the endangered steelhead trout.
Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting).
26. Casitas demonstrates the lack of a consistent judicial approach. It was not a unani-
mous opinion. Also, the Casitas case was decided in the Court of Federal Claims by Judge
Wiese. Wiese had earlier adopted the physical invasion approach in Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (Fed. Cl. 2001). Due to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002), Judge Wiese changed position and rejected the physical invasion analysis to find
no taking. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100 (2007).
27. Casitas itself did not result in a recovery for the water user because, on remand, Judge
Wiese found no interference with the state law property right and dismissed the case without
prejudice. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443 (2011).
28. The seminal case on this issue is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992).
29. The balancing test that is considered to be the standard is drawn from Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are,
of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be found when
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government, than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good.30
In both the flood control context and the water shortage context, it is
easy to imagine governmental actions that could trigger regulatory
takings claims. For example, in an effort to increase the flood stor-
age in anticipation of more frequent, extreme storm events, a fed-
eral dam operator could, depending on reservoir conditions, release
water in larger quantities than the historic norm, resulting in some
marginal inundation of downstream areas that had remained dry in
the past.31 Similarly, in an effort to protect fisheries, prevent exces-
sive sedimentation, and enhance other riparian values and uses, a
state might set and enforce a minimum flow requirement; the effect
of which is to prevent water users from withdrawing as much water
as they would otherwise be allowed to withdraw in the absence of
the minimum flow protection.32
C. Exactions
These claims arise when the government requires a property owner
to pay a fee, or dedicate a portion of the property to public use, as a
condition for receiving governmental permission to engage in regu-
lated land development activity. In exactions cases, the courts make
a two-pronged inquiry that measures, first, the “essential nexus”
30. Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
31. This scenario reflects several features of the AG&FC case, Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n
v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012). The purpose of the changed flow regime in AG&FC, how-
ever, was a response to a request from a group suffering water inundation losses that could be
avoided by altering the release pattern, while the changed flow regime raised in the scenario
being presented in the text is a part of an overarching regional flood control strategy.
32. There are no cases directly on point, but there are some cases where minimum flow
requirements have triggered more indirect impacts that have been challenged as takings by
property owners. See Whatcom Cty. v. Hirst, 186 Wash. 2d 648 (2016) (regarding the preven-
tion of residential development due to the inability to pump a quantity of groundwater that was
otherwise exempt from regulation due to the hydrologic link to a stream having a minimum
flow requirement that was not being met).
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between the condition and the underlying purpose of the regulatory
regime giving rise to the exaction,33 and second, whether the burden
on the parcel is roughly proportionate to the projected impacts of the
proposed development.34 To date, there are no governmental responses
to hydroclimate stresses that have resulted in takings claims based
on an excessive exaction theory.35
IV. THE VIEW FROM THE FEDERAL DAM OPERATOR’S PERSPECTIVE
For the moment, do not consider legislated purposes and policies
that may act as a constraint on how dams are operated.36 Instead,
set as the object of the dam operator the maximization of the total
net social benefit of the dam as an asset of the nation. In charting an
operations plan, the focus would be on events that have the potential
to have the greatest impact financially and socially on the citizenry.
Droughts and floods, because of the broad regionally disruptive im-
pacts they cause, are the two starting points in building an initial,
somewhat simplistic operating plan.
Operators of the dam would (1) seek to maximize the amount of
water retained behind the dam in anticipation of drought conditions,
to be able to release the water to ameliorate shortfalls in municipal,
industrial, irrigation, and environmental supplies. Contrastingly,
those same dam operators would (2) seek to reduce the amount of
33. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
34. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
35. Hypotheticals raising such a claim can be constructed. For example, if a state sought
to increase instream flows by conditioning approval of a water user’s change request based
on a dedication of a portion of the water right to instream flow, an exactions taking claim might
be lodged. Such an exaction would seem to easily satisfy the nexus prong and, depending on the
proportion of water dedicated to instream flow, likely to withstand the proportionality test as
well. In the wake of Hurricane Harvey, it seems plausible, if not likely, that exactions for flood
control may be levied due to the exacerbation of flooding attributable to hardening of the flood
plain caused by the developmental activity. See, e.g., C. P. Conrad, Effects of Urban Develop-
ment on Floods, USGS: U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FACT SHEET 076-03 (Nov. 29, 2016), https://
pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs07603/ (study of the effects of flood plain hardening by development).
36. Federally funded dams built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are congressionally
authorized to serve particular purposes that often include flood control. A dam authorized for
flood control also may include additional authorized purposes, such as navigation or municipal
supply. Disputes over the authorized purposes can have immensely important consequences,
such as in resolving whether municipal supply was an authorized purpose of the Buford Dam
and its reservoir, Lake Lanier, which had become the mainstay of Atlanta’s water supply. See
In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2011).
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water retained behind the dam in anticipation of potential flood
events, thereby providing storage capacity to be able to capture
water that otherwise risks flood damage. Seasonally and histori-
cally, many locales follow a general strategy of lowering storage in
winter to prepare for snow melt and spring rains and then, once the
risk of flooding lessens, of retaining as much of the spring runoff as
possible for release in late summer if supplies are short. Treat that
pattern as the historic status quo that those owning parcels down-
stream of the dam have come to expect. Recalling the stationarity
discussion set out at the very beginning of this Article, when the dam
was built the assumption was that rainfall patterns would be variable
from year to year, but the variations would be within predictable
limits of storage capacity and ability to release water that the dam
was engineered to handle.
In the current period of hydroclimate instability, a period that
includes more severe storms and more protracted droughts, the old
pattern of storage and release very likely is no longer appropriate.
The winter and early spring releases might need to be greater to en-
sure that space is available to store more water, to be prepared in
case a spring storm is more extreme than historic highs. At the same
time, however, there will be a countervailing pressure of wanting to
increase the amount of water held in storage to hedge against more
intense droughts than have occurred in past years. Due to the diffi-
culty of accurately predicting the weather as climate variability in-
creases, the dam operator is going to respond in more extreme ways
to short-term weather phenomena—knowing that a storm system
might be more severe than in the past, for example, the dam operator
would release water faster than under the old pattern of releases.
When that water is released, it has to go somewhere and that some-
where is downstream in greater quantities than the historic norm.
That alteration in releases may mean that the greater volume of
water inundates downstream areas that had not flooded at that time
of year in the past, giving rise to claims that the dam operator is tak-
ing the property of the downstream landowners whose parcels flood
as a result.37 At the opposite end of the spectrum, refusing to deliver
37. Although the reasons for the change in the release pattern were not associated with
the loss of stationarity, the timing and duration of downstream flooding in the wake of a changed
release pattern was what precipitated the takings claim in Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v.
United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012).
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water to irrigators in a time of anticipated (or actual) extreme drought
interferes with the activities of those who had benefitted from the
releases of that water in the past.38
Now factor in additional benefits that can be obtained from the
dam. These include maintaining navigation channels, hydropower
generation, recreation, and support of the environment. Only a mo-
ment’s reflection will reveal that a release pattern optimizing flood-
and drought-amelioration operations differs from a release pattern
optimizing other forms of benefits. Navigation tends to require re-
leases to supplement low flows in the natural hydrograph to main-
tain water levels downstream. Navigation may also require water
retention to ensure navigability of areas above the dam.39 That flow
pattern competes with upstream flatwater recreation and maximiz-
ing or minimizing storage as a hedge against high- and low-water
extremes. Hydropower tends to be maximized by keeping the water
level behind the dam high, to increase head, and timing the releases
to align with power peaking, which is the time the price obtainable
on the market is highest.40
The most obvious conflicts are between environmental protection
and all other purposes, with the possible exception of recreation. En-
vironmental values, especially when endangered species are present,
often are enhanced by trying to maintain the river’s historic hydro-
graph (the disruption of which may have been caused by the dam’s
presence). This will mean reducing large volume human diversions
from already low water in droughts and having high spring pulse
flows that clear sediment and flood some riparian lands to ensure
38. See, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
39. The USACE operation of the Missouri River dams to support navigation was a major
point of controversy raised by the upstream states’ desire to operate the system for recreational
benefits and the environmentalists’ desire to protect endangered species. This resulted in
extensive litigation. The most recent judicial opinion reviewing the USACE’s Master Manual
for the Missouri River and the choices made by the operating plan gives great deference to the
USACE. See In re Operation of the Missouri River System Litigation, 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1097 (2006).
40. This aspect of dam operations was an important element in the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint (“ACF”) controversy. In the dam’s planning process and throughout
virtually all of the project’s existence, a small minimum off-peak flow from the Buford Dam
was set at a mere six hundred cubic feet per second to retain as much water as possible in
storage, to be released when power generation would be most advantageous. See In re MDL-
1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1168 (2011). One of Florida’s key litigation
objectives was to increase the volume of the continuous release as a means to increase flows in
the Apalachicola River.
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appropriate breeding and sheltering habitats that the native species
have adapted to over the millennia.41 Those very same actions, how-
ever, reduce the water still in storage just as the traditionally higher
water demand summer months are approaching. These conflicts are
the ones seen in highest relief both in the ESA-irrigation conflict
situations and in the return to more natural conditions pursued by
the USACE on the Missouri River.42
When more extreme highs and lows are added by the changed
weather patterns, the difficulty of designing an operating plan that
strikes the proper balance among all of the competing interests in-
creases. This is seen in AF&GC, where a change in the release pat-
tern caused extended seasonal inundation 115 miles downriver,
making any change in the release pattern run the risk of adversely
affecting some downstream interests. Recognizing that dam opera-
tions inevitably involve trade-offs among the many purposes that
might be served, every decision by a dam operator regarding release
patterns will likely advantage some users of the resource complex
and disadvantage others. It would seem odd, however, for takings
law to transform the dam operator into a guarantor of all reliance
interests that might be disrupted by a failure to maintain a particular
release pattern. This realization affects the reasonableness of prop-
erty owners’ expectations, particularly when they insist on maintain-
ing the status quo that provides them with an advantage but reduces
the benefits to others that could have been realized by changes in
dam operations.
It is time to add another consideration to the calculus facing the
federal dam operator—the choices regarding the policies to be pur-
sued are constrained significantly by the statutory directives issued
by Congress to the dam operator and by the statutes that authorized
41. See, e.g., Bettina Boxall, Lake Powell Dam Releases Increased to Spread Sediment in
Grand Canyon, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci
-sn-grand-canyon-high-flow-experiment-20131111-story.html.
42. See Ideker Farms v. United States, 2018 WL 1282417 (Fed. Cl.) (takings challenge to
changes in Missouri River flood-management operations). In the Ideker Farms example, some
of the changes in USACE operations were ESA-mandated changes that sought to mimic the
natural hydrograph for the benefit of the endangered pallid sturgeon and restore portions of
the floodplain to more natural conditions that would improve sturgeon breeding and create
endangered bird-species habitat. To a degree, those purposes compete with obtaining absolutely
maximal flood protection. The USACE contends that the extraordinary precipitation pattern
in the time period covered by the lawsuit would have resulted in the flooding of the claimants’
lands even in the absence of the changes in operations.
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the construction of the dam. The federal dam operator has only the
authority Congress has given and must follow congressional directives.
Using the Missouri River basin as an example, for several decades
the congressional mandate was largely monochromatic, making flood
control the first priority and navigation the second. Beginning in
1973, the USACE, together with the rest of the federal government,
was required to fulfill its duties in conformity with the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”). Even if the USACE did not have to go back and
revisit its pre-1973 dam building and flood protection actions under
that law, all actions taken after passage of the ESA are subject to its
strictures. This would include any revisions to the Master Manual
for the Missouri River, controlling dam operations and any construc-
tion projects undertaken, even projects that had been approved prior
to the passage of the Act.43
Section 7 of the ESA requires all federal agencies to ensure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out “is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened spe-
cies or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of
such species.”44 In the 1980s, the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”) listed three species in portions of the Missouri River
basin as threatened or endangered. The listings had the effect of re-
quiring45 compliance with the ESA, which resulted in consultation
under Section 7 of the ESA and eventually took the form of provid-
ing suitable habitat for those species, set out as the Reasonable and
43. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (finding that the dam that had been autho-
rized and started prior to the passage of the ESA was subject to ESA for remaining stages of
construction). Even before ESA jeopardy opinions imposed habitat-supportive requirements
on the USACE, Section 601 of the Water Resource Development Act of 1986 had launched the
Corps on the path of habitat restoration for the damage caused by the Bank Stabilization and
Navigation Project, which had been an ongoing aspect of the federal flood control program for
seven decades.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018).
45. In re Operation of Missouri River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618, 631 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding
Section 7 of the ESA applies where USACE is able to exercise its discretion in determining
how best to fulfill the statutory purposes of the Flood Control Act of 1944, 16 U.S.C.A. § 460d
(2018)). Case law involving the Bureau of Reclamation dams has ruled that whenever the
action being taken by the agency is an action to which the agency has no discretion, the agency
need not comply with the ESA. Compare Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118,
1125–26 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no discretion and no ESA obligation), with Nat. Res. Def.
Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776, 785 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that Section 7 of the ESA applies
where the Bureau of Reclamation has some discretion in negotiating renewal of contracts with
water rights holders).
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Prudent Alternatives (“RPAs”) in FWS biological opinions. This addi-
tional legal requirement that supplemented the authority granted by
the Flood Control Act put the agency in a potentially awkward posi-
tion. Despite its flood control mandate, some of the steps required by
the ESA could reduce the flood control protection previously provided.
As would be expected, the role of Congress in shaping flood control,
navigation, and environmental protection in the Missouri River basin
is central: the USACE is empowered to do only what Congress autho-
rizes. Congress, the legislative branch, sets the policy to be followed
by the agency. Of particular concern in this setting are American con-
stitutional norms, which subject the implementation of those policy
decisions to judicial review to ensure compliance with the congres-
sional command, and to ensure that private property is not taken
for public use without just compensation. Policy choices that ratio-
nally prefer one activity over another are given a wide berth by the
Supreme Court. The leading case is Miller v. Schoene.46 In that case,
cedar trees were carriers for cedar-apple rust, a fungal disease that
was harmless to cedar trees but fatal to apple trees. The Virginia leg-
islature opted to protect the apple trees, literally at the expense of the
owners of cedar trees. The legislation required the owners of cedar
trees to cut and dispose of cedar trees on their own property at their
own expense to protect the state’s apple growers. The Court perceived
this as a triage nuisance decision and ruled unequivocally that a rea-
sonable policy choice in a triage situation is not a taking of property:
When forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its consti-
tutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of
property to save another which, in the judgment of the legisla-
ture, is of greater value to the public. It will not do to say that the
case is merely one of a conflict of two private interests and that
the misfortune of apple growers may not be shifted to cedar own-
ers by ordering the destruction of their property; for it is obvious
that there may be, and that here there is, a preponderant public
concern in the preservation of the one interest over the other. And
where the public interest is involved preferment of that interest
over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even of
its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every
exercise of the police power which affects property.
46. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
2018] AN ERA OF HYDROCLIMATE INSTABILITY 147
We need not weigh with nicety the question whether the infected
cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law; or
whether they may be so declared by statute. For where, as here,
the choice is unavoidable, we cannot say that its exercise, con-
trolled by considerations of social policy which are not unreason-
able, involves any denial of due process.47
Miller v. Schoene, though not widely cited, is not an outlier in Supreme
Court takings jurisprudence. Cases where a building and its contents
are sacrificed to prevent further spreading of a fire have long been
acknowledged as not giving rise to governmental liability.48 The logic
of these cases militates strongly for a finding that governmental re-
sponses to climate extremes are unlikely to be easily categorized as
takings of property. This especially is the case when the claimed prop-
erty damage comes about as a result of the changed operations of a
water control facility responding to climate extremes that were not
anticipated when the projects were being built.
The deference given to governmental triage decisions by the Su-
preme Court has not blunted the efforts to seek takings redress for
flooding events occurring in the Missouri River basin after the ESA
impelled changes in USACE flood control operations. A recent, pend-
ing case presents precisely those issues. In Ideker Farms v. United
States,49 claimants’ lands had not previously suffered major flood
damage in the decades when the USACE had single-mindedly pur-
sued flood control and navigation. Those lands, however, experi-
enced major flooding and, in some cases, sand deposition during and
after extreme weather events in the years after the USACE began
to pursue Missouri River habitat restoration. Ideker Farms is an
outgrowth of AG&FC in two regards. First, and correctly, the Ideker
Farms claimants rely on the holding of the AG&FC case that removes
the barrier to takings recovery for flooding that is not permanent.
Second, and less certainly correct, the Ideker Farms court relied on
the theory that takings liability can be based on a foreseeability stan-
dard rather than an intentionality standard.50 That approach grows
principally out of overbroad language in the decision of the Federal
47. Id. at 279–80 (citations omitted).
48. See Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1880).
49. Ideker Farms v. United States, 2018 WL 1282417.
50. Id. at *16.
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Circuit opinion in AG&FC on remand.51 The standard applied by the
Federal Circuit is essentially that of negligence; that is to say, the
government is liable for inundation damage when that damage is a
foreseeable consequence of the government’s action.52 Were that the
standard, the USACE would become a de facto guarantor of all such
losses, even though the actions were taken for a public purpose.53 Con-
gress has clearly proscribed tort recovery for flood control operations
by granting broad immunity for those operations.54 The intention-
ality standard that has been applied in takings cases requires what
Professor Sandra B. Zellmer has termed, “substantial certainty.”55
There is absolutely no indication that AG&FC intended to change
that. Justice Ginsburg’s unanimous opinion flatly states:
We rule today, simply and only, that government-induced flooding
temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Tak-
ings Clause inspection. When regulation or temporary physical
51. In an earlier article, this author has described the overbroad language of the Federal
Circuit in AG&FC following the remand from the Supreme Court (Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n
v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013)) as follows:
The Federal Circuit finding of a taking on remand adopted broad language that
tended to obscure the absence of issues not preserved due to the Corps’ litigation
strategy that might have averted a successful takings claim. As written, the
Federal Circuit opinion suggests that an inundation claimant can recover for a
taking of property by proving only an objective and foreseeable harm due to in-
creased flooding linked to a pattern of releases that confers a benefit of lesser
flooding on others situated below a dam. The Federal Circuit’s use of foreseeability
badly misstates the rules laid down by the precedents upon which it relied.
Robert Haskell Abrams & Jacqueline Bertelsen, Downstream Inundations Caused by Federal
Flood Control Dam Operations in a Changing Climate: Getting the Proper Mix of Takings,
Tort, and Compensation, 19 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 11 (2015) (citations omitted).
52. On April 20, 2018, shortly after the Ideker Farms decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit handed down its decision in St. Bernard Parish v. United States, 887 F.3d
1354, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 10023, in which claimants’ standard of proof on the issue of cau-
sation was set out in a manner that may require reconsideration of that issue in the ongoing
portions of Ideker Farms. That court, in the context of flooding attributed to the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet during Hurricane Katrina stated, “the correct legal standard [requires] that
the causation analysis account for government flood control projects that reduced the risk of
flooding.” Id. at *2. To properly apply that standard, the governmental actions must be viewed
in their entirety, including consideration of the parcel’s propensity to flood before any govern-
mental action. Id. at *16. In Ideker Farms, that will require proof of historic conditions that
obtained before any federal activities were taken to prevent flooding on the Missouri.
53. See Sandra B. Zellmer, Takings, Torts, and Background Principles, 52 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 193, 211–12 and 217–18 (2017).
54. See 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (2015) (originally enacted as Act of May 15, 1928, ch. 569, § 3,
45 Stat. 534, 535–36).
55. Zellmer, supra note 53, at 194–95 (2017). Professor Zellmer provides an extended
justification of that standard and its roots in case law. Id. at 216–29.
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invasion by government interferes with private property, our deci-
sions recognize, time is indeed a factor in determining the exis-
tence vel non of a compensable taking.56
V. THE EVOLUTIONARY IMPETUS OF CHANGED PHYSICAL
CONDITIONS ON PROPERTY LAW
Property law evolves to meet the needs of society. Water law is one
of the best proving grounds for that proposition as its legal doctrines
change instrumentally to meet the most pressing needs of society.57
Take a traditional property right as fundamental as the right to ex-
clude others from one’s land. When protection of that sacrosanct prin-
ciple in the water law arena became sufficiently antithetical to the
public good, it was jettisoned with barely a second thought by the
Supreme Court of the Colorado Territory in 1872. The state was in
its early phases of settlement, and the settlers locating on the east
slope of the Rockies in the region known on the maps as the “Great
American Desert” were faced with arid conditions that made dry-land
farming untenable. The region’s streams and rivers were spaced far
apart, meaning that water could not be diverted from rivers and
brought to the non-riparian lands for irrigation without trespassing
on the lands of riparians and others located closer to the watercourse.
That meant vast tracts of land would be uninhabitable until the inven-
tion of the centripetal pump made large volume groundwater pump-
ing technologically feasible roughly seventy-five years hence. The
law recognized the conditions and changed. The court summed it up
in a single sentence:
In a dry and thirsty land it is necessary to divert the waters
of streams from their natural channels, in order to obtain the
fruits of the soil, and this necessity is so universal and imperious
that it claims recognition of the law.58
56. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 38 (2012).
57. See, e.g., Robert Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist Theory
of Change, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381 (1989). The Google online dictionary defines instrumental-
ism as “a pragmatic philosophical approach that regards an activity (such as science, law, or
education) chiefly as an instrument or tool for some practical purpose, rather than in more
absolute or ideal terms, in particular.” Instrumentalism, GOOGLE ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://
www.google.com/search?q=google+online+dictionary&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b
#dobs=instrumentalism.
58. Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553 (Colo. Terr. 1872). Also cf., Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S.
361, 369–70 (1905) (Under arid conditions prevailing in Utah, but not in the absence of those
150 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 7:129
The holding in that case allowed private condemnation of an ease-
ment over the objection of the landowner across whose land the canal
would run. With equal aplomb, many of the states of the West that
had initially recognized riparianism as their water law legislatively
abolished riparianism in favor of prior appropriation. That radical
revision of property rights was not found to be a taking of the rights
of the riparians.59
What is today’s reality? What are the pressing interests of the
community at large? Are the extraordinarily strong property rights
being claimed by prior appropriators suitably viewed as inviolable
without being a taking of property, or can they be adjusted instru-
mentally as a response to new understandings of ecology and hydro-
climate instability? Keep in mind, here, that changes in conditions
and attitudes are not always one-way ratchets that expand public
rights at the expense of private property. AG&FC added protection
of private property by discarding an older Supreme Court precedent,
Sanguinetti v. United States,60 which had required that inundations
be permanent to qualify as takings.61 At the same time, however,
AG&FC required non-permanent inundations to be analyzed using
Penn Central principles, rather than Loretto principles. By a parity
of logic, AG&FC extends to the water shortage situation and calls
for using the Penn Central balancing tests and not the permanent
physical invasion rubric that would treat them as per se takings. This
is particularly appropriate in the case of analyzing temporary govern-
mental reductions in water deliveries, which are far less physically
invasive than the deposit of flood waters. Beyond that, the newly
emergent exigencies of hydroclimate instability bring the Miller v.
Schoene principles into play.
Looking at the water shortage aspects of this discussion, the prop-
erty rights being claimed are quite extraordinary. Consider, first, the
or similar circumstances, a private party’s condemnation of land for water transport is a
public use.).
59. See, e.g., Hough v. Porter, 95 P. 732 (Ore. 1908). On the topic of how the western
states justified the renunciation of riparianism, see A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS
AND RESOURCES §§ 5.5–5.10 (2017). Only Oklahoma has found that the elimination of residual
(unexercised) riparian rights, to make use of water, constitutionally problematic. See Franco-
American Charolaise Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Board, 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990). California
and Nebraska have what are considered dual systems that address the issue in less than fully
satisfying ways. See TARLOCK, supra § 5.13.
60. Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924).
61. That was the holding below, in AG&FC. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United
States, 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d, 568 U.S. 23 (2012).
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unusual nature of the rights claimed to have been taken in cases like
Tulare Lake,62 Klamath,63 and Casitas.64 The entire prior appropria-
tion system operates as a perpetual grant of public resources for the
benefit of holders of appropriative rights, the vast majority of whom
are private parties profiting from the use, without paying anything
for the right to use the water resource itself. Once established, there
is no time limit on the right—it functions as a permanent alienation
by the government of a portion of each year’s available water.65 The
effect of treating even a temporary interruption of the right to divert
water, in order to protect important public interests, as a physical
invasion is also quite extraordinary. The prior appropriation system
awards rights to take that water in a priority order and on a perpet-
ual basis with no concern for the potentially harmful impacts of that
activity on the resource base and the interest of the general public.
That absolute private control of the water is claimed even when its
exercise results in significant public harms. Throughout the West,
streams have been dewatered by the actions of prior appropriators, at
times harming threatened and endangered species and other riparian
ecosystem values. Moreover, the resource over which the private own-
ers are claiming dominion is a publicly owned public resource, which
the state administers as a trustee for the benefit of all of its citizens.
Recalling the background principles of property and nuisance law,
these rights not only should be, but are subject to reasonable regula-
tion without takings liability under either the public trust or nuisance
prevention doctrines. Assume, momentarily, that Tulare Lake and
Klamath properly state the law, that is to say, that interference
with those appropriative rights are governed by the rule for physical
invasion cases and are takings of property. In effect, under that rule,
the usufructuary rights of appropriators are perpetual and immune
to government regulation for the public interest. Due to the perpetual
nature of the appropriative rights and their immunity to regulation
in the public interest, there could scarcely be a more concrete example
that contravenes the doctrine established by Illinois Central,66 which
62. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (Fed. Cl. 2001).
63. Klamath Irrigation v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 722, 729 (2016).
64. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. V. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
65. The doctrines of abandonment and forfeiture place a minimal burden on the water user
to ensure that the rights granted be exercised and not go unused for a period of time. See BARTON
THOMPSON, JR., JOHN LESHY & ROBERT ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 356
(5th ed. 2013).
66. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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announced, as the core public trust principle, that government cannot
abdicate its authority to govern public trust resources for the benefit
of the public. That is not to say that the state cannot validly opt to
honor appropriative rights due to their importance to the predictabil-
ity and stability of the persons relying on the uses made of the water—
that is one of the teachings of the famous Mono Lake decision.67 What
Illinois Central does say, however, is that the reasonable restriction
of those rights in exigent circumstances remains in the power of the
state, and operates as an inherent limitation on private rights in trust
property and is not a taking if that restrictive power is exercised.
The next point to be made is the unrealistic idea that the water
rights themselves are immutable. As already noted, the instrumental
nature of water law has seen major changes in property rights accom-
plished without takings liability. The case can readily be made for
establishing the importance of live streams to regional ecology, re-
gional economy, and the public welfare. Like hydroclimate instability,
changed understandings call for changes in the law. In fact, this is not
a new and radical realization in the water community. More than
forty years ago, in 1973, in an influential report suggesting numerous
changes in water law, the National Water Commission stated, “The
people of the United States give far greater weight to environmental
and aesthetic values than they did when the nation was young and
less settled.”68 As Garrett Hardin said in his very famous article The
Tragedy of the Commons, “The morality of an act is a function of the
state of the system at the time it is performed.”69 The state of the
system, due to the stresses imposed by hydroclimate instability, has
changed. The collective stresses of droughts and over-appropriation
in many parts of the West is literally destroying riparian ecosystems
to the detriment of all, including the water-user community. As was
recognized by the Colorado Supreme Court, a court known for its com-
mitment to the fundamental principles of the prior appropriation doc-
trine, it is no longer reasonable for appropriators to expect to utilize
every last drop of water.70
Takings law itself has seen outcomes in cases change with the
times and with the perceptions about the extent and importance
67. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983).
68. NAT’L WATER COMM’N, NEW DIRECTIONS IN U. S. WATER POLICY 5 (1973).
69. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245 (1968).
70. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 314 (Colo.
2007), as modified (Nov. 13, 2007).
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of the injury to be avoided by the challenged regulation. Just as the
bright-line test of Sanguinetti gave way to the possibility of a Penn
Central–based analysis in AG&FC, the outcome in the famous regula-
tory takings case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon71 was disregarded
on almost indistinguishable facts sixty-five years later in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,72 where the nuisance
prevention rationale was applied to coal mining–induced subsidence
prevention laws. The change vindicated the words of Justice Brandeis,
dissenting in Mahon:
[T]he right of the owner to use his land is not absolute. He may
not so use it as to create a public nuisance, and uses, once harm-
less, may, owing to changed conditions, seriously threaten the
public welfare. Whenever they do, the Legislature has power to
prohibit such uses without paying compensation; and the power
to prohibit extends alike to the manner, the character and the
purpose of the use.73
Under current conditions of increased water scarcity and better
knowledge of the consequences of dewatering ecosystems, states and
the federal government have the power to regulate appropriators to
protect minimum flows and levels (“MFLs”) and endangered species
as incidents of nuisance prevention without takings liability. Applied
in the takings arena, changed understandings about the ecological
effects of dewatering streams and the need for the government to be
able to address more frequent drought scenarios, not anticipated
when the nation’s major water control structures were built, vitiates
all possibility that it is reasonable for water rights holders to expect
that their appropriative rights are, or should remain, unregulated
and “unregulable” without takings liability.
It is equally doubtful that governmental dam operations can be
expected to be immutable in the face of both the increased ecological
understanding and the pressure of hydroclimate instability. Under
a tort standard, governmental liability for unreasonable choices might
otherwise be available, but Congress intentionally granted a broad
tort immunity to be sure that its flood control projects would not be
subject to review on that basis. What is left is takings law, but even
71. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
72. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
73. 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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after the lowering of the barrier to inundations caused by the opera-
tion of flood control dams in AG&FC, there is still more required than
mere tort foreseeability before a recovery for a taking can be obtained.
In sum, it is already apparent that hydroclimate instability is cre-
ating a new normal. In that universe, government operators of water
control structures are ever more frequently being pressed to make
decisions charting a course among competing perils. When reason-
able choices are made, properly analyzed, those actions are neither
torts nor takings. That has long been the case, and the Supreme
Court’s ruling in AG&FC is not to the contrary. Even as the Court
removed the requirement that a flooding invasion must be perma-
nent to support a takings claim, the Court did not find a temporary,
physical invasion of property to be a per se taking. The Court called
for the use of Penn Central balancing, one key element of which is the
reasonable, investment-backed expectations of the landowner. In an
era of hydroclimate instability, surely those expectations are shaped
by the climate and the physical capabilities of dam and reservoir sys-
tems built with reference to assumptions that are no longer operative.
Applying the principles of takings law, principles that expressly were
left unchanged by AG&FC, when reasonably made in response to
fraught choices, the actions of dam operators in controlling flood
waters or responding to drought conditions will seldom, if ever, run
afoul of the prohibition against takings of property.
MUDDYING THE WATERS: SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF
DOCTRINAL UNCERTAINTY IN MONTANA WATER LAW
ERIC ALSTON* & JOHN STAFFORD**
INTRODUCTION
The development of water law in the western United States is an
important case study of the refinement and abrogation of the com-
mon law in the face of existing practices and their comparative
suitability to the unique climactic and institutional conditions in the
arid West. Just as climate and industrial demands from agriculture
and mining defined institutions in a bottom-up fashion along the
western frontier, federal land policy also influenced the definition
of institutions in a top-down fashion. We show how, in the context of
Montana, the courts played an important role in the process of tran-
sitioning the state from an informal to a formal legal system, balanc-
ing the tensions created by conflicting statutory and case precedents,
as well as by predominant industrial and agricultural uses of water
along the frontier.
In the most arid of western states, this transition meant that the
prevailing legal doctrine governing water rights became prior appro-
priation, although the means by and time at which this change
occurred varied from state to state. Adoption of the doctrine of prior
appropriation required the abrogation of the common-law riparian
doctrine in place in the eastern United States. This change has been
linked to both an economic and an institutional explanation. The
economic rationale holds that a doctrine suited to the orderly dispo-
sition of the majority of water rights in areas where water was
abundant did not map well to places where competing demands for
water outstripped the available supply. The institutional explanation
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depends, instead, on the fact that the predominant uses of public land
in the western states required resolution of water claims where the
water user did not hold title to the land itself. This meant the ripar-
ian doctrine, which granted holders of a land title the rights to
running water on or adjacent to their property, could not be directly
applied to cases involving the rights to water appurtenant to uses
of public land, such as mining. This question—whether the choice
of institutions by ranchers and miners or the incompatibility of
public lands with riparian water rights led to the emergence of the
prior appropriation doctrine—is one we consider in the context of
Montana. Montana ultimately took sixty-one years to settle the ques-
tion definitively as to whether the riparian or prior appropriation
doctrine governed the disposition of water rights in the state.
This sixty-one-year period provides an extended context to view
the iterative process by which the formal water-rights regime even-
tually evolved into the prior appropriation doctrine. Unlike other
western states such as Colorado, the Montana territorial and state
legislatures provided an unclear statutory backdrop for the courts
regarding the contexts in which prior appropriation and riparian-
rights systems applied. This meant the Montana Supreme Court
was presented with a series of cases that required the court to clarify
territorial and state laws surrounding water rights. As the court
interpreted the muddied statutory and case precedent, it avoided
having to abrogate one doctrine in favor of another, in keeping with
the notions of judicial deference that animate the canon of avoid-
ance of legal conflict. However, in reconciling conflicting claims to
water rights, the court slowly removed certain definitional compo-
nents of the riparian doctrine in favor of those that, in contrast,
defined the doctrine of prior appropriation. By the time the Montana
Supreme Court stated with finality in 1921 that prior appropriation
was the only doctrine governing water rights in the state, the court’s
previous decisions, and the bulk of water-rights users’ choice for prior
appropriation as reflected in the vast majority of cases, had already
made the riparian doctrine of water rights dead-letter law.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the litera-
ture surrounding formalization of property rights regimes along
frontiers, especially in the context of water rights in the United
States West. In Part II, we detail the territorial, state, and federal
statutes that governed the disposition of lands along the western
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frontier, and how the means of land use and ownership that these
statutes provided influenced the disposition of water rights. In Part
III, we survey the Montana Supreme Court case law that defined
water rights from 1865 to 1921. Our analysis in this section consid-
ers both the limited number of cases where the court considered the
riparian doctrine, as well as the entirety of cases treating conflicts
over water rights in this period. Through the avoidance of legal con-
flict and the recognition of the actual uses in practice, the Montana
Supreme Court proved a complementary force alongside water users
themselves in clarifying the law of water rights in the territory and
State of Montana.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS ALONG FRONTIERS
Property rights in the West developed in a complex dynamic in
which prior, informal practices existed in varying degrees of tension
with the application of a formal system of law and policies. In cases
where the de facto uses of cattle ranches were at odds with the
rights granted to individual settlers under the Homestead Act,1 the
de facto uses tended to carry the day because of the comparative
ability of the ranchers to exercise collective enforcement. Although
the threat of violence was rarely carried out, significant rents were
dissipated as ranches consolidated range rights through fraud and
employee claims, and continued to engage in self-enforcement.2 The
imposition of federal law surrounding mining was less distortionary,
in that it recognized the informal practices and written codes that
had emerged among mining camps to govern disputes surrounding
claim locations long before the imposition of a formal authority gov-
erning these claims.3 These granular studies of the emergence of
rights to land and minerals shed important light on the specific ways
in which rights to property in frontier contexts have emerged in
1. The Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
2. Lee J. Alston, Edwyna Harris & Bernardo Mueller, The Development of Property
Rights on Frontiers: Endowments, Norms, and Politics, 72 J. ECON. HIST. 741 (2012).
3. See Paul A. David & Gavin Wright, Increasing Returns and the Genesis of American
Resource Abundance, 6 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 203 (1997); Gary D. Libecap, Distributional
Issues in Contracting for Property Rights, 145 J. INST. THEORETICAL ECON. 6 (1989); John
Umbeck, The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights, 14 EXPLORATIONS
ECON. HIST. 197 (1977).
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response to shocks that make resources comparatively scarcer.4 Our
analysis studies the incremental definition of water rights in a con-
text where statutory and case law were decidedly ambiguous as to
certain critical aspects of the doctrine governing water claims.
However, the fact that formal law, at best, imperfectly corresponded
to informal practices meant that the rules governing the uses of
resources relied to some extent on self-definition and self-enforce-
ment. Several studies have emphasized how bottom-up, collectively
enforced institutions resolved disputes over property resources with
relatively minimal conflict. One such study suggests that lawless-
ness, in a variety of contexts along the western frontier, was much
less than suggested by popular depictions of the period.5 Another
study examined cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California, in a
more modern context and showed how enforcement patterns tended
to rely on informal, individual practices, as opposed to the require-
ments created by formal authorities.6 Studies of the development of
mineral law, surrounding one of the most valuable claims to that
date in U.S. history, the Comstock Lode, emphasize how mining in-
terests played a role in the statutory and judicial definition of mineral
rights and how these same mining interests were more incentivized
to do so as the value of minerals in question increased.7 The U.S.
West was particularly likely to display this blend of customary and
legal remedies in part because settlement of the frontier preceded
the arrival of formal authorities in many places. In such a context,
self-definition and self-enforcement led to the emergence of practices
well-suited to the contextual demands of the frontier.
One example of such a practice, the extralateral right in mineral
claims, displays the way in which institutions defined from the
bottom-up can vary significantly from practices that emerged under
the common law of Britain, the colonies, and the eastern states. The
application of the common law over time can lead to jurisdictional
variation due to the distinct fact patterns that emerge in each unique
4. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
5. See TERRY ANDERSON & P.J. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS
ON THE FRONTIER (Stanford University Press 2004).
6. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(Harvard University Press 1991).
7. Gary D. Libecap, The Evolution of Private Mineral Rights: Nevada’s Comstock Lode,
6 BUS. & ECON. HIST.138 (1977).
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context. However, the adoption of the common law from one context
to an entirely new one is likely to generate areas where the existing
law is so unsuited to the new context that gradual judicial clarifica-
tion may be insufficient to overcome the problems created by the
mismatch. The extralateral right in mineral claims was one such
area; given the different valuable minerals that were deposited in the
eastern as opposed to western states, mineral claims in the West were
more likely to develop precious metals like gold and silver, which
typically did not lay “flat,” vertically or horizontally.8 This is in part
due to the nature of metallic deposits, but also because the western
states, in contrast to those in the East, present much more topo-
graphical variation as a result of the underlying tectonic forces that
thrust the mountains upwards. This means mineral deposits typi-
cally do not lie horizontally or vertically but instead tend to run
diagonally, following the fall line of whatever mountain slope within
which they are deposited. This led to the emergence of a practice
that allowed the first locator of a lode to follow the lode until it termi-
nated, provided the lode reached its apex within that claimant’s
location.9 This customary practice was first institutionalized into
mining-camp codes, and was eventually codified into law and judi-
cial precedent in a number of western states. By taking into account
the nature of mining in the mountainous West, the extralateral right
reduced conflict by guaranteeing to a successful lode locator the right
to follow the lode in any direction, provided they had located the
point where the lode came closest to the surface.10 This reduced the
potential for opportunistic claimants to locate their claim adjacent to
an already productive lode and, instead, incentivized new claimants
to discover original lodes to which they would be fully entitled.11
The emergence of the extralateral right displays a number of gen-
eral lessons surrounding the development of property rights along
the western frontier. First, the federal, territorial, and state govern-
ments were typically confronting groups of resource and land users
who had already developed a de facto set of rights governing their
8. See Theodore Francis Van Wagenen, International Mining Law (1918).
9. Wm E. Colby, The Extralateral Right: Shall It Be Abolished?, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 437,
456–57 (1916).
10. See David & Wright, supra note 3; Gary D. Libecap, Government Support of Private
Claims to Public Minerals: Western Mineral Rights, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 364, 369 (1979).
11. See VAN WAGENEN, supra note 8.
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uses. To the extent that these uses did not conflict with larger legis-
lative priorities, the informal practices presented one margin along
which to reduce the costs of imposing formal, legal authority for the
first time. These customary practices were especially cost reducing
when they reflected climactic or geological constraints that made
existing rights regimes less likely to function well. Similarly, the
way in which the extralateral right encouraged the discovery of new
lodes, as opposed to a legal conflict over the rights to an existing
lode, both reduced the conflict likelihood and incentivized the pro-
ductive development of the underlying resources in question. We
argue that the emergence of the prior appropriation doctrine in
Montana reflects these underlying patterns within a statutory context
that did not directly reflect these existing practices. In particular,
the climate and topography of Montana meant that the prior appro-
priation doctrine was better suited to the comparative scarcity of
water and the need to irrigate far from a given water source.
In an environment of comparative scarcity like Montana, uses of
water were more likely to come into conflict, but the law can itself
create comparatively more or less conflict, depending on the clarity
it provides to the participants governed by it. Competing resource uses
that are given legal force will generate conflict, as rights holders under
opposing doctrines seek to better settle their rights to justify invest-
ment and facilitate associated loans and sales. This is a specific ex-
pression of the general problem created by cases of legal conflict,
which has led to a observable tendency on the part of courts to in-
terpret cases in a way that avoids legal conflict between different
statutes currently in force, both of which bear upon a given case in
question and present potentially opposing interpretations of the issue
in question.12 The tendency for conflict under opposing legal regimes
becomes more pronounced as scarcity increases. A resource user
faced with a choice between a resource with a competing claimant
12. Where courts are confronted with potential legal conflict, they have been observed to
employ a similar technique to the canon of avoidance of reaching a constitutional question
when a case can otherwise be decided based upon factual, procedural, or legal factors. In cases
of legal conflict, courts frequently seek to employ an interpretation of potentially conflicting
statutes in a way that reconciles the law to prevent actual conflict between the possibly com-
peting legal requirements of different statutes. See Carolos E. Gonzalez, The Logic of Legal
Conflict: The Perplexing Combination of Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Adjudication of
Conflicting Legal Norms, 80 OR. L. REV. 447 (2001).
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or an unclaimed resource, with the same underlying costs to use, will
choose the latter option due to the reduced legal costs associated
with the specification and enforcement of the rights to the resource.
The increasing value surrounding the definition and enforcement of
a right as the underlying resource becomes scarcer directly implies
that as the cost of an underlying resource use increases so, too, does
the sensitivity of this use to imperfections and uncertainties in the
rights structure surrounding its use and sale. In sum, in a context
of resource scarcity where self-definition and self-enforcement of
property rights preceded formal authorities, the extent to which the
first laws of these authorities diverge from existing practices can
create a direct possibility for legal conflict in ensuing periods.
II. RIGHTS TO WATER IN THE UNITED STATES WEST
In order to understand the fundamental ways in which these
rights regimes differ, a brief discussion of prior appropriation and
riparian-rights doctrines is warranted. The doctrine of prior appro-
priation is entirely distinct from the common-law doctrine of riparian
rights. Unlike the common-law doctrine, the doctrine of prior appro-
priation depends fundamentally upon the principle of “first-in-time,
prior-in-right.”13 This doctrine holds that one who appropriates the
waters prior to another appropriator, and puts the water to benefi-
cial use, has obtained an exclusive right to that amount of water.
The doctrine of [prior] appropriation extends the right to the use
of the waters flowing in a natural stream to riparian and non-
riparian lands alike, and it is immaterial whether the lands to
which the waters are applied are within or without the water-
shed of the stream from which the waters are taken.14
Thus, under prior appropriation, the right to water is not contingent
on the location of the land where the water is being used. The right to
water instead depends upon the date of appropriation and whether
the appropriated water is put to beneficial use. Beneficial use requires
that those waters that were appropriated must be used for productive
13. ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS (University of Nebraska
Press 1983).
14. Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152, 159 (1921) (citations omitted).
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purposes.15 Finally, once an appropriation has been made and put
to beneficial use, abandonment can occur. Abandonment occurs when
there is explicit evidence of intention to no longer use the waters.
When there is abandonment, the water right reverts to public prop-
erty and is then subject to appropriation or allotment to existing
junior appropriators.16 As we will discuss subsequently, prior appro-
priation’s characteristics of “first-in-time, prior-in-right,” beneficial
use, and abandonment provide a much more precise definition of the
rights to water than the riparian doctrine does. This level of defini-
tion becomes increasingly beneficial as water is comparatively scarcer,
a pattern in line with Harold Demsetz’s insights regarding the de-
velopment of property rights more generally.17 The English common
law did not develop in contexts in which water was sufficiently
scarce to warrant the additional costs of specifying and enforcing
rights under a system like prior appropriation, which meant the
vaguer and more flexible standard that the riparian doctrine pro-
vided was sufficient.
The common-law riparian doctrine creates a completely different
rights regime for water. The riparian doctrine is derived from Eng-
lish jurisprudence, in which waters were “accustomed to flow . . .
[neither] in a lower, or a higher, or a thinner, or a more rapid stream
than before, or . . . diminished in any way.”18 This system of water
law was applied to the eastern United States through the application
of the English common law in the original colonies. In this region, one
water user’s practice was unlikely to detract from another’s, at least
in terms of volume.19 In a context of such comparative abundance,
15. MONT. REV. STAT. § 12 (1881).
16. See Power v. Switzer, 21 Mont. 523 (1898); Barkley v. Tielke, 2 Mont. 594 (1877).
17. Harold Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J. LAW & ECON. (1966); See also
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. R. (1967).
18. HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLAIE, (Travers Twiss, ed.,
Cambridge University Press 2012) (1880); ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN
WESTERN WATERS (University of Nebraska Press 1983); see also Earl F. Murphy, English
Water Law Doctrines Before 1400, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.103.
19. With the industrialization of the nineteenth century, some economic uses of water in
the East began to exceed the level that was considered “reasonable” under the riparian doctrine,
which led to the judicial clarification of the common law in the East surrounding when industrial
users could appropriate in excess of this amount. See DONALD PISANI, WATER, LAND, AND LAW
IN THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC POLICY, 1850–1920 (University Press of Kansas 1996).
Nonetheless, for the purposes of our analysis, the riparian doctrine as we define it remains
accurate to describe how legislators and courts in the West understood the doctrine as a whole.
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a standard that allowed for any reasonable use up to the point where
other users’ amounts were affected was more than sufficient to govern
water users’ rights disputes. The Montana Supreme Court’s consid-
eration of this doctrine aptly summarizes the underlying intent:
“[H]e who owned land upon the banks of a running stream, or land
over which the same flowed, had the right to have the waters thereof
flow down, to or over his land, undiminished, materially, in quantity
or quality.”20 The common-law doctrine of riparian rights grants
relatively unfettered access to water rights to those landowners di-
rectly adjacent to the waters. Those landowners can appropriate and
use those waters for their desired needs so long as these uses do not
detract from the ability of other riparian rights holders to do the
same. The riparian doctrine does not include the prior appropriation
requirement of beneficial use; there must only be “reasonable use.”21
This standard gives the riparian rights holder comparatively expan-
sive liberty in the use of the waters. Unlike prior appropriation,
which affirmatively requires the beneficial use of waters, riparian
rights holders can use or not use waters to the extent they desire,
limited only by those unlikely instances where the volume or nature
of their use impinges upon the ability of others to act similarly.
As between these two doctrines of water rights, what about prior
appropriation made it well-suited to conditions in the arid West?
Two distinct explanations have formed surrounding the emergence
of prior appropriation in the face of an existing doctrine that was
well-established in the eastern states, whose legal systems served
as templates for their more junior, western cousins in many other
areas of substantive law. The first surrounds the economic benefits
associated with the prior appropriation doctrine in climates where
water was scarce. The second has to do with the specific nature of
the law underlying land and water rights in the arid West.
The comparative scarcity of water in the West and the need to
irrigate land far from a given watercourse implied significant eco-
nomic benefits to prior appropriation.22 The doctrine facilitated co-
ordination and created lower levels of disputes, as compared to the
20. Thorp v. Freed, 1 Mont. 651, 653 (1872).
21. Samuel C. Wiel, “Priority” in Western Water Law, 18 YALE L.J. 188 (1909).
22. Bryan Leonard & Gary D. Libecap, Economic Analysis of Property Rights: First
Possession of Water in the American West, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 22185, 2016).
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riparian doctrine’s vaguer standard of “reasonable use.”23 Coordina-
tion among users (and between users and landholders, whose lands
were needed for an irrigation right of way) was required due to the
scale of construction, expense, and manpower that many irrigation
projects in the arid West entailed. For example, one early case in
Montana involved an irrigation canal whose construction cost over
$23,000 (greater than $320,000 in 2015), which serviced mining
claims valued at $15,000 and $20,000, respectively.24
These high financial and coordination costs have an important
implication. Both from a static and dynamic perspective, coordina-
tion over which water-rights regime to employ would reduce the
transaction costs to participants within the industry. From a static
perspective, coordinating two incompatible rights regimes would
reduce the potential for costly disputes. In the frontier context, the
use of prior appropriation before the formal adoption of a water
allocation system meant that this was likely to be the least costly
regime. Furthermore, from a dynamic perspective, subsequent en-
trants along the frontier, even if presented with a choice between
legal regimes for water, faced costs associated with choosing a less
dominant rights regime, especially in a context of scarcity, where it
became increasingly likely that all water rights had prior claimants
in times of drought.
The amount of public land in the West, and the inability of min-
eral claimants to own the land they mined meant the riparian
doctrine was fundamentally incompatible with existing federal law
governing public lands in the West. Riparian water rights vested
with title to land adjoining or containing a watercourse. However,
many of the uses of public lands, such as mining and forestry, did
not grant the land user title to the land itself; instead, these individ-
uals were granted a use right to extract mineral or timber as against
other claimants. This meant that any individual seeking to use
water in the process of extracting and refining minerals could not
obtain rights to water they needed under the riparian doctrine be-
cause of their “defect” in title from the perspective of the riparian doc-
trine. Furthermore, the nature of settlement on the western frontier
23. Stephen N. Bretsen & Peter J. Hill, Irrigation Institutions in the American West, 25
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. 283 (2006–2007).
24. Woolman v. Garringer, 1 Mont. 535 (1872); U.S. Inflation Rate, 1872–2016, INFLATION
CALCULATOR, http://www.in2013dollars.com/1872-dollars-in-2016 (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
2018] MUDDYING THE WATERS 165
demanded an allocative regime to water that did not depend on the
underlying title to the land. Water disputes among settlers who were
technically trespassing on public lands prior to the passage of the
Preemption Law were customarily resolved according to prior appro-
priation, which played a large part in the federal statutory recogni-
tion of customary practices preceding the creation of law governing
public lands in the West.25
In Montana, water rights, especially early on in the territory’s
history, necessarily depended on a blend of self-definition and self-
enforcement.26 This makes Montana, like many frontier contexts,
one where participants had a significant role in the definition of the
rights regimes governing their resource uses. The most readily
evident example of this is when the frontier government recognized
informal practices, such as mining-camp codes and customs, which
also received federal and state statutory recognition in a number of
western states.27 In contrast, the Montana legislature did not unam-
biguously recognize existing practices relating to water. However,
this does not mean the actions of settlers in Montana could no longer
influence the definition of formal law when it came to water rights.
We will argue subsequently that the choice of water-rights regimes
by settlers actually influenced the incremental definition of which
rights regime would prevail in the Montana courts, an outcome con-
sistent with the role participants played in defining the rights regimes
governing resource use along the western frontier, both before and
after the imposition of formal territorial and state control.
III. LAND AND WATER LAW IN THE TERRITORY AND STATE OF
MONTANA
Prior to the creation of territorial and state authorities, settlers ar-
riving on the western frontier were confronted with two institutional
25. See Donald J. Pisani, A Critique of Western Water Law in the Nineteenth Century, 18
W. HIST. Q. 15 (1987).
26. See ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS (University of
Nebraska Press 1983); PISANI, supra note 19; James E. Sherow, ‘The Fellow Who Can Talk
the Loudest and Has the Best Shotgun Gets the Water’: Water Regulation and the Montana
State Engineer’s Office, 1889–1964, 54 MONTANA: MAG. OF WESTERN HIST. 56 (2004); Brian
Shovers, Diversions, Ditches, & District Courts: Montana’s Struggle to Allocate Water, 55
MONTANA: MAG. OF WESTERN HIST. 2–15 (2005).
27. Gary D. Libecap, Government Support of Private Claims to Public Minerals: Western
Mineral Rights, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 364, 369 (1979).
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regimes governing the disposition of land, resources, and water. The
first of these were the informal practices that frontier communities
developed to clarify rights to resources and land and to resolve asso-
ciated disputes. However, the presence of informal practices did not
mean that there were no laws governing the disposition of federal
lands, prior to the definition of these public lands as a territory or
a state. Three federal land laws, for example, played an important
role in the settlement of Montana. The Preemption Act of 1841,28
passed September 4th of that year, is the first federal law that
defined the rights of settlers in obtaining public lands from the
federal government. This Act allowed any head of the family, widow,
or single male over the age of twenty-one, who settled upon public
lands by inhabiting and making improvements upon the land, to be
authorized to purchase title to the land for $1.25 an acre, for up to
160 acres.29 The passage of the Preemption Act is significant in the
history of U. S. public land law, for it was the first time the federal
government formally recognized the rights to land for individual set-
tlers in the West. Preemption allowed a formal means to secure a title
to previously owned public lands and as such is the first piece of the
patchwork of federal law that influenced the patterns of settlement
on western lands.
The second federal land law is the Homestead Act of 1862,30 which
was passed on May 20th of that year. This law provided any person
the right to claim up to 160 acres of public lands. In order to formal-
ize the right to land, a settler first had to file an application in the
local land office prior to entry upon the land, affirming that he or
she was the head of the family, twenty-one years of age, and a citizen
of the United States. Upon filing and payment, the settler was per-
mitted to enter the land and was subsequently required to cultivate
the land for five years, after which period the title to the land passed
to the landowner.31 This Act expanded upon the Preemption Act of
1841 by allowing a straightforward method to formalize lands in-
tended to incentivize settlers to move west. Even more so than the
Preemption Act, the Homestead Act of 1862 greatly defined the
settlement of the western territories during this period.
28. The Preemption Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 453 (1841).
29. Id.
30. The Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
31. Id.
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The last federal land law that aided in the settlement of western
lands was the Desert Land Act, formally known as the Act of March
3, 1877.32 The Act provided any person, who was a requisite age, the
ability to purchase title to desert lands for up to 140 acres at $0.25
per acre.33 Because the Desert Land Act required successful irrigation
of the land in order to obtain title, the Act allowed for the appropria-
tion of water, which in practice required prior appropriation on
federal lands. The significantly discounted price reflects the govern-
ment’s growing recognition of the unique challenges that the arid
climates of the West posed to agriculture and industry. The ability
to obtain lands under the Desert Land Act can be understood as
another step in the gradual refinement of rights to public lands
begun by the Preemption Act and Homestead Act.
Federal mining laws also aided in the settlement of western lands.
Three federal laws passed from 1866 to 1872 defined the extraction
of minerals from western lands. On July 26, 1866, Congress passed
the Lode Law of 1866,34 which is the first federal statute with sub-
stantive influence regarding mining, water, and claimants to land.
This law declared the public domain free and open to all citizens of the
United States for the exploration and production of minerals. In order
to secure water for the purpose of mining, the Lode Act stipulated,
[W]henever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water
for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have
vested and accrued, and the same recognized by the local cus-
toms, laws, and the decision of the courts . . . owners of such
vested rights shall be maintained and protected the same; and
the right of way for the construction of ditches and canals for the
purposes aforesaid is hereby acknowledged and confirmed.35
The Act also incorporated the basic rules and customs of the mining
districts and gave congressional approval for protected mining rights
on public land.36 The Lode Act was subsequently codified with the
32. Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 20 Stat. 377 (1877).
33. Id.
34. An Act Granting Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners Over Public Lands, and for
Other Purposes, § 2-9, 15 Stat. 251, 251 (1866) [hereinafter the Lode Act] (the Lode Act is the
colloquial understanding of this Act).
35. Id.
36. Despite the Lode Act’s granting of public lands for mineral exploration, the law did
not authorize the patenting of placer claims; it instead only treated claims over lodes or veins
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placer mine legislation in the Mining Law of 1872.37 This law then
became the defining federal law governing mineral extraction on
public lands through the end of our analysis in 1921.
In the subsequent section, our detailed case survey from 1865 to
1921 shows that land users made claims either under mining laws,
the Homestead Act, or the Preemption Act—to the extent that the
factual record in a given case contains such a detail. One example
serves to display how the patchwork of federal laws created the
possibility for significant uncertainty surrounding the rights to land
and water. Claims made under the Preemption Act were seen as
legitimizing a trespass on federal lands, but this very trespass raised
a question as to who had a right to the water this trespasser was
using.38 The same reasoning that caused the Preemption Act to for-
malize the “claims” of de jure trespassers led to the recognition of
the right to the water that these trespassers had been utilizing for
beneficial uses as against any other users on the public lands, who
would also have been be trespassers, as both were using the land
prior to federal recognition of the legality of doing so.39 The exten-
sion of this prior water right to include cases of irrigation40 follows
directly from the contexts found in the arid West where the appro-
priated water’s most economically productive use was often far from
the rugged ravines and canyons where the water flowed. In cases
where claims were instead being made under the various mineral
laws, depending upon when a specific mineral claim was located, a
similar result obtained, but for different reasons. Because title to
of minerals. The distinction between these types of claims depends upon where within the
earth the minerals are situated. Under a lode, the minerals are embedded in the underlying
firmament itself, while placer minerals are those which have been eroded by waterways and
lie within the sediment of the waterway. This oversight led Congress to pass the Placer Act
of 1870, H.R. 562, 41st Cong. (2d Sess. 1870), which expanded upon the Lode Act of 1866 to
include patent claims for placers.
37. The Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91–95 (1872).
38. Thorp v. Freed, 1 Mont. 651, 667 (1872).
39. See id.; see also Parks v. Barclay, 1 Mont. 514, 517 (1872).
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one owns the property, and that the appropriation is for a beneficial purpose,
establishes a principle that certainly ought to allow the appropriation of water
for the purposes of irrigation. In this latter case no one, it would be presumed,
owned the water, and the appropriation would be for a beneficial use.
Thorp v. Freed, 1 Mont. 651, 659 (1872).
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the land itself did not vest with a mineral appropriator, no right to
water could vest along with title. This created a variety of means by
which economic activities on public lands, whether they were agri-
cultural or mineral, were construed to require prior appropriation.
The federal land laws, and the existing, customary prior appropria-
tion practices, thus played an important role in determining the
rights to water for those users claiming rights. This also created a
margin that influenced the rights of private land users, both in the
coordinative sense we describe in earlier sections and also to the
extent that a private landholder, whether making their claim under
the riparian or prior appropriation doctrine, had to contend with a
set of users on federal and formerly federal lands who claimed the
prior right to water under federal law.
With the preceding federal laws providing a backdrop for defining
the rights of resource users on public lands and the means of acquir-
ing public lands, Montana water-law statutes developed in stages.
The Bannack Statutes were the first territorial legislation to address
the issue of water. The Bannack Statutes provided
any owner or holder of a possessory right or title to land on the
bank or margin of a stream, or in the neighborhood of any stream,
should be entitled to the use of the water of such stream for the
purpose of irrigation, and to a right of way for his ditch, if neces-
sary, over intervening property.41
These statutes asserted both prior appropriation and the incongru-
ous requirement for equitable apportionment by specially appointed
county commissioners in times when water was scarce. The Bannack
Statutes not only created a confused version of the doctrine of prior
appropriation but also stated that the “common law of England, so
far as the same is applicable and of the general nature, and not in
conflict with the special enactments of this Territory, shall be the
law and rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until
repealed by the legislative authority.”42 Absent a specific abrogation
of the riparian doctrine contained within the common law adopted
by the territorial legislature, these statutes necessarily recognized
both doctrines of water law.
41. WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE MONTANA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS (Montana Agricultural
Experiment Station, Montana State College 1958).
42. Laws of the Territory of Montana, 1864–1865, Mont. Laws, 365.
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Given the extent to which fundamental characteristics of the two
doctrines are at odds with one another, this very recognition caused
legal uncertainty. As a result, these statutes were replaced in 1869
by the Act to Repeal the Act of January 12th, 1865. This Act allowed
anyone holding valid title to land the right to the use of waters for
the purpose of irrigation; and in instances where the water in ques-
tion was claimed under prior appropriation, those appropriations
were to be considered valid.43 The Act of 1870 became codified in the
Revised Statutes of 1872. However, it should be noted that despite
this clarification in the water law, the Legislative Assembly never
explicitly abrogated the common-law doctrine of riparian rights, an
oversight that would take the court decades to overcome.
It was not until 1885 that the legislature made a distinctive
departure from the riparian doctrine. In An Act Relative to Water
Rights, the legislature endorsed the definitional components of prior
appropriation including “first-in-time, prior-in-right”; beneficial use;
time of appropriation; and the proper filing of an appropriation.44
This Act was a significant alteration in the legislative definition of
the doctrine of prior appropriation rights, but with it the legislature
omitted once again to abrogate the doctrine, whose legal applicabil-
ity in the state the courts had already long interpreted as being a
necessary consequence of the territorial legislature’s adoption of the
common law in 1865.45 The statutory timeline of Montana, from the
Bannack Statute’s ill-defined water-rights regime to the Act of 1885’s
more explicit water-rights regime, exposes the evolving influence stat-
utes had on the development of water rights in the State of Montana.
43. [A]ny person or persons, corporation or company, who may have or hold a title,
or possessory right or title, to any agricultural lands within the limits of this
Territory, as defined by the organic act thereof, shall be entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the waters of the streams and creeks in said Territory for the
purposes of irrigation and making said land available for agricultural purposes
to the full extent of the soil thereof: Provided, That in all cases where by virtue
of prior appropriation, any person may have diverted all the water of any
stream, or to such an extent that there shall not be an amount sufficient let
therein for those having a subsequent right to the waters of such stream for
the such purpose of irrigation.
Act to Repeal the Act of January 12th, 1865, 1869–1870 Mont. Laws 57 (also entitled An Act
to Repeal an Act Entitled “An Act to Protect and Regulate the Irrigation of Lands in Montana
Territory,” Approved January 12th, 1865, and to Make Provisions for the Construction of
Ditches and the Irrigation of Agricultural Lands).
44. An Act Relative to Water Rights, 1885 Mont. Laws §§ 1–6.
45. See Bailey v. Tintinger, 45 Mont. 154 (1912).
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It is within this muddied statutory context that the supreme court
of Montana interpreted conflicting water-rights claims, a question
we turn to in detail in the following section.
IV. MONTANA CASES DEALING WITH RIPARIAN DOCTRINE
The importance of water to industrial and agricultural develop-
ment along the western frontier is clear. Whether it was raising crops
on a homestead, watering cattle on a ranch, or processing ore at a
mine, the predominant economic activities along the frontier all re-
quired water. Given climatological conditions in the West, there was
simply not enough water available to satisfy every potential water
user’s demands. In legal and economic terms, the comparative scarcity
of water meant disputes surrounding the use of water were more
likely, which led to the development of the prior appropriation doctrine
in many western states. This scarcity and, hence, the significant
economic value of water, also meant water rights were (and are) a
perennial topic of litigation in the West. In Montana, the supreme
court was confronted with these types of disputes nearly from its
inception.46 In this section, we treat every example from the record
of the supreme court of Montana where the court considered the
competing water-rights doctrines that persisted in the state until
1921. The court, in avoiding overt conflict between the competing
doctrines, gradually reconciled the cases in a way that whittled away
at core components of the riparian doctrine, until there was so little
left to distinguish it that by 1921 the court abrogated the riparian
doctrine outright.
The first time the court treated both the riparian and prior appro-
priation doctrines came in 1870 with the case of Thorp v. Woolman.47
Both Thorp and Woolman owned a ranch on the same creek, and
following a drought in 1869, their irrigative uses became more than
the creek could supply. In resolving the competing claims presented
in the case, the court recognized that both landholders adjoining a
given stream had the right to use water, a determination entirely
consistent with the riparian doctrine.48 However, the court also de-
cided the case by awarding the adjacent landholder with an older
46. See Caruthers v. Pemberton, 1 Mont. 111 (1869).
47. Thorp v. Woolman, 1 Mont. 168 (1870).
48. Id. at 171.
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water claim the right to use it as against the competing claimant.49
In a jurisdiction governed unambiguously by the riparian doctrine,
such an outcome would be entirely at odds with the requirement that
no adjacent landholder’s use materially affects the use of another.
In a climate where there was not nearly enough water to go around,
the riparian requirement quickly fell before the reality that the first
user to settle upon a stream had an equitable expectation to the use
of the water, sufficient for the economic purposes that supported his
or her settlement there. The case also noted another existing contro-
versy pertaining to whether the prior appropriation doctrine applied
to private as well as public lands, but given that the prior appropria-
tion doctrine required the same result, it was “not necessary for the
court to determine, in this case, whether or not the doctrine of
appropriation applies to ranchmen as well as to miners, concerning
water rights.”50 The distinction between ranchmen and miners di-
rectly suggests private versus public lands because miners were,
necessarily, entrants upon the public lands whereas ranchers were,
much more commonly, titled land holders, which meant the riparian
doctrine could apply to them in theory, at least from a formal, legal
perspective. This latter question as to the applicability of the prior
appropriation doctrine on private versus public lands is one that
remained unresolved until the case we consider from 1912.
Just two years later in 1872, the court again confronted the con-
flicted state of land and water laws in Thorp v. Freed.51 Of the three
justices on the court, one recused himself from the case and the other
two reached opposing conclusions about the intent of the legislature
and the state of water law in the territory. This case illustrates a
clear example of the costs of legal conflict: when judges cannot reach
a unified conclusion on how to resolve legal ambiguity, such judicial
conflict can itself further obscure the law for those governed by it.
On the one hand, in considering the conflicting authorities sur-
rounding water law in the territory, Justice Knowles recognized the
classic explanations regarding the development of property and
natural-resource law on the western frontier in those instances
where it departed from the existing doctrine in the East.52 Justice
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Thorp v. Freed, 1 Mont. 651 (1872).
52. Id. at 654, 656.
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Knowles stressed both the unique topography in the West53 as well
as more general concerns of welfare and equity54 animating the
prior appropriation doctrine’s emergence. However, Justice Knowles
ultimately adopted a position of judicial deference, noting that: “the
question of whether or not a law is for the good of the people in our
Territory, is a matter for legislative, and not judicial, consideration.”55
In contrast, Justice Wade looked at the 1865 territorial statute and
concluded that “looking at the whole statute, we say most unhesitat-
ingly, that the whole purpose of the statute was to utterly abolish
and annihilate the doctrine of prior appropriation, and to establish
an equal distribution of the waters of any given stream in the agri-
cultural districts of the territory.”56 Justice Wade also concluded
that “so in this arid country should the waters of any given stream
be divided equally among the farmers for purposes of irrigation,”57
notwithstanding the impossibility of such a requirement given the
scarcity of water in the arid West. Thorp v. Freed, without a clear
holding and with stark opposition between the positions of the two
judges, deepened the uncertainty as to the applicability of the ri-
parian doctrine in Montana in the face of prior appropriation.
Following Thorp v. Freed, the court was not presented with an-
other case requiring treatment of the riparian doctrine until 1899 in
Haggin v. Saile.58 This case was an action for an injunction to restrain
the defendants from diverting water that the plaintiff claimed, based
upon having settled in the canyon in 1883 when plaintiff Saile first
began using the adjacent waters. However, sometime that same year
the plaintiff ceased to use the waters, which led the defendant to
claim abandonment of the earlier riparian claim. In deciding the
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and prosperity of our best agricultural districts. It must be apparent to all that
the best agricultural lands in this Territory are not at the sources of the streams.
Our broad valleys, as a rule, are better adapted by nature for settlement and
agriculture than our narrow and rocky canons and mountain gorges.
Id. at 654.
54. “[C]onsiderations of the general welfare of the country and the principles of natural
equity should guaranty to the prior appropriator of water for such use the first right to the
use of the same . . . .” Id. at 654–55.
55. Id. at 653.
56. Id. at 668.
57. Id. at 676.
58. Haggin v. Saile, 23 Mont. 375 (1899).
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issue, the court employed a beneficial use calculus to consider the
opposing water rights of the two parties,59 ultimately determining
that the riparian right holder had effectively abandoned any claim
they had to the water through non-use.60 A finding that a riparian
right holder can abandon his or her right through non-use is at odds
with the riparian standard of reasonable use determined by the
right holder, which is governed only by the requirement that such
use (or non-use) not materially impair the water to which other
riparian rights holders are similarly entitled.61 Thus, the case effec-
tively imposed a beneficial use requirement upon those instances
when Montana water users believed their rights emanated from the
riparian doctrine. Like the earlier case that found riparian landown-
ers’ water claims were governed by “first-in-time, prior-in-right,”
Haggin transformed one of the definitional components of the ripar-
ian doctrine from the reasonable use requirement to the beneficial
use requirement of the prior appropriation doctrine.
One year later, the court again examined the tension between the
riparian and prior appropriation doctrines in Smith v. Denniff.62
Smith’s appropriation of water from the public domain to nonriparian
lands presented the question of whether riparian land subsequently
granted to a railroad created a superior right to the one Smith had
created through appropriation from the public domain. This case is
notable because the court summarized the water laws in the state,
to that point. In weighing the requirements under each doctrine, the
court noted how the right to prior appropriation for beneficial pur-
poses was necessarily at odds with the reasonable use granted to
every adjacent landholder, and the State’s preference for beneficial
use meant that “to this extent the doctrine of prior appropriation
59. “The suggestion that the plaintiff has rights as a riparian holder can have no force as
against defendant Saile, who in June, 1883, actually diverted and appropriated water for
beneficial uses under the statutes of the territory recognizing the right of appropriation.” Id.
at 381.
60. [
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for a number of years after purchase, and where such a purchaser has per-
mitted the water to be taken, appropriated and used by others adversely for a
period of years, warranted an inference of abandonment.
Id. at 381.
61. See Wiel supra note 21.
62. Smith v. Denniff, 24 Mont. 20 (1900).
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may be said to have abrogated the common law rule.”63 The court also
noted that any vested prior appropriation right necessarily created a
servitude upon upstream riparian lands, a clear subjugation of ripar-
ian rights in the face of prior appropriation statutes and practice.64
Despite the case not fully abrogating the riparian doctrine, due to the
court preserving the right of prior riparian landholders to the waters
of a given stream, the partial abrogation in Smith speaks volumes as
to the extent to which the court’s periodic avoidance of legal conflict
had ultimately vitiated one doctrine in favor of another.
The final barrier that remained separating the heavily modified
and weakened riparian doctrine from the system of prior appropria-
tion rights was removed by the court in the 1912 case of Bailey v.
Tintinger.65 This was the issue that had persisted since the court
tried to reconcile what it interpreted as the common-law require-
ment of private riparian land ownership with the problems that such
a requirement created in the context of water use by mineral claim-
ants on public lands. An extensive amount of lands irrigated by sev-
eral companies forced this suit, to determine the relative rights of the
parties to the waters.66 In Bailey, the court determined that the right
to appropriate water does not depend on the land on which the ap-
propriated water is being used. The court, at the same time, declared
that all water rights prior to 1885 were governed by the rules and
customs of settlers,67 effectively ignoring and overwriting the first
two decades of statutory and judicial treatment that we consider in
our analysis, here. In so doing, the court held that ownership of the
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of a stream which would be unreasonable at the common law, and to this
extent the doctrine of prior appropriation may be said to have abrogated the
common-law rule.
Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 25.
65. Bailey v. Tintinger, 45 Mont. 155 (1912).
66. Id. 160–61.
67. “[T]he time from the earliest settlement to 1885, during which period the rights were
determined exclusively by the rules and customs of settlers . . . .” Id. at 167;
In other words during the first period of our history above, there was but one
method of making an appropriation, and that was by complying with the rules
and customs of the pioneer settlers; while during the period since 1885, two dis-
tinct methods are prescribed, the first by complying with the rules and customs
of the early settlers, and the second by complying with the terms of the statute.
Id. at 172.
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land upon which water was used was irrelevant to the application of
the governing doctrine68 and so removed the last component distin-
guishing a riparian right from a prior appropriation right in the State
of Montana. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the court noted outright, upon
surveying the bulk of precedent before it, that “[i]t is impossible to
harmonize the decisions of the courts upon the subjects presented.”69
This understandable sentiment presages the final time the court
considered the question of the riparian doctrine in Montana. In
Mettler v. Ames Realty Co.,70 the court held that: “[t]he common-law
doctrine of riparian rights has never prevailed in Montana since the
enactment of the Bannack Statutes in 1865.”71 A drought in 1919
caused Ames Realty Company, the prior appropriator to the waters
of Prickly Pear Creek, to change its place of diversion. The new point
of diversion caused Anna Mettler, who claimed the right to the wa-
ters through the riparian doctrine, to be below the place of diversion,
resulting in a severe diminution in the quantity to which she had
been accustomed to use in her ranch. As a result, she sued Ames
Realty Company to return the flow of the waters, undiminished in
quantity. Given that the court outright abrogated the riparian doc-
trine from the date of territorial formation onwards in the case,
Mettler’s claim went unrecognized in the face of Ames Realty’s prior
right. In one fell swoop, absent legislative repudiation of the doc-
trine, riparian rights were formally abandoned in favor of prior ap-
propriation. More potently, the court stated with finality that the prior
appropriation doctrine had always been the letter of the law in the
state, notwithstanding the conflicted sixty-one years of statutes and
case law that we survey here. Upon first blush, the court’s interpre-
tation of the preceding sixty-one years of precedent appears quite
bold. However, when the set of cases are taken into account that
slowly hollowed out the riparian doctrine until it was a mere legal
fiction resting on top of the underlying reality of prior appropriation,
the court’s action in Mettler appears more like a formality than a
sweeping abrogation.
68. The court construed the holding in Smith by defining “that the appropriator need not
be either an owner or in possession of land in order to make a valid appropriation for irri-
gation purposes.” Id. at 175.
69. Id. at 177.
70. Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152 (1921).
71. Id. at 170–71.
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V. DISCUSSION
These cases display a number of factors that constrained or in-
fluenced the decisions of the Montana Supreme Court when rights
under the riparian doctrine would have conflicted with water rights
under the prior appropriation doctrine. Just as territorial, state, and
federal statutes influenced the court, so too did the existing practices
of settlers along the frontier, based in the economic realities created
by the unique topography and aridity of the West. Operating within
these constraints, the court slowly reconciled the conflicting doctrines
until prior appropriation carried the day in law as well as in practice.
First of all, the statutes that the Montana territorial and state
legislatures passed regarding the disposition of water rights un-
surprisingly played a large role in the court’s treatment of disputes
that emerged surrounding claims to water.72 Every case we analyze,
in detail, contains a reference to the statutory backdrop governing
these claims. However, as our analysis displays, the statutes more
often created confusion than provided clear guidance to the court as
to how to handle claims emerging from conflicting water-rights doc-
trines. Nonetheless, animated by a desire to avoid overt legal conflict,
the court took the existing statutory requirements seriously when
balancing the different statutes whose conflicting requirements did
not provide sufficient guidance to water users in Montana.
72. For example, the court in Bailey tried to briefly summarize the existing statutes
governing water within the state:
In 1870 our legislature passed an Act (Laws 1869–1870, p. 57) which apparently
undertook to limit the right to appropriate water for irrigation purposes to persons
or corporations having title to, or possession of, agricultural lands. (Tucker v.
Jones, 8 Mont. 225, 19 Pac. 571.) The act recognized the rights acquired or to be
acquired under the rules and customs of the early settlers; but there was not any
attempt made to prescribe any other method by which such rights might be
secured. By an act of February 1877, the right of a person or association of persons
or a corporation to appropriate water to sell, rent, or otherwise dispose to others
was authorized. In 1885, however, there was a distinct departure made by the
Legislature in enacting a statute under the title, “An act relating to water rights.”
These several acts were carried forward in the compilation of 1887, as chapter
74, Fifth Division, Compiled Statutes, and with some modifications into the Civil
Code of 1895, as title 8, division 2, part 4; and again, with slight amendments
and additions, into the Revised Codes of 1907, as sections 4840–4891, and now
constitute the law of appropriation of water so far as controlled by legislation.
Bailey v. Tintinger, 45 Mont. 154, 166–67 (1912).
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Second, the cases clearly display the court’s deference to the com-
mon law, which the Montana territorial legislature adopted in 1865.
Due to the legislature not clearly abrogating the riparian doctrine (if
this had even been the intent of the legislature, given their unclear
statutory treatment of water law in 1865), the Montana Supreme
Court wrestled with how to square a common-law requirement for
riparian water rights with federal and territorial statutes that re-
ferred to elements of the prior appropriation doctrine. For example,
in Thorp v. Freed, the rigorous debate between Justice Knowles and
Justice Wade on the application of the Bannack Statutes exposes the
court’s difficulty in squaring conflicting water-rights doctrines. Justice
Knowles’s opinion supports the notion that the legislative intent
was to create the right to prior appropriation.73 On the other hand,
Justice Wade argued in his opposing opinion that the Bannack Stat-
utes demand “equal distribution of the waters of a stream among all
the parties concerned in such waters.”74 This juxtaposition between
the two justices’ opinions as to the appropriate way to interpret the
requirements of the Bannack Statutes highlights the difficulty in-
herent in squaring conflicting elements of water rights under unclear
statutory requirements. Years later, in Smith v. Denniff, the court
again wrestled with the interpretation of the riparian doctrine within
the confines of existing prior appropriative requirements. The court
in Smith actually went to great lengths to square the riparian doc-
trine with prior appropriation rights granted by statute, construing
the riparian right holder to be the state or federal government, whose
permission to appropriate water was the equivalent of transferring
the riparian right to the prior appropriator who did not own land on
the banks of a water source.75
73. This statute, as far as it could, established and recognized the right of appro-
priation of water for agricultural purposes . . . . If it is claimed that this statute
does not recognize the doctrine of “prior in time, prior in right,” the answer to
this is, that when the law gives a man the right to divert water from a stream
to irrigate his land to the full extent of the soil thereof, and in pursuance of this
law he goes and digs a ditch, or constructs machinery for the purpose of taking
water from a stream for this purpose at a great expense, the principles of
equity come in and say that no other man can come in and divert this water
away from him. That he is prior in time in availing himself of the benefits of
such a statute, and his rights are prior to any subsequent appropriator.
Thorp v. Freed, 1 Mont. 651, 657 (1872).
74. Id. at. 668.
75. “ [Person] A. has absolute title in fee to riparian land. Under the statutes of Montana
he is clothed with the right, by compliance with the provisions of the statute, to appropriate
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It is also quite clear from the case law that the incompatibility of
federal lands with the riparian doctrine influenced the court’s defini-
tion of water law in Montana. As early as 1870, the court noted how
[t]here are many reasons for holding that this very statute recog-
nizes or establishes the doctrine of appropriation of water for
irrigation, limiting, however, the right to appropriate to persons
owning land upon the banks of the stream from which the same
is taken, and also limiting the quantity of water he can appropri-
ate to what is necessary to irrigate his land.76
This indicates that although the common law and statutes created
a legal conflict surrounding rights to water on private lands, the
prior appropriation doctrine had legal influence within the territory
and state from 1865 onwards, due to the incompatibility of riparian
rights with federal land uses that did not grant title of the land itself
to the natural-resource user. This tension appears again in Smith
v. Denniff, when the court ultimately interpreted the state and fed-
eral governments as the riparian rights holders on all lands that
had not passed into private hands; any water appropriated on such
property to irrigate lands further away necessarily made subsequent
upstream, riparian-rights claims subservient to it.77 Furthermore,
federal law afforded some recognition of customary practices that
had existed prior to federal, territorial, or state statutory treatment
of water rights on lands in the arid West, due to the reality that
people had settled on federal land as trespassers long before federal
land law caught up to the realities on the ground. This meant that
the prevalence of prior appropriation as a customary practice played
a role beyond the court’s recognition of the practice; the very nature
of claims brought before the court, often emanating from claims to
water on public lands, partially determined the predominant doc-
trine within the state.
The cases we survey above where the two doctrines were given
explicit consideration by the court also display the concerns of eco-
nomic efficiency and the specific demands of productive activity in
a water right, subject, of course, to the vested rights of prior appropriators.” Smith v. Denniff,
24 Mont. 20, 24–28 (1900).
76. Thorp v. Woolman, 1 Mont. 168, 171 (1870) (emphasis added).
77. Smith v. Denniff, 24 Mont. 20, 25 (1900).
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the dry and rugged, arid West, which have long been argued to have
led to the emergence of the prior appropriation doctrine. The court’s
early arguments in favor of the prior appropriation doctrine were
typically justified through an appeal to equity.78 However, even at
these early stages the court recognized that the unique climate,
topography, economic efficiency, and legal certainty of the state were
critically important in animating the characterization of prior ap-
propriation, while simultaneously being faithful to the principles of
equity.79 Recognition of the value of water to economic pursuits
along the frontier persists throughout the period we survey,80 and
the court closes the period in which the riparian doctrine tenuously
existed with a clear appeal to both the economic and climactic argu-
ments, as underlying the fundamental preference for the prior
appropriation doctrine in the arid West.81
78. Any tribunal, governed by the established principles of law, making an appor-
tionment of water in accordance with what is just and equitable, would be
compelled to hold that the one who first located the land, and claimed the
water, was entitled to sufficient to irrigate his land; for equity declares that he
who is first in time is first in right.
Thorp v. Woolman, 1 Mont. 168, 171–72 (1870).
If we were called upon to say what were the necessities of this country, in
regard to the use of water for the purposes of irrigation, we should reply that
there was a demand that water should be used for that purpose, and that the
considerations of the general welfare of the country and the principles of
natural equity should guaranty to the prior appropriation of water for such use
the first right to the use of the same, to the extent of his necessities for
domestic purposes, the quenching of the thirst of himself or animals, and for
agricultural purposes.
Thorp v. Freed, 1 Mont. 651, 654–55 (1872).
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ment and prosperity of our best agricultural districts. It must be apparent to
all that the best agricultural lands in this Territory are not at the sources of
the streams.
Thorp v. Freed, 1 Mont 651, 654 (1872).
80. The opinions in both Haggin and Smith highlight how the beneficial-use requirement
was tied to productive economic activity. Smith v. Denniff, 24 Mont. 20, 29–30 (1900); Haggin
v. Saile, 23 Mont. 371, 380 (1899). Furthermore, the decision in Smith rested in part on the
right of a given right holder to sell to another who proceeded to put the water to a different
beneficial use, a principle designed to increase the likelihood that water was being applied to its
highest-valued uses. Bailey also displays these considerations, in that the case distinguishes the
right to water—as vesting with irrigation companies—upon the time of completion of irrigation-
ditch construction, not at the time water was actually put to beneficial use, as was the case
in a number of other western states. Bailey v. Tintinger, 45 Mont. 154, 164–65 (1912).
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Out of sixty-one years of jurisprudence defining water doctrine in
Montana, only six of 109 cases treat riparian rights to the extent of
defining them or their interaction with other statutory requirements
or customary practices. Mettler also directly indicates that it took
until a drought in 1919 for a riparian right to come into direct con-
flict with a prior appropriation right.82 In comparison to the exten-
sive amount of clarification that the prior appropriation doctrine
required,83 riparian rights did not appear to have generated signifi-
cant controversy within the state and never required treatment
beyond the cases we analyze in detail, here. The notion that difficult
cases are much more likely to make it to the highest court of a given
jurisdiction84 further supports our interpretation that water rights
holders within the State of Montana very infrequently operated
under the assumption that they had riparian rights to water. Unfor-
tunately, the lower-court record upon which the cases were deter-
mined is not available for our analysis. Thus, we are unable to
examine the question of whether claimants appear to have believed
in good faith that they had a riparian right to the water, or if they
that reason, never prevailed, or, if ever recognized, was thereafter repudiated,
and therefore neither the United States nor the patentee has such rights, and
that it is competent for any state so situated to adopt the doctrine of appro-
priation as the only means through which the beneficial use of water flowing
in the natural streams may be enjoined, and that the appropriator derives his
right from the state in the exercise of local sovereignty.
Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152, 161 (1921).
82. Id. at. 157
83. The Montana jurisprudence begins by defining the basic canons of prior appropriation
rights to appropriate waters governed by the Bannack statutes. Tucker v. Jones, 8 Mont. 225
(1888); Thorp v. Woolman, 1 Mont. 168 (1870). The court later held that dates of appropriation
are determined by the earliest appropriator. Columbia Mining Co. v. Holter, 1 Mont. 296
(1871). The court also held that appropriations can be made for mining purposes. Taylor v.
Stewart, 1 Mont. 316 (1871). The court also held the concepts of abandonment. Gassert v.
Noyes, 18 Mont. 216 (1896); Middle Creek Ditch Co. v. Henley, 15 Mont. 558 (1895); Atchison
v. Peterson, 1 Mont. 561 (1872). Similarly, the centrality of irrigation to productive use of
water in Montana meant that over the same period, the court defined a variety of legal prin-
ciples related irrigation under prior appropriation. The court held that change of diversion
cannot deprive subsequent appropriators. Gassert v. Noyes, 18 Mont. 216 (1896). Congruently,
the right of way has been recognized by the Constitution of the State of Montana and the
compiled statutes of 1887. Glass v. Basin Mining & Concentrating Co., 22 Mont. 151 (1899);
Ellinghouse v. Taylor, 19 Mont. 462 (1897). Lastly, the court defined an appurtenance as
anything used and related to the thing to which it appended. Hays v. Buzzard, 31 Mont. 74
(1904); Donnell v. Humphreys, 1 Mont. 518 (1872).
84. See Arthur Corbin, Hard Cases Make Good Law, 33 YALE L.J. 78 (1923); Ronald
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1109 (1975).
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raised the claim opportunistically because of the ambiguity created
by Montana’s statutory and case-law precedent.
Furthermore, a doctrine like riparian rights to water would have
required significant clarification in an arid state like Montana, given
the impossibility of productive uses along a watercourse never inter-
fering with one another, especially in times of drought. A dearth of
cases treating riparian rights indicates water claimants self-selected
into prior appropriation. This supports the arguments surrounding
the comparative economic efficiency of prior appropriation given the
scarce nature of water in the West and the need for allocative cer-
tainty, which was required by the high coordination and investment
costs of irrigation projects. This suggests there were significant gains
to coordinating a rights regime in an environment where self-defini-
tion and self-enforcement of property was at least partially the norm.
In summary, a comprehensive picture of the disposition of water-
rights claims early in Montana’s history requires an understanding
of the variety of factors that constrained or influenced the supreme
court of Montana as it adjudicated these claims. First, the court was
constrained by federal law governing the disposition of public re-
sources and lands as well as the statutory backdrop created by the
territorial and state legislatures. Notably, this statutory backdrop
included the adoption of the common law, which contained the ripar-
ian doctrine, whose incompatibility with public land uses influenced
the development of the relevant case law. Similarly, given the unique
climate and topography of the arid West, concerns of equity and
economic efficiency also animated the court as it navigated poten-
tially conflicting doctrines in light of the facts of each case. The court’s
deference to the common law alongside statutory requirements cre-
ated a doctrine of water rights that in practice was defined by both
the court’s gradual reconciliation of legal conflict as well as coordi-
nation among water users themselves around the doctrine of prior
appropriation. These dual means of doctrinal development are both
apparent in the Territory and State’s supreme court water-rights
jurisprudence throughout the period we have surveyed.
CONCLUSION
The territory and State of Montana was confronted with an insti-
tutional problem similar to that facing many arid, western states:
the riparian doctrine was simply incompatible with realities in the
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West and so was modified or abrogated entirely in favor of the prior
appropriation doctrine. Our analysis of case law from the supreme
court of Montana supports this contention. In the context of Montana,
both prevailing explanations for the abandonment of the riparian
doctrine are apparent. The doctrine was incompatible with pre-ex-
isting and predominant uses of public lands, given that these lands
were already governed by prior appropriation in a de facto sense and
given that title to public lands did not pass to mineral claimants, a
requisite for the application of the riparian doctrine. Furthermore,
the riparian doctrine was ill suited to an area where water was
sufficiently scarce such that all participants could not use water
without detracting significantly from the uses of other, competing
settlers. However, unlike some western states, Montana did not
settle definitely upon the prior appropriation doctrine until 1921; in
the interim, the court was presented with a muddied set of statutory
and case law that forced it to repeatedly consider the conflict be-
tween the water-rights doctrines. In resolving cases in a manner
faithful to statutory intent, equitable resolution for the interests of
the participants, and the canon of avoidance of legal conflict, the
court slowly removed core components of the riparian doctrine until
prior appropriation was the de facto law of the land. It was only
after the conclusion of this process that the court abrogated the
riparian doctrine entirely.
The Montana example carries a number of lessons regarding the
development of property rights along frontiers. The case law clearly
displays how scarcity drives changes in property rights, for a num-
ber of the cases we analyze in detail were only brought to court once
a drought made two competing settlers’ uses of water incompatible.
Also, unclear or internally inconsistent statutes can take a long time
to unravel, for the court ultimately took sixty-one years to whittle
away at the riparian doctrine before abrogating it, something the
legislature of the Montana Territory could have done at the outset
in 1865. Similarly, even when directly indicative of avoidance of
legal conflict, judicial reconciliation of conflicting law can ultimately
rewrite the law itself. In cases where this conflict emerged, the court
slowly removed components of the riparian doctrine in the face of
the hard truth that not every landowner in the territory and state
could use water in a way that did not detract from others’ uses.
Finally, our analysis of the entirety of the case law treating water
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rights from 1865 to 1921 suggests that participants along frontiers
can directly influence the definition of the law through their choices
within a context of doctrinal ambiguity. The vast majority of dis-
putes treating water rights that made it to the supreme court of
Montana required clarification of the prior appropriation doctrine,
as opposed to reconciliation between the competing riparian and
prior appropriation doctrines.
Thus, our analysis is situated in a historical context that sheds light
on a number of questions of interest to legal scholars. The Montana
Supreme Court’s treatment of water law over sixty-one years displays
elements of both legal-formalist and legal-realist understandings in
the development of law. The letter of federal law clearly influenced
the development of water law through the court’s recognition of the
incompatibility of public lands with the riparian doctrine. The fed-
eral law (and conflicting state statutory treatment) had an effect but
ultimately fell to the comparative prevalence of use of one doctrine
over another. Similarly, the court repeatedly recognized arguments
taking into account the comparative scarcity of water in the West
and how the riparian doctrine was insufficient to resolve claims
surrounding competing uses of water when there was not enough
water to go around. In sum, both institutional and economic expla-
nations for the emergence of the prior appropriation doctrine hold
water in Montana.
MURR AND MERGER
STUART BANNER*
In Murr v. Wisconsin,1 the Supreme Court finally answered the
“denominator” question that had been lurking beneath Takings
Clause jurisprudence for decades. The Court’s answer was a multi-
factor test that, although nominally a middle position between the
two extremes offered by the litigants, is in practice likely to be a big
win for regulators. Under this test, conventional forms of land use
regulation that affect owners of multiple, contiguous lots, in ordi-
nary circumstances, are unlikely to be deemed regulatory takings,
even if the regulation has severe effects on one of those lots.2
The outcome of Murr was an unpleasant surprise for property
rights advocates, who had good reasons to expect a victory. The Court
granted the Murrs’ certiorari petition despite the absence of any
published opinions from the courts below. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court had denied review, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals had
written an unpublished opinion. When the Court grants certiorari
in such circumstances, it is usually with an eye toward reversing.
The certiorari grant thus strongly suggested that there were at least
five votes in the Murrs’ favor. One of those votes presumably be-
longed to Justice Scalia, who died a few weeks after certiorari was
granted. The Court then declined to schedule oral argument for a
remarkably long time. The Murrs filed their reply brief in July 2016.
In the normal course, the case would have been argued in October.
But the Court did not schedule argument until March 2017, most
likely in the hope that Justice Scalia’s successor would be confirmed
so the Court could avoid a four-four tie. The delay likewise sug-
gested that even without Justice Scalia there would be four votes in
the Murrs’ favor. As it happened, Justice Gorsuch was not confirmed
until April, so the Court had only eight Justices for Murr, and a
four-four tie was widely thought to be a probable outcome.
Why did the government win? I would like to suggest that one im-
portant reason was the sheer ordinariness of the land use regulation
* Norman Abrams Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
1. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
2. Id. at 1945.
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at issue in the case. The ordinance that the Murrs alleged to be a
taking was a “merger” provision, which allows the development of a
substandard lot only if the lot is in separate ownership from adja-
cent lots.3 Merger provisions are very common. Merger has been a
standard tool of land use regulation for decades. That turned out to
be important, for two reasons.
First, although defining the denominator is in principle a separate
question from whether a taking has occurred, in practice the two
questions are often inseparable. Answering the denominator ques-
tion is often outcome-determinative. Picking the smaller denominator
would imply that the regulation at issue is a taking; picking the
larger denominator would imply that it is not.
Second, most of the Court’s regulatory takings cases can be grasped
intuitively by asking a simple question: is the regulation being chal-
lenged a normal part of the regulatory landscape, or is it exceptional?
Is it a restriction that everyone should expect, or is it an unfair
surprise? At bottom, the point of regulatory takings doctrine is to
protect the reasonable expectations of property owners. A regulation
that seems to come from out of the blue or affects the property of
only a small number of people is far more likely to be a taking than
a regulation that is familiar and affects everyone. Merger is in the
latter category. It is a familiar part of zoning ordinances throughout
the country. No well-informed lawyer could be surprised by a mer-
ger provision.
Because merger is so ordinary and because picking the smaller
denominator favored by the Murrs would have invalidated merger
provisions, the Court refused to pick the smaller denominator. As a
strategic matter, Murr v. Wisconsin turned out to be the wrong case
for property rights advocates to take to the Supreme Court.
I. THE DENOMINATOR QUESTION
One important component of regulatory takings doctrine has al-
ways been the extent to which regulation reduces the value of prop-
erty. If we consider two regulations, one of which causes the value
of property to fall by one percent and the other of which causes the
3. Id.
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value of property to fall by ninety-nine percent, it is obvious that the
second regulation is a far more serious incursion on property rights
than the first. It would be hard to imagine any coherent regulatory
takings doctrine that does not take into account the economic im-
pact of regulation.
But one percent or ninety-nine percent of what? How to define the
denominator of this fraction has always posed a puzzle. The prop-
erty owner wants the denominator to be as small as possible, to make
the diminution in value look bigger. The government has the oppo-
site incentive. This debate took place as early as Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon,4 which is conventionally said to be the Supreme Court’s
first regulatory takings case. The case involved a state law banning
underground coal mining that would cause the subsidence of a
house on the surface. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, de-
fined the denominator as the coal company’s subsurface rights to
the coal (the company had sold the surface rights to the homeowners
and had retained only the subsurface rights).5 With the denominator
so defined, the state law took away virtually one hundred percent
of the coal company’s property. As Holmes put it, “[T]he extent of
the taking is great. It purports to abolish what is recognized in
Pennsylvania as an estate in land—a very valuable estate . . . .”6 In
dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the denominator should be
the value of the entire parcel of land, including the subsurface, the
surface, and the air rights. He explained:
If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the
restriction, we should compare it with the value of all other parts
of the land. That is, with the value not of the coal alone, but with
the value of the whole property. The rights of an owner as against
the public are not increased by dividing the interests in his
property into surface and subsoil. The sum of the rights in the
parts can not be greater than the rights in the whole. The estate
of an owner in land is grandiloquently described as extending ab
orco usque ad coelum [from Hades up to heaven]. But I suppose
no one would contend that by selling his interest above 100 feet
from the surface he could prevent the state from limiting, by the
4. Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5. Id. at 413–14.
6. Id. at 414.
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police power, the height of structures in a city. And why should
a sale of underground rights bar the state’s power?7
Brandeis recognized that the denominator can be manipulated by
the landowner to make the impact of the regulation look more severe.
His examples involved the vertical division of property, because those
were the facts of Pennsylvania Coal, but his concern applies equally
well to the horizontal division of property. For example, a landowner
who is not allowed to build within six feet of the property line might,
if he is allowed to choose his own denominator, claim a one hundred
percent reduction in the value of that six-foot strip.
The problem never went away. In Penn Central, the 1978 case
that marked the origin of contemporary regulatory takings jurispru-
dence, Justice Brennan’s majority opinion insisted that the denomi-
nator was not just the air rights above the train station, which the
Penn Central Railroad wanted to lease to a company that would build
a skyscraper, but rather the entire parcel on which the train station
was located.8 The New York Court of Appeals, the court below, had
defined the denominator even more broadly to include other parcels
of land near the train station that were also owned by Penn Central,
on the theory that the train station made these parcels more valu-
able than they would otherwise have been.9 A few years later, in
another case involving a coal-mining statute, the Court effectively
overruled Pennsylvania Coal on the denominator question, defining
it as the whole parcel, not just the underground coal.10 In subse-
quent cases, the Court noted the existence of the question without
attempting to resolve it.11
The difficulty of the denominator question, as it existed prior to
Murr, is perhaps most easily seen with a stylized example. Imagine
a landowner who owns ten equally sized, contiguous parcels, num-
bered one through ten. Parcel six has an environmental feature,
such as a wetlands or an endangered species, that causes the gov-
ernment to prohibit building on parcel six, which renders parcel six
7. Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
8. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
9. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276–77 (N.Y. 1977).
10. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497–501 (1987).
11. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331–32
(2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
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worthless. Has the landowner lost one hundred percent of the value
of parcel six? Or has he lost ten percent of the value of his land as
a whole? Or consider a more realistic example. A real estate developer
purchases a large tract of undeveloped land. She plans to subdivide
the tract into fifty residential parcels, to build a house on each
parcel, and to sell the parcels to fifty different purchasers. If, before
the subdivision takes place, the government prohibits building on
the area that was intended to be residential parcel thirty-three, the
value of the tract will decline by two percent. What if the govern-
ment prohibits building in that area after the subdivision takes
place, but before any of the fifty parcels is sold? Has the developer
lost one hundred percent of parcel thirty-three? Or only two percent
of the combined area of all fifty parcels?
In principle, defining the denominator is a separate and prior ques-
tion from deciding whether a taking has occurred. In practice, how-
ever, the questions blend together because a very small diminution
in value is virtually never a taking, while a very large diminution
in value is quite likely to be a taking and complete diminution in
value, except in certain circumstances, is always a taking.12 Choos-
ing a denominator thus often means deciding whether a taking has
occurred. The debate is sometimes couched as a technical question
of defining the scope of a claimant’s property right, but everyone
realizes that it is often a debate over outcomes rather than methods.
The debate has been colored by the awareness that either party,
the property owner or the government, has some ability to manipu-
late the size of the denominator. A property owner anticipating
regulation that will affect part of his land may be able to divide one
parcel into two or more, while the government may be able to com-
bine two or more parcels into one. Empirical examples of these
strategies seem to be rare, but the possibility that they might be
implemented has counseled against any rule that would give either
the property owner or the government the unilateral ability to
define the denominator. On one side, if the denominator were a
matter of personal choice, it would be open to manipulation by the
property owner. On the other, if the denominator were a matter of
state or local law, it would be open to manipulation by the state or
local government.
12. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
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Murr presented the denominator question in the context of a mer-
ger provision.13 The Murrs owned two adjacent lots, Lot E and Lot
F, along the St. Croix River in Wisconsin. There was a cabin on Lot
F. Lot E was undeveloped. Both lots were too small to build on, under
a county ordinance requiring at least one acre of buildable land. Be-
cause both lots were in existence before the enactment of the ordi-
nance, both were “nonconforming” lots—that is, they benefited from
a grandfather clause that allowed building despite their size.14 But
the grandfather clause included a merger provision: it applied only
to lots in separate ownership from adjacent lots.15 If two adjacent
lots were owned by the same person and the combined area of the
two lots was large enough to build on, the grandfather clause did
not apply to either of the individual lots. The merger provision did
not literally merge the lots, but it required treating them as a single
lot for the purpose of the lot size requirement.16
Because of this merger provision, it was unlawful to develop Lot
E separately. The Murrs alleged that this was a regulatory taking.17
Here was where the denominator question arose: in evaluating the
economic impact of the St. Croix County ordinance, which was the
appropriate denominator, Lot E alone, or Lots E and F combined? If
the answer was Lot E, the Murrs would have a strong takings claim
because they were completely denied the ability to develop Lot E.
But if the answer was Lot E and F combined, their takings claim
would be considerably weaker. They were allowed to develop Lots E
and F combined, and they lost only about ten percent of the lots’ com-
bined value by not being allowed to develop both lots separately.18
The Wisconsin courts held that the appropriate denominator was
Lots E and F combined.19
II. MERGER PROVISIONS
If one had to predict the outcome of the Court’s regulatory takings
cases in recent times with knowledge of only a single fact about each
13. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1940–41.
14. Id. at 1940.
15. Id. at 1947.
16. Id. at 1940–41.
17. Id. at 1941.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1941–42.
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case, perhaps the most useful fact to know would be whether the regu-
lation at issue is common or unusual. Regulations that the Court
has found to be takings have tended to fall unfairly on one person
or a small number of people. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, the challenged statute had the effect of preventing a single
beachfront landowner from building a house after all his neighbors
had already been allowed to build one.20 By contrast, the Court has
found no taking where property owners challenged the sort of ordi-
nary, ubiquitous regulations that affect large numbers of people,
such as the historic landmark ordinance in Penn Central.21 Most
regulation falls somewhere between these two extremes, and although
people can disagree about how commonplace any particular sort of
regulation actually is, this is still a useful generalization. Ordinary
zoning ordinances, of the sort that exist in most cities of any size, are
very unlikely to be regulatory takings. It would be very surprising if
the Court were to use the Takings Clause to upset the expectations
of millions of homeowners.
The merger provision at issue in Murr is not quite as common-
place as, say, the separation of commercial and residential uses in
a normal zoning ordinance, but it is closer to that than any regula-
tion the Court has considered in any of its previous takings cases.
According to their brief, the Murrs were “flabbergasted”22 when they
learned, too late, about the merger provision. If so, it is because they
received poor legal advice when they placed the two parcels into
common ownership. Merger provisions are such normal features of
zoning ordinances that any competent real estate lawyer would know
about them. Merger provisions are common because they serve an
important purpose: they reconcile the community’s interest in pre-
venting the harms caused by congestion with the landowner’s interest
in developing a substandard lot.
Minimum lot size requirements have long been the standard way
of preventing the harms caused by congestion. Since the advent of
zoning, state and local governments have sought to regulate the
density of development, in order to prevent overcrowding, to avoid
depleting natural resources, to preserve the character of communities,
20. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
21. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
22. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 27, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No.
15-214).
192 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 7:185
and to sustain property values. Minimum lot size requirements “are
by far the most common form of density control in zoning ordi-
nances.”23 Today, lot size requirements can be “found in virtually all
zoning ordinances.”24
Courts have consistently recognized that minimum lot size re-
quirements serve important public purposes, including
preventing the evils of overcrowding and the ill effects of urban-
ization, control of traffic, protection of property values, protec-
tion of aesthetics and the character of an area, protection of open
space, the provision of adequate public facilities, protection of
the water supply, preventing erosion and providing emergency
access, preventing water pollution, preservation of agricultural
lands, and the protection of environmentally sensitive areas
including wildlife habitat.25
As early as 1926, the Court noted that “[t]here is no serious dif-
ference of opinion in respect of the validity of laws and regulations
fixing . . . the adjoining area which must be left open, in order to
minimize the danger of fire or collapse, the evils of overcrowding
and the like.”26 More recently, the Court observed that minimum lot
size requirements are a way of protecting a town’s residents “from
the ill effects of urbanization.”27 The state courts have likewise em-
phasized the value of lot size restrictions in limiting traffic conges-
tion,28 safeguarding the environment,29 conserving the water supply,30
and sustaining neighboring property values.31
Merger has long been recognized as the most reasonable way to
reconcile the landowner’s interest in developing a nonconforming lot
with the community’s interest in preventing congestion. A “non-
conforming” lot is one that was of lawful size before the enactment
23. Gavin L. Phillips, Validity of Zoning Laws Setting Minimum Lot Size Requirements,
1 A.L.R. 5th 622 (1992).
24. 1 DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & KATHERINE KMIEC TURNER, ZONING AND PLANNING DESKBOOK
109 (2015).
25. 3 SARA C. BRONIN & DWIGHT H. MERRIAM, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLAN-
NING § 51:12, Westlaw (4th ed. 2017) (citations omitted).
26. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
27. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
28. Simon v. Town of Needham, 42 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Mass. 1942).
29. Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm’n, 593 A.2d 251, 258 (N.J. 1991).
30. Ketchel v. Bainbridge Twp., 557 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ohio 1990).
31. La Grange State Bank v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 591 N.E.2d 480, 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
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of a minimum lot size requirement but is now too small. Noncon-
forming lots are analogous to nonconforming uses—that is, uses of
land that were once lawful but do not comply with a new zoning
restriction, as when a business finds itself located within an area
newly zoned for residential use. Nonconforming lots and noncon-
forming uses are allowed to continue because of the obvious unfair-
ness in forcing them to terminate immediately.
But there is one major difference between nonconforming lots and
nonconforming uses. Nonconforming uses are typically phased out
over time.32 Zoning ordinances often establish an “amortization”
period, which “simply designates a period of time granted to owners
of nonconforming uses during which they may phase out their
operations as they see fit and make other arrangements.”33 Provided
the amortization period is long enough to allow the owner to recoup
his investment, courts have generally concluded that amortization
strikes an appropriate balance between the landowner’s reasonable
expectations and the public’s interest in advancing the goals served
by the zoning ordinance.34
Amortization will not work for nonconforming lots, however, be-
cause the size of a lot cannot be phased out over time. Most non-
conforming lots are thus grandfathered in permanently; they are
forever exempt from the minimum lot size requirement that would
otherwise be applicable.35 But this outcome limits the community’s
ability to accomplish the goals that the lot size requirement was in-
tended to serve. Because of the impossibility of amortizing noncon-
forming lots, local governments have sought some other way to
strike a sensible balance between private and public interests.
The solution has been merger. Where the owner of an undeveloped,
nonconforming lot also owns another contiguous lot, and where the
two lots together would be large enough to comply with the lot size
minimum, ordinances often treat the two lots as one for this purpose.
Typically, the lots are not literally merged. The sole effect of most
“merger” provisions is simply that the exemption for nonconforming
lots is denied to a landowner who also owns an adjacent lot.36
32. 4 SARA C. BRONIN & DWIGHT H. MERRIAM, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLAN-
NING § 74:18, Westlaw (4th ed. 2017).
33. Village of Valatie v. Smith, 632 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (N.Y. 1994).
34. 2 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 12:23, Westlaw (5th ed. 2017).
35. Id. § 12:12.
36. See, e.g., EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25:179.6,
194 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 7:185
Such merger provisions have been features of local zoning ordi-
nances for a very long time. Great Neck Estates, New York, enacted
one in 1926.37 Bayville, New York, enacted one in 1927.38 Nahant,
Massachusetts, enacted one in 1940.39 Attleboro, Massachusetts, en-
acted one in 1942.40 Skokie, Illinois, enacted one in 1946.41 Hempstead,
New York, and Wellesley, Massachusetts, both enacted theirs in
1951.42 Weston, Connecticut, enacted one in 1953.43 Berlin, Connecti-
cut, enacted one in 1954.44 Redford, Michigan, enacted one sometime
before 1957.45 Old Lyme, Connecticut, enacted one in 1957.46
By 1960, merger provisions were so common that the American
Society of Planning Officials included one in The Text of a Model
Zoning Ordinance it published for the benefit of local governments
nationwide.47 A few years later, the leading zoning treatise of the
era explained that the owner of a nonconforming lot
is entitled to an exception only if his lot is isolated. If the owner
of such a lot owns another lot adjacent to it, he is not entitled to
an exception. Rather, he must combine the two lots to form one
which will meet, or more closely approximate, the frontage and
area requirements of the ordinance.48
Westlaw (3d ed. 2017) (“Municipalities often have ordinances which treat commonly owned,
contiguous lots, one or more of which are nonconforming, as one conforming lot.”); Jock v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 878 A.2d 785, 794 (N.J. 2005) (“The term ‘merger’ is used in zoning
law to describe the combination of two or more contiguous lots of substandard size, that are held
in common ownership, in order to meet the requirements of a particular zoning regulation.”).
37. Ferryman v. Weisser, 158 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957).
38. Flanagan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 149 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956), aff’d,
151 N.Y.S.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
39. Clarke v. Bd. of Appeals, 155 N.E.2d 754, 755 & n.3 (Mass. 1959).
40. Vetter v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 116 N.E.2d 277, 277–78 (Mass. 1953).
41. Weber v. Village of Skokie, 235 N.E.2d 406, 410 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
42. Cabral v. Young, 177 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); Sorenti v. Bd. of Appeals,
187 N.E.2d 499, 500 & n.1 (Mass. 1963).
43. Bankers Trust Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 345 A.2d 544, 546 (Conn. 1974).
44. Schultz v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 130 A.2d 789, 790 (Conn. 1957).
45. Korby v. Twp. of Redford, 82 N.W.2d 441, 443–44 (Mich. 1957).
46. Corsino v. Grover, 170 A.2d 267, 269 (Conn. 1961).
47. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, THE TEXT OF A MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE
26 (2d ed. 1960).
48. 2 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 8.49 (1968). See also John R.
McGill, Note, Substandard Lots and the Exception Clause—“Checkerboarding” as a Means of
Circumvention, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 612, 614 (1965) (“[M]ost ordinances include a section which
exempts substandard lots in existence at the time the ordinance is enacted (or amended)
provided they are held in single, separate ownership.”).
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ground between two unattractive extremes—prohibiting the devel-
opment of substandard lots, which would be a hardship to their
owners, and allowing the development of all substandard lots, which
would be a hardship to neighbors and the community. As the Maine
Supreme Court explained, a merger provision “is designed to strike
a balance between a municipality’s interest in abolishing nonconfor-
mities and the interests of property owners in maintaining land
uses that were allowed when they purchased their property.”49
On one side of the balance, the public has an interest in “the re-
duction of nonconforming lots,”50 which exacerbate the congestion
that motivated the enactment of the lot size minimum. “Otherwise,
subdivisions in their infancy could perpetuate for years the problems
zoning was designed to eliminate.”51 On the other side of the balance,
while any restriction on development will have some effect on the
owner of property, “the financial hardship on the owner in comply-
ing is not nearly as great [where he is able] to conform by enlarging
lot sizes or combining two lots into one.”52 The state courts have
thus widely recognized that merger provisions “operate to decrease
congestion in the streets and to prevent the overcrowding of land”53
without imposing unreasonable burdens on individual landowners.
For this reason, countless ordinances all over the country include
merger provisions like the one challenged by the Murrs. Several
states have enacted statutes specifically authorizing local govern-
ments to include merger provisions in their zoning ordinances.54 In
49. Day v. Town of Phippsburg, 110 A.3d 645, 649 (Me. 2015). See also Kalway v. City of
Berkeley, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 477, 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (observing that merger provisions
“balance the interests of the public and private ownership”).
50. Goulet v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 978 A.2d 1160, 1165 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
51. York Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Brown, 182 A.2d 706, 707 (Pa. 1962) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id.
53. Brum v. Conley, 572 A.2d 1332, 1334 (R.I. 1990).
54. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 66451.11 (Deering 2018) (“A local agency may, by ordinance
which conforms to and implements the procedures prescribed by this article, provide for the
merger of a parcel or unit with a contiguous parcel or unit held by the same owner if any one
of the contiguous parcels or units held by the same owner does not conform to standards for
minimum parcel size . . . .”); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 40A, § 6 (2018) (providing that lot size
minimum requirements shall not apply to a nonconforming lot that “was not held in common
ownership with any adjoining land”); MINN. STAT. § 394.36(5)(d) (2017) (providing that
nonconforming lots “must be combined with the one or more contiguous lots so they equal one
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some states, merger is a common-law doctrine that can apply even
in the absence of a local ordinance requiring it.55 In other states, local
governments enact merger provisions pursuant to general legisla-
tive grants of zoning authority.56 Many municipalities have merger
provisions in their zoning ordinances, including, just to name a few,
Charlotte, El Paso, Miami, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Palm Springs,
Pittsburgh, and Tampa.57
With just a few minutes of research, one can find many periodicals
and web pages explaining that the purchaser of a vacant, noncon-
forming lot should be careful to ascertain whether the lot is governed
by a merger provision.58 Practice guides for attorneys likewise advise
or more conforming lots as much as possible”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-6-9.1 (West 2018) (stating
power of local governments to require “consolidation of contiguous parcels in common owner-
ship for the purpose of enforcing minimum zoning or subdivision standards on the parcels”);
45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-38 (2018) (authorizing local governments to provide “for the merger
of contiguous unimproved, or improved and unimproved, substandard lots of record in the
same ownership to create dimensionally conforming lots”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4412(2)(B)
(2018) (authorizing local governments to provide that “if an existing small lot subsequently
comes under common ownership with one or more contiguous lots, the conforming lot shall
be deemed merged with the contiguous lot”).
55. See, e.g., Remes v. Montgomery Cty., 874 A.2d 470, 485 (Md. 2005) (referring to the
discussion of merger in Friends of the Ridge as “a statement of the common law”); Friends of
the Ridge v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 724 A.2d 34, 38 (Md. 1999) (discussing merger); Timperio
v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 993 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (“It is well settled that
‘[u]nder the common-law merger doctrine, when adjacent nonconforming lots come into common
ownership, they are normally merged and treated as a single lot for zoning purposes.’”) (quoting
Hoffman v. Bd. of Zoning Appeal, 910 N.E.2d 965, 971 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009)).
56. See, e.g., Neumann v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 539 A.2d 614, 616 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988)
(noting that “many zoning ordinances” in the state include merger provisions, without any
reference to legislation specifically authorizing them).
57. There is a list of more than one hundred such ordinances in Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l
Ass’n of Counties et al. at 14–31, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
58. See, e.g., Kathleen Deegan Dickson, The Law of Merger, N.Y. REAL ESTATE J., Nov. 11,
2014, http://nyrej.com/78995 (“Take caution when purchasing a vacant parcel of land [because
of] the possibility of the merger of lots . . . .”); Richard Gallogly, Merger by Acquisition:
Grandfathered Status Can Be Lost, MASS. LAND USE MONITOR, Aug. 22, 2013, http://www
.massachusettslandusemonitor.com/zoning/the-status-of-a-pre-existing-nonconforming-lot-is
-subject-to-change/ (explaining “the grandfathered status of a lawful pre-existing nonconfor-
ming lot is not perpetual, and can be lost if the lot later comes into common ownership with
adjoining land”); Anthony S. Guardino, Lot Merger and Single and Separate Exemptions, N.Y.
LAW J. LONG ISLAND WEEKLY, Dec. 11, 2004, http://www.farrellfritz.com/wp-content/uploads
/art-183.pdf (“[L]ot merger frequently play[s] a crucial role in the zoning approval process . . . .”);
Lloyd Pilchen, When Two Become One: A Look at the Law of Merger of Adjoining Parcels, 7
AMERICAN SURVEYOR, no. 4, May 22, 2010, http://www.amerisurv.com/content/view/7419 (“Local
governments typically only seek to impose a merger when [the adjoining lot] does not conform
to today’s zoning standards, such as minimum lot area or street frontage.”); Anne L.H.
Studholme, Understanding “Merger” of Nonconforming Lots, HILL WALLACK, http://www.hill
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that local zoning ordinances may treat a nonconforming lot as merged
with an adjoining lot in common ownership.59 In short, a well-advised
owner or purchaser of land should expect that the land may be gov-
erned by a lot size minimum and an associated merger provision.
These are common zoning rules that are well within the reasonable
expectations of landowners and their lawyers.
In deciding Murr, the Court seems to have been influenced by how
common these merger provisions are. Near the beginning of oral
argument, Justice Ginsburg asked: “[T]hese merger rules have a
long history. Many States have them. So why isn’t that background
State law that . . . would apply?”60 Justice Kennedy worried that if
the Murrs prevailed, “all of those other State regulations are also
invalid”61—that is, the Court would be invalidating merger provi-
sions in towns all over the country. Kennedy repeated this concern in
his opinion for the Court. “The merger provision here,” he observed,
is “a legitimate exercise of government power, as reflected by its con-
sistency with a long history of state and local merger regulations
that originated nearly a century ago.”62 He noted that the Murrs’
proposed rule “would frustrate municipalities’ ability to implement
minimum lot size regulations by casting doubt on the many merger
provisions that exist today.”63
The sheer ordinariness of the merger provision at issue in Murr
thus played an important part in the Court’s decision to adopt a
government-friendly standard for identifying the appropriate de-
nominator in regulatory takings cases. Of course, that was not the
only consideration in the case. This issue has been around for so long
wallack.com/?t=40&an=15702 (last visited Jan. 9, 2018) (“Those thinking of buying a parcel
composed of undersized lots need to understand the doctrine of merger . . . .”).
59. See, e.g., 28 MICHAEL PILL, ET AL., MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, REAL ESTATE LAW § 23.6,
Westlaw (4th ed. 2017) (“Always check the local zoning bylaw or ordinance . . . [B]uilding lots
which do not meet current zoning dimensional requirements, and which came into common
ownership or control subsequent to the zoning change that rendered them nonconforming, are
merged into a single lot for zoning purposes . . . .”); 36 DAVID J. FRIZELL & RONALD D. CUCCHIARO,
NEW JERSEY PRACTICE: LAND USE LAW § 15.7, Westlaw (3d ed. 2017) (suggesting that merger
can be easily avoided by titling adjacent nonconforming parcels in different entities, because
“[s]o long as the legal titles are kept separate, the doctrine will not be used to merge lots that
are under a single ‘dominion and control.’”); 9B ROBERT A. FULLER, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE:
LAND USE LAW & PRACTICE § 53:6, Westlaw (4th ed. 2017) (“[T]here can be lot merger . . .
where the zoning regulations contain a merger provision for nonconforming contiguous lots.”).
60. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
61. Id. at 12.
62. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947.
63. Id. at 1947–48.
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that there are many standard arguments on both sides, all of which
were duly made by the parties and their many amici. But one has to
wonder whether the Court would have reached the same result in a
case involving a limitation on land use that was not so normal. If the
denominator issue had been litigated in a case involving a regulation
that was an unfair surprise, one that upset a landowner’s reason-
able expectations, perhaps the result would have been different.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional takings doctrine, based as it is on the indicia of
physical occupation of land, does not fit easily into the issues that
arose with the emergence of the regulatory state.
Judge S. Jay Plager1
During the past forty years, the United States Supreme Court has
developed a doctrinal structure for adjudicating inverse condemna-
tion claims respecting property in land. Permanent government arro-
gations of possession are compensable, as are permanent deprivations
of all economic value. Other deprivations of rights in land are evalu-
ated using an ad hoc, multifactor test and are compensable if suffi-
ciently severe. Claims are evaluated based on the Takings Clause and
not other constitutional provisions such as the Due Process Clause.
However, closer inspection indicates that judicial formulations
regarding claims based on other than arrogations of land—referred
to as “regulatory takings”—rest on an insecure foundation. It was
a statute that literally drew lines on coastal sands that led to the
dueling opinions of Justices Scalia and Kennedy a quarter century
ago in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.2 It was a statute
obliterating property lines along scenic river shores that, in 2017,
gave rise to Murr v. Wisconsin.3 There, Justice Kennedy maintained
his earlier views, while the late Justice Scalia’s quest for bright-line
stability was picked up by Chief Justice Roberts.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Murr held fast to Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,4 where the Court de-
veloped the outlines of its ad hoc, multifactor approach to regulatory
takings. Indeed, Kennedy took the Court’s muddled, ad hoc approach
and conflated it with antecedent considerations of property owner-
ship. Chief Justice Roberts, however, decried that the Court now was
drawing into its Penn Central multifactor web the very definition of
property itself.
For some, Murr reflects changing notions of property and environ-
mental awareness, and vindicates Heraclitus’s admonition: “No man
1. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
2. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
3. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct.1933 (2017).
4. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
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ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the same river and he’s
not the same man.”5 For others, redefining property rights in light of
social pressures is reminiscent of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s
famous admonition that American society eliminates dissonance by
diminishing norms.6
In a broader sense, Penn Central, Lucas, and now Murr reflect the
tension between two fundamental goals. On the one hand,
“property” is an undifferentiated attribute of the individuals who
enter into society.7 The protection of property rights in things
counters overreaching by government8 and is essential to individual
liberty.9 On the other hand, the Constitution’s framers and their
generation primarily have conceived of a society imbued not by
individualism but with the need for, and promise of, civic virtue.10
Deprivations of ownership in things seem a natural fit with the
Takings Clause,11 whereas placing unfair burdens on individuals
largely invokes substantive due process.12 Assertions of republicanism
5. HERACLITUS, FRAGMENTS, at xii, 27 (Brooks Haxton trans., Viking Adult 2001).
6. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AM. SCHOLAR 17 (1993), http://
www.jstor.org/stable/41212064. Moynihan discussed Kai T. Erickson’s Wayward Puritans (1965),
which attempted to test the theory of Émile Durkheim’s The Rules of the Sociological Method
(W.D. Halls trans., The Free Press 1982) (1895). The theory, in Erickson’s words, hypothesized
that “the number of deviant offenders a community can afford to recognize is likely to remain
stable over time.” Id. at 19.
7. See, e.g., John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOV-
ERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., New York: Mentor 1965) (1690). “Lives, Liberties and Estates,
which I call by the general Name, Property.” Id. § 123; FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985).
[W]hen the Framers of the Constitution said that the protection of property was
a (or the) fundamental purpose for submitting to the authority of government,
they understood that the word property had more meanings than one. In its
older and more general sense it was related to the word proper, derived from the
Latin proprius, meaning particular to, or appropriate to, an individual person.
MCDONALD, supra at 10.
8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 281 (1985) (“[T]he Takings Clause is designed to control rent seeking and political
faction. It is those practices, and only those practices, that it reaches.”).
9. See, e.g., 6 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 280 (Charles Francis Adams ed.,
Boston: Little Brown 1850) (“Property must be secured or liberty cannot exist.”).
10. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning
of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 1099, 1107–31 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1593 (1988) (outlining the role of republicanism in the
founding period and exploring modern implications).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation.”). The Clause is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
12. See infra Section II.E.1 for discussion.
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and civic virtue engender a reaction of distrust of government, largely
manifested in what Justice Alito described in Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Management District13 as “extortionate demands” that
“impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without
just compensation.”14
Another challenge is finding an appropriate baseline for legal
inquiry.15 Among the inflection points in American takings law are
the following: the expansion beyond explicit condemnation in Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co.,16 the inclusion of takings by regulation in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon,17 the rise of loosely constrained judicial
review based largely on perceived owners’ “expectations” in Penn
Central,18 and the articulation of a bright-line test in Lucas.19 Now
Murr promises to further blur the distinction between property and
its regulation.20
This Article asserts that the concept of property as a tool for soci-
etal governance remains ascendant; that the traditional view of
property rights as protecting owners’ autonomy is an impediment to
this progression; and that, to paraphrase Senator Moynihan, this re-
sults in a government inclination to define property down. This
occurs in Murr through the Court’s recognition of a four-factor Penn
Central regulatory takings test,21 which interacts in indeterminate
ways with a new “relevant parcel” test, loosely tethered to owner-
ship of a specific parcel.
I. PENN CENTRAL’S INCOHERENCE IS EXACERBATED BY MURR
In Murr v. Wisconsin,22 the petitioners maintained that the bound-
aries of an individually deeded parcel that they owned were definitive.
Under the applicable Wisconsin merger regulation, that parcel was
13. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
14. Id. at 2595–96.
15. See generally Adam M. Samaha, On the Problem of Legal Change, 103 GEO. L.J. 97,
100–01 (2014) (discussing the difficult legal tasks of discerning change from the status quo
and drawing appropriate normative conclusions).
16. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
17. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
18. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
19. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
20. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1948 (2017).
21. See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test,
118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 601 (2014) [hereinafter Eagle, Four-Factor].
22. Murr, 137 S. Ct.
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consolidated with another, which petitioners asserted deprived them
of all rights to develop it. The State maintained that its merger
regulation was definitive.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,23 found that neither the
boundaries of the deeded parcel nor the merger statute were defini-
tive. Instead, he employed a loose formulation that at the same time
subjects a “relevant parcel” to regulatory takings analysis and uses
the elements of regulatory takings analysis to help determine the
relevant parcel to be analyzed.24
As I previously asserted,25 the judicial career of Penn Central’s
“parcel as a whole” analysis, albeit textually separate from its treat-
ment of the three other considerations, made it clear that the case
had functionally laid out a four-factor test. Murr confirmed this
understanding, and laid out that the “parcel as a whole” was both
separate from and interrelated to the other factors. Murr thus both
exacerbated existing problems with Penn Central and weakened the
Court’s understanding of “property.”26
This Part summarizes the Penn Central litigation and analyzes the
Supreme Court’s ad hoc, multifactor test for adjudicating regulatory
takings. It examines how the takings framework conventionally de-
scribed as the “three-factor” Penn Central test was incoherent even
before Murr.
Justice Brennan’s Penn Central opinion for the Court27 remains,
after four decades, the “polestar” of the Supreme Court’s regulatory
takings jurisprudence.28 Penn Central has been the subject of volu-
minous scholarly commentary.29 Although the case has become
23. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the principal dissent, joined by Justices Thomas (who also wrote
a separate dissent) and Alito. Justice Gorsuch, who joined the Court subsequent to oral
argument, did not participate.
24. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943–50.
25. Eagle, Four-Factor, supra note 21.
26. See infra Part II.
27. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Justice Rehnquist
dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens. Id. at 138.
28. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our
polestar . . . remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that
govern partial regulatory takings.”). See also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336 (2002) (quoting “polestar” language approvingly).
29. See, e.g., David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Per-
spectives on Property Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and
Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523 (1999); Eric R. Claeys, The Penn
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regarded as pre-eminent, at the time it was written there was little
inkling that it would be important at all.30
A. The Penn Central Litigation
Grand Central Terminal, opened in 1913, was described by the
Supreme Court as a “magnificent example of the French beaux-arts
style.”31 Eventually, it was designated as a landmark by the New
York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, which meant that
the commission’s permission was required for exterior alterations or
site improvements. In 1968, Penn Central, desirous of augmenting
its income, entered into a long-term lease of air rights that would
involve the construction of a fifty-five-story office building above the
terminal. There was no dispute that the building would meet all
zoning and building requirements, but the commission denied a re-
quired “certificate of appropriateness” because it deemed the project
an “aesthetic joke.”32
The railroad sued, and the New York trial court found that the com-
mission’s denial constituted a compensable taking.33 The intermedi-
ate appellate court reversed, finding that the railroad could earn a
reasonable rate of return,34 and its decision was affirmed in a very
sweeping opinion by the New York Court of Appeals that emphasized
the public’s role in creating the terminal’s value.35 Justice Brennan’s
Supreme Court opinion did not refer to that analysis but rather
Central Test and Tensions in Liberal Property Theory, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339 (2006);
Christopher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (2016).
30. Transcript, Looking Back on Penn Central: A Panel Discussion with the Supreme
Court Litigators, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 287 (2004) [hereinafter Transcript, Looking
Back] (noting that, in order to hold a majority, clerks in other chambers warned that “the opin-
ion better not say very much,” and, after the draft was circulated, “Justice Stewart’s clerk
read it and said he was pretty sure it doesn’t say anything at all. [Laughter]” (comment of
David Carpenter, who worked on the opinion as Justice Brennan’s judicial clerk)).
31. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 115 (1978).
32. Id. at 117–18.
33. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)
(noting the unpublished order of the New York court).
34. Id.
35. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 438
U.S. 104 (1978). In determining the base upon which the rate of return was calculated, Chief
Judge Charles Breitel subtracted “that ingredient of property value created not so much by
the efforts of the property owner, but instead by the accumulated indirect social and direct
governmental investment in the physical property, its functions, and its surroundings.” Id.
at 272–73. See also Steven J. Eagle, Public Use in the Dirigiste Tradition, 38 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1023, 1070 (2011) (criticizing Judge Breitel’s Georgist approach).
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broadly deemed that the landmark regulation “benefit[ed] all New
York citizens and all structures.” The opinion further declared,
contrary to the gravamen of then-Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, that
“we cannot conclude that the owners of the Terminal have in no
sense been benefitted by the Landmarks Law.”36
The Court applied its three-factor test to the tax block on which
the terminal was located37 and determined that there had been no
taking. I will summarize the Court’s analysis in Penn Central briefly,
but I have discussed it at greater length elsewhere.38
B. The Penn Central Ad Hoc, Multifactor Takings Test
In 1978, the Court developed in Penn Central39 the outlines of an ad
hoc, multifactor approach to regulatory takings that it subsequently
expanded upon.40 Justice Brennan enunciated the standard for the
Court’s inquiry:
36. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134–35 (1978). Justice
Rehnquist declared: “Of the over one million buildings and structures in the city of New York,
appellees have singled out 400 for designation as official landmarks.” Id. at 138 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
37. See infra Section I.C.1.
38. Eagle, Four-Factor, supra note 21, at 605–26.
39. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
40. The principal cases expanding upon Penn Central include the following: Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (finding that “does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests” is not a valid takings test, but rather a substantive due process test); Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (deciding whether
a temporary moratoria on all economic use is a taking that must be evaluated on Penn Central
factors); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (deciding that a takings claim is not
barred by acquisition of title subsequent to the effective date of regulation); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (finding that conditions imposed on an administrative permit not
based on an individualized determination of the “rough proportionality” between the conditions
and the police-power burdens resulting from development constitute a taking); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (noting that a complete deprivation of economic use
constitutes a taking); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (deeming the impo-
sition of a development-permit condition without any nexus to permissible regulatory purposes
a taking); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987) (ordering that compensation must be paid where a regulation constituted a
taking for the time during which the taking was effective, despite the government’s subsequent
withdrawal or invalidation of the regulation then in effect); Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (stating that takings claims
against state or local governments are not “ripe” for federal court adjudication without (1) a
final decision regarding the type and intensity of development permitted and (2) the exhaustion
of available state procedures for compensation); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986
(1984) (finding that the public disclosure of trade secrets in violation of a statutory promise
of confidentiality constitutes a taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982) (finding that permanent physical occupations constitute per se takings).
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In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have partic-
ular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are,
of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government, than when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.41
At the outset, it is useful to discuss whether the Penn Central
regulatory takings factors were intended to be talismanic, and also
whether they are useful in predicting legal determinations.
Conventionally, Penn Central is described as a three-factor test,42
examining (1) the economic impact on the property owner, (2) inter-
ference with the owner’s distinct investment-backed expectations,
and (3) the character of the regulation. It is not clear, however, why
this formulation should be definitive. Logically, perhaps the test
should be comprised of two factors since “investment-backed expecta-
tions” seems a subset of “economic impact,” or, perhaps truer to the
overall tenor of the opinion, the first factor of the multifactor test
should be “the impact of the challenged regulation on the claimant,
viewed in light of the claimant’s investment-backed expectations.”43
That said, the Court specified, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, that
expectations constituted a separate factor.44
More broadly, the fact that the Court had “identified several fac-
tors that have particular significance” seems to suggest that there
are factors either of lesser importance or not yet identified. The Su-
preme Court of California included the three Penn Central factors
in its list of thirteen factors, which it described as “not a comprehen-
sive enumeration.”45 This dispute over the proper taxonomy seems
41. Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
42. See, e.g., E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 518 (1998) (“The court analyzed Eastern’s
claim . . . under the three factors . . . .”); Schooner Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. United States, 569
F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Penn Central considered and balanced three factors . . . .”).
43. Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson & Guillermo A. Montero, “Oh Lord, Please Don’t
Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering the Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn Central
Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 32 (2005).
44. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
45. Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997).
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reminiscent of French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau’s dis-
missive comment that while President Woodrow Wilson had Fourteen
Points, “God Almighty has only Ten!”46 In fact, the ad hoc nature of
the Penn Central inquiry might preclude any definitive list of factors,
and “it is far from obvious” that Penn Central “actually intended this
enumeration of ‘significant’ factors to define a determinative, free-
standing test” at all.47
The three conventional Penn Central factors are as follows.
1. Economic Impact
In Mahon,48 Justice Holmes acknowledged that “[g]overnment
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law.”49 He added, however, that regulation “must have its
limits or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for
consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminu-
tion [in value].”50 The Penn Central economic-impact factor of the
regulation test might have been designed to incorporate diminution-
in-value as a rough measure of harm and therefore a coarse screening
device.51 As the Supreme Court later put it, the “common touch-
stone” of its regulatory takings tests are that they “aim to identify
regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to a [government]
appropriation . . . or ouster.”52
Where a regulation strips property of “all economically beneficial
uses,” its economic impact is conclusive under Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council53 and constitutes a categorical taking not
requiring Penn Central balancing.54 In Lost Tree Village Corp. v.
46. Georges Clemenceau, as quoted in DIXON WECTER, THE HERO IN AMERICA: A CHRONICLE
OF HERO-WORSHIP 402 (1941).
47. John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for History’s
Dustbin?, 52 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Jan. 2000, at 4.
48. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
49. Id. at 413.
50. Id.
51. See generally Eagle, Four-Factor, supra note 21, at 616–19.
52. Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
53. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992).
54. “Surely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically
beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the
legislature is simply ‘adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life.’” Id. at 1017–18
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124).
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United States,55 the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
made clear that “economic use” was the key, and that the existence
of market value predicated on speculative regulatory changes or
potential future uses was not relevant.56
On the other hand, the Court in Lucas noted that it had “fre-
quently . . . held that, in some circumstances, a law that renders
property valueless may nonetheless not constitute a taking” if the
action was necessary to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.57
Similarly, in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles,58
the California Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that required
the cessation of the company’s sand and gravel excavation even though
the parcel had substantial value in those uses and otherwise its value
was “relatively small if not minimal.”59 The U.S. Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question.60
The “economic impact” factor of Penn Central seems to be accorded
a role secondary to “investment-backed expectations.”61 In any event,
impact is difficult to ascertain given that there are contesting meth-
odological approaches to valuation.62
2. Investment-Backed Expectations
“Investment-backed expectations” has been the most important
of the Penn Central factors.63 In his seminal article Property, Utility,
and Fairness,64 Professor Frank Michelman referred to the importance
of a “distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed
expectation.”65 The concept was derived from Michelman’s desire to
55. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 2325 (2017).
56. Id. at 1117.
57. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (citing cases).
58. Consol. Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1962).
59. Id. at 351.
60. Consol. Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (dismissing appeal).
61. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
62. See generally Steven J. Eagle, “Economic Impact” in Regulatory Takings Law, 19
HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 407 (2013).
63. See, e.g., Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing
it as the “primary factor”); Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of “Investment-Backed Expecta-
tions,” 32 URB. LAW. 437 (2000) (noting a trend towards treating investment-backed expectations
as an “absolute requirement,” and citing cases); Serkin, supra note 29, at 924 (describing it
as the “most important” factor).
64. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
65. Id. at 1233.
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protect an owner whose particular land uses were predicated on
then-existing regulations, as opposed to a speculator who might be
open to many possibilities for the land’s use.66 Justice Brennan’s use
of “investment-backed expectations” came directly from Professor
Michelman’s article.67
Without the slightest explanation, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States
the Court changed the phrase “distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions” to “reasonable investment-backed expectations.”68 The effect
was to change the inquiry from whether the landowner’s expecta-
tions were sincere albeit perhaps idiosyncratic to whether they were
both sincere and ostensibly objective. While “expectations” seem
personal and subjective, “reasonableness” is objective only in the
sense that it is rooted in the context of the broader society’s expecta-
tions, which might be conflicting or indeterminate. The only thing
clear is that the expectations of individuals and the society that
regulates their conduct interact.69
Justice Brennan cited Mahon as the “leading case for the proposi-
tion that a state statute that substantially furthers important public
policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as
to amount to a ‘taking.’”70 However, it is useful to recall that Mahon
involved the arrogation of the company’s mineral estate, which was
defined as a separate interest in land under Pennsylvania law.71 Thus,
it involved not “general” state policies but rather a narrow policy
transferring the rights from the holders of mineral interests to surface
owners.72 Thus, Justice Holmes’s emphasis on regulations that go “too
far” and on “diminution in value” seems like dicta on a grand scale.73
66. Id. at 1233–34. See also Eagle, supra note 63, at 437–42 (discussing the implementa-
tion of Michelman’s vision in Penn Central).
67. Transcript, Looking Back, supra note 30. “The concept of ‘investment backed expecta-
tions’ definitely came from Michelman’s article.” Id. at 309 (comment of David Carpenter, who
worked on the opinion as Justice Brennan’s judicial clerk).
68. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
69. See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing circularity). See also Eagle, supra note 63, at 442).
70. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978).
71. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
72. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987)
(upholding a statute designed, generally, to prevent subsidence, which, unlike the Kohler Act
at issue in Pennsylvania Coal, “does not merely involve a balancing of the private economic
interests of coal companies against the private interests of the surface owners.”).
73. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415, 419 (1922). See Richard A. Epstein, Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon: The Erratic Takings Jurisprudence of Justice Holmes, 86 GEO. L.J. 875, 892 (1998).
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The takings claim in Penn Central resulted from the rejection by
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission of the rail-
road’s application to construct an office building above Grand Cen-
tral Terminal.74 Justice Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court,
upheld the New York Court of Appeals’ finding for the defendants.
Among the ironies surrounding Penn Central are that the air
rights envelope, in which the building was to be constructed, already
had been sold to UGP Properties, Inc., and plausibly might have been
considered a separate parcel. However, Penn Central’s attorney
thought in 1978 that air rights were novel, and thus chose not to
raise the point.75 Also, the railroad failed to challenge the New York
courts’ determination that it “could earn a ‘reasonable return’ on its
investment in the Terminal,”76 although at that time passenger rail-
roads faced a “fatal hardship” that soon led to the takeovers of Penn
Central’s rail operations by the federal government and the Termi-
nal by New York City.77 Finally, the assumption that Penn Central
had no “investment-backed expectations” with respect to the air-
space above the terminal seems belied by the Court’s fleeting recog-
nition that its foundation “includes columns, which were built into
it for the express purpose” of supporting an office building.78
Ultimately, Professor Richard Epstein’s comment that “[n]either
[Justice Brennan in Penn Central] nor anyone else offer[] any telling
explanation of why this tantalizing notion of expectations is prefera-
ble to the words ‘private property’”79 remains much on point.
3. Character of the Regulation
It is not clear if the “character of the regulation” test has any con-
temporary meaning. While the Court in Penn Central contrasted a
“physical invasion by government,” which was compensable, and
“some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
74. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 117–18.
75. Transcript, Looking Back, supra note 30, at 288 (remarks of Daniel Gribbon, Esq.). Mr.
Gribbon later stated that he thought he made a “mistake . . . in not arguing the notion that
air rights are a very important and discrete part of a property interest.” Id.
76. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 n.26 (1978).
77. See William W. Wade, Penn Central’s Economic Failings Confounded Takings Juris-
prudence, 31 URB. LAW. 277, 284–85 (1999).
78. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 115 n.15 (1978).
79. Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1993).
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life,” which was not,80 that distinction fell away after only four years.
Then, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,81 the
Court held that a permanent physical invasion constituted a cate-
gorical taking without need for recourse to Penn Central balancing.
If a government action is arbitrary or capricious, Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. subsequently made it clear that it will fail muster for
that reason alone, with no takings inquiry required.82 On the other
hand, if an action is vital to the public welfare, that does not excuse
the failure to pay just compensation, since it is exactly the situation
the Takings Clause contemplates.83
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,84 a four-justice plurality of the
Supreme Court found that a statute imposing severe and unexpected
retroactive payment obligations triggered the need for declaratory
relief.85 Four other Justices concluded that the statute did not violate
due process.86 The swing vote, Justice Kennedy, agreed with the
plurality that relief was required, but grounded his view in the Due
Process Clause.87 A few subsequent lower court opinions have indi-
cated that if a regulation is of a character embodying severe retroac-
tivity or if it targets a particular entity, it would suggest a taking.88
However, no Supreme Court holding has been based on the “charac-
ter” issue, and it remains to be seen whether it is relevant at all.
80. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
81. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
82. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (“[I]f a government action is
found to be impermissible—for instance because it . . . is so arbitrary as to violate due process—
that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such action.”).
83. E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and
dissenting in part) (“The [Takings] Clause presupposes what the government intends to do
is otherwise constitutional . . . .”).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 528–29.
86. Id. at 556–57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 540–46 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
88. See Arctic King Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 360, 381 (2004) (noting
that “the Supreme Court, in Eastern Enterprises, suggested that in considering whether,
under this factor, a regulation ‘implicates [the] fundamental principles of fairness underlying
the Takings Clause,’ two other indicia are relevant: (i) the extent to which the action is
retroactive; and (ii) whether the action targets a particular individual” (alteration in original)
(citing E. Enter., 524 U.S. at 537)); Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 36,
51 (2001) (holding that there is no property interest in a fishing permit and stating that “[t]he
character of the governmental action here, because that action, in both purpose and effect,
was retroactive and targeted at plaintiff, supports the finding of a taking”), rev’d on other
grounds, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
2018] PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TAKINGS BURDENS 213
4. Observations Regarding Balancing Tests
Dean Anthony Kronman observed that “the act of balancing re-
mains obscure,” and that balancing tests are “likely to be particularly
attractive to those who by virtue of their inexperience feel unable to
articulate the bases of their judgments, or who simply lack confidence
in them and are therefore afraid to expose their own deliberations too
nakedly.”89 In a well-known law review article,90 Justice Scalia adum-
brated the fear of judicial discretion unfettered by a “law of rules.”
Three years after Penn Central was handed down, Judge James
Oakes of the Second Circuit stated that “[t]he takings ‘jurisprudence’
of the Supreme Court is still in an unsatisfactory ad hoc stage, with
a lack of development of analytical principle or reconciliation of con-
flicting lines of precedent.”91 The Penn Central taxonomy, as described
by Professor Gary Lawson and others, consists of “three factors in
search of meaning and relevance.”92
C. The “Relevant Parcel” Test and “Parcel as a Whole”
Justice Kennedy wrote in Murr, that
[b]ecause our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare
the value that has been taken from the property with the value
that remains in the property, one of the critical questions is
determining how to define the unit of property “whose value is
to furnish the denominator of the fraction.”93
Kennedy added that “the answer to this question may be outcome de-
terminative.”94 Perhaps for that reason, determining the proper de-
nominator in the takings fraction is a “difficult, persisting question.”95
89. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
349 (1993).
90. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law is a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
91. James L. Oakes, “Property Rights” in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV.
583, 613 (1981).
92. Lawson, Ferguson & Montero, supra note 43, at 38–46.
93. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1944–45 (2017) (quoting Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting, in turn, Michelman, supra note
64, at 1192)).
94. Id. at 1944 (citing Eagle, Four-Factor, supra note 21, at 631).
95. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
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1. A History of “Parcel as a Whole”
Professor Frank Michelman wrote that “to determine compensa-
bility one is expected to focus on the particular ‘thing’ injuriously
affected and to inquire what proportion of its value is destroyed by
the measure in question.”96 Furthermore, “[t]he difficulty is aggra-
vated when the question is raised of how to define the ‘particular
thing’ whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.”97
As Professor Carol Rose later phrased the issue, Mahon not only
failed to answer the most obvious question, “how much diminution
in value is too much,” but also failed to answer its antecedent ques-
tion, “how much of what?”98
Justice Brennan’s response in Penn Central was that the Court
would focus on the “extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole.”99 Alas, as Justice Kennedy observed in Murr v.
Wisconsin, “the Court has not set forth specific guidance on how to
identify the relevant parcel for the regulatory taking inquiry.”100 He
indicated, however, that the Court had disclaimed two concepts, the
first being “to limit the parcel in an artificial manner to the portion
of property targeted by the challenged regulation.”101 The second
approach Kennedy cautioned against was treating property rights
under state law as “coextensive” with those rights under the Takings
Clause, since “States do not have the unfettered authority to ‘shape
and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions,’ leaving landowners without recourse against unreasonable reg-
ulations.”102 He illustrated this point with a hypothetical example:
For example, a State might enact a law that consolidates non-
adjacent property owned by a single person or entity in different
96. Michelman, supra note 64, at 1192.
97. Id.
98. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561, 566 (1984) (discussing Pa. Coal Co., v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
99. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
100. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct.1933, 1944 (2017).
101. Id. at 1944 (providing, as examples, the Court’s refusal to limit the relevant parcel to
the air rights above the Grand Central Terminal in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130, and the
thirty-two-month duration of the development moratoria in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)).
102. Id. at 1944–45 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001) (emphasis
added)).
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parts of the State and then imposes development limits on the
aggregate set. If a court defined the parcel according to the state
law requiring consolidation, this improperly would fortify the
state law against a takings claim, because the court would look
to the retained value in the property as a whole rather than
considering whether individual holdings had lost all value.103
A less extreme example might be the reasoning employed by the
New York Court of Appeals’ Chief Judge Breitel in Penn Central, who
asserted the relevant parcel to be all of the railroad’s holdings in the
vicinity of Grand Central Terminal, on the grounds that private and
public activity and spending in that broad area are what gave the ter-
minal parcel its value.104 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
Justice Scalia termed that analysis “extreme” and “unsupportable.”105
Judge Breitel’s view might today claim justification in agglomera-
tion theory, which states that clusters of productive people and
innovative businesses tend to attract similar individuals and firms,
making the parcels on which they work and live very valuable.106
Perhaps one could extend that reasoning further, to include the
provisions of education, roads and ports, and other infrastructure,
such that the State, in Professor William Fischel’s memorable
words, would be “entitled to appropriate to itself all of the advan-
tages of civilization.”107
In Murr, Justice Kennedy reiterated his earlier caution in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island108 that “States do not have the unfettered
authority to ‘shape and define property rights and reasonable
investment-backed expectations,’ leaving landowners without re-
course against unreasonable regulations.”109 However, results such
as those reached by Judge Breitel in Penn Central are not precludes
103. Id. at 1945.
104. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276–1277 (1977), aff’d,
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
105. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
106. See generally David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1507 (2010) (citing foundational research). See also Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama,
2014 BYU L. REV. 1373 (2014); Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 139
(1998).
107. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 50 (1995).
108. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
109. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1944–45 (2017) (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626)
(emphasis added).
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if “property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations”
are regarded as one unit. As I will discuss later, Murr does just that.110
2. Variations on Rules for a “Relevant Parcel”
As Dwight Merriam observed in his classic article on the subject
of the “relevant parcel,” “[e]ven a simplistic scheme, which collapses
many categories into others, yields a dozen ways of thinking about
property in the context of takings claims.”111 Among Merriam’s
examples are the following: Does the purported relevant parcel
contain subsurface mineral rights112 or air rights?113 Are consoli-
dated operations conducted on contiguous parcels114 or noncontigu-
ous parcels?115 Were parcels purchased at different times, perhaps
before or after regulations were imposed?116 Are parcels held in fee
or for a temporal duration?117 Might parcel ownership entail the
ability to transfer air rights or development rights?118
In addition to the factors noted by Merriam having to do with
parcels and their uses, questions of ownership are also important.
One of the questions raised in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims’ first
opinion in Lost Tree Village v. United States119 was whether the
110. See infra Section II.C.
111. Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the Relevant Parcel, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 357 (2003).
Many of the following examples in the text are taken from Merriam; id. at 357–63.
112. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
113. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
114. See Forest Props. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 56, 73 (1997) (treating lake bottom and
uplands as a single parcel where they were a single-income-producing unit for financing,
planning, and development).
115. See Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991) (treating non-contiguous
properties as one).
116. See Forest Props., 39 Fed. Cl. at 73 (noting that the lake bottom and upland were
purchased five months apart).
117. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
118. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997). See also Serkin, supra
note 29 (describing how the contemporary owners of the air rights at issue in Penn Central
claimed that the relaxation of restrictions on neighboring parcels, which gave the rights their
value, constituted a taking).
119. Lost Tree Vill. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 412, 427–30 (2011), rev’d, 707 F.3d 1286
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that “relevant parcel” for purposes of takings analysis included only
the plat that was the subject of the permit application, and not a neighboring plat or scattered
wetlands owned by a developer in the area). The U.S. Federal Claims Court’s remand opinion,
115 Fed. Cl. 219 (2014), was reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
787 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017).
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government was “aggregating separate parcels owned by legally sep-
arate entities.”120
I have analyzed elsewhere that there are times when common-law
principles justify the consolidation of parcels under different owner-
ship.121 If A, B, and C are members of the ABC Partnership, or the sole
shareholders of the XYZ Corporation, consolidation might be appro-
priate where the parties’ intent to share profits led them to appropri-
ate their lands to the entity.122 There is nothing novel about this.123
On the other hand, where separate owners intend merely to coordi-
nate the use of their parcels for their separate benefits, aggregation
is inappropriate. That was the issue in the California Sweetwater
Mesa litigation124 where the California Coastal Commission staff
asserted that such coordination (together with unsubstantiated
suspicions of common ownership) sufficed for the consolidation, for
development-permitting purposes, of five parcels that were sepa-
rately deeded with no overlapping ownership.125 Where coordination
can obliterate the difference between “property” and “regulation,”
the scope of government authority is broad indeed.126
3. Severance—But Also Agglomeration
Justice Kennedy’s statement in Murr about the necessity of
“compar[ing] the value that has been taken from the property with
120. Lost Tree Vill., 100 Fed. Cl. at 436 (quoting Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177
F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
121. Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel as a
Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549 (2012).
122. Id. at 567–68.
123. See, e.g., Chapman v. Hughes, 37 P. 1048 (Cal. 1894) (noting that the associates
intended to divide the profits from use of their separate lands).
124. See Complaint at 2, Mulryan Props., LLP v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, No. BS133269 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Aug. 12, 2011). Owners of the other parcels filed similar complaints, and the cases
were consolidated. See Eagle, supra note 121, at 595–97 (describing the cases). Eventually the
Coastal Commission, after significant design changes, approved the five homes; a California
court ruled its lengthy proceedings to be the equivalent of a full environmental impact study;
and in April 2017, a lawsuit against the project by the Sierra Club was dismissed, thus
clearing the way for development. See Emily Sawicki, Sierra Club Lawsuit Fails to Halt ‘Edge
Project’ on Sweetwater Mesa, MALIBU TIMES, April 27, 2007, http://www.malibutimes.com
/news/article_8523c5da-2b7f-11e7-bcbe-a74e6cccb1ed.html.
125. CAL. COASTAL COMM’N, Th 8a-f, STAFF REPORT: REGULAR CALENDAR 82 (Nov. 17, 2010),
https://documents.coastal.ca.gov/reports/2011/2/Th8a-s-2-2011.pdf.
126. See Eagle, supra note 121 (analyzing legal and policy implications).
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the value that remains in the property”127 suggests, as does Justice
Brennan’s “parcel as a whole” formulation in Penn Central,128 that
a court could discern through observation and judgment a natural
starting point for the “relevant parcel” inquiry. The type of land-
owner manipulation that allegedly is implicit here and explicit in
Tahoe-Sierra129 has placed the focus on what Professor Margaret
Radin described as “conceptual severance.”130
However, there are two sides to the manipulation story. The U.S.
Claims Court has noted that while “a taking can appear to emerge
if the property is viewed too narrowly” it is just as true that “[t]he
effect of a taking can obviously be disguised if the property at issue
is too broadly defined.”131 I have referred to such gamesmanship on
the government side as “conceptual agglomeration.”132 A blatant
example of this is the California Coastal Commission’s assertion of
a “unity of ownership” theory, consolidating separately deeded and
owned parcels for land use regulatory purposes.133
D. The Murr Litigation
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Murr v. Wisconsin upon
the precise and carefully framed question presented by the petitioners:
“In a regulatory taking case, does the ‘parcel as a whole’ concept as de-
scribed in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York
establish a rule that two legally distinct, but commonly owned contigu-
ous parcels, must be combined for takings analysis purposes?”134
127. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1944–45 (2017) (emphasis added).
128. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
129. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
“Petitioners seek to bring this case under the rule announced in Lucas by arguing that we can
effectively sever a 32-month segment from the remainder of each landowner’s fee simple
estate, and then ask whether that segment has been taken in its entirety by the moratoria.”
Id. at 331.
130. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1667 (1988).
131. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318–19 (1991).
132. STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 7-7(b)(2) (5th ed. 2012).
133. See Eagle, supra note 121. For discussion, see supra notes 118–25 and accompanying
text.
134. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15-
214) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978)).
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The Court essentially answered that narrow question in the nega-
tive, as petitioners intended. It did so, however, only in the course
of a far broader inquiry. Also, both the opinion of the Court and the
principal dissent relied in part on appraisal estimates that had not
been subjected to examination by lower courts hearing the case, nor
briefed by the parties.135
In many respects, the Court treated Murr as an ordinary applica-
tion of Penn Central, and even the dissenters did not object to its
“bottom line” factual conclusion that treating the two parcels owned
by the Murrs as one did not constitute a taking under the circum-
stances.136 The Court could have analyzed each lot as a separate
relevant parcel and concluded that there was a taking of neither.137
The Court could have simply held that an inflexible statutory man-
date for consolidation of contiguous parcels under common owner-
ship was inconsistent with the ad hoc approach of Penn Central, and
the case could have been remanded for the courts below to identify
the relevant parcel.138 Instead, the Court applied Penn Central in a
manner conflating property and its regulation.
1. The Basic Facts
The petitioners in Murr139 were two brothers and two sisters whose
parents had arranged for them to acquire two lots along the scenic
St. Croix River in Wisconsin. The parents had purchased Lot F in
1960, built a recreational cabin on it in that year, and the following
year transferred title to their family plumbing business. In 1963,
the parents acquired the adjoining Lot E, which they held in their
own names. Each lot was about 1.25 acres in area and consisted of
land along the river, a steep slope, and an upland area. Wisconsin law,
and parallel local ordinances, limited construction to lots with one
acre of buildable area. However, because of the steep slopes, Lots E
135. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
136. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1957 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1956, 1957 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I would therefore vacate the judgment
below and remand for the court to identify the relevant property using ordinary principles of
Wisconsin property law.”) In full disclosure, the author submitted an amicus brief suggesting
this approach. Brief for Reason Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Murr
v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15-214), 2016 WL 1593411.
139. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
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and F, together, contained slightly less than one acre of buildable
area.140 A grandfather clause “relaxe[d] the restriction for substan-
dard lots which were ‘in separate ownership from abutting lands’ on
January 1, 1976, the effective date of the regulation.”141 However, a
merger provision provided that “adjacent lots under common owner-
ship may not be ‘sold or developed as separate lots’ if they do not
meet the size requirement.”142
Lot F was transferred from the plumbing company to the petitioners
in 1994, and Lot E was transferred to them from their parents the fol-
lowing year. A decade later, the petitioners wanted to relocate the
cabin to a different part of Lot F, and also to sell lot E to fund the proj-
ect. After the Murrs learned that the lots were deemed consolidated
when they came under their common ownership, they sought adminis-
trative variances to permit development on both, which were denied.143
The Murrs then filed an action in state court, alleging that the
state and county regulations effected a regulatory taking by depriv-
ing them of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot
cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot.”144 Thus, the Murrs
could neither sell Lot E nor build an additional structure on it.
A Wisconsin appellate court affirmed that when the petitioners
acquired both lots the applicable state statute and local ordinance
“effectively merged” them, so that petitioners “could only sell or build
on the single larger lot.”145 Citing Zealy v. City of Waukesha,146 the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s summary
judgment for the State.147
Most saliently, the grandfather clause would have permitted
structures to be built on both Lot E and Lot F had the lots remained
under separate ownerships after the one-acre restriction was im-
posed in 1976. Thus, while different owners could have built on each
lot, the Murrs could not.
140. Id. at 1940 (summarizing facts).
141. Id. (quoting WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4)(a)(1) (2017)).
142. Id. (quoting WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4)(a)(2) (2017)).
143. Id. at 1941.
144. Id. (quoting Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App.
Dec. 23, 2014)).
145. Id. (quoting Murr v. St. Croix County Bd. of Adjustment, 796 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2011)).
146. Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Wis. 1996).
147. Murr v. State, 859 N.W.2d 628, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581 (unpublished
table decision) (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014).
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2. Murr in the Supreme Court
Justice Kennedy wrote the Court’s 5–3 majority opinion in Murr,148
stressing that “[a] central dynamic of the Court’s regulatory takings
jurisprudence . . . is its flexibility.”149 Chief Justice Roberts wrote
the principal dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito.150 He was
troubled not by the majority’s “bottom-line conclusion,” given the
facts of the case, but rather by its “new, malleable definition of ‘pri-
vate property.’”151 Justice Thomas also wrote a brief, separate dissent,
stressing the need to re-examine the grounding of regulatory takings
in the Constitution.152
Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated that “using [the Zealy] frame-
work, the [Wisconsin] Court of Appeals concluded the merger regu-
lations did not effect a taking”153 and its takings analysis “‘properly
focused’ on the regulations’ effect ‘on the Murrs’ property as a whole’—
that is, Lots E and F together.”154
However, Zealy did not address the central issue of the manda-
tory, statutory merger of separately deeded parcels. Rather, Zealy
was a classic case in which the landowner was attempting to sever
part of an existing parcel for a separate regulatory takings examina-
tion. The appellate court had made it clear that “[t]he challenging
landowner in this case primarily claims that when part of a parcel’s
zoning classification is changed to conservancy, the courts should
treat that portion as though it has been constructively taken and
the government should pay accordingly.”155 It held that “compensa-
tion depends upon a case-by-case analysis of the landowner’s rea-
sonably anticipated use of the property.”156
148. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan joined Justice Kennedy. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case.
149. Id. at 1937.
150. Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1956 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1942.
154. Id. at 1941 (discussing Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1996), and
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978)).
155. Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 534 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Wis. App. 1995), rev’d, 548 N.W.2d
528 (Wis. 1996).
156. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Wisconsin agreed that “the property at
issue . . . is Zealy’s entire 10.4-acre parcel.”157 Thus, Zealy did not
involve a determination of whether two separately deeded parcels
merged by operation of law constituted the “parcel as a whole” but
merely determined whether the landowner engaged in a conceptual
severance of what legally had been one parcel.
Furthermore, it is useful to note that the phrase “parcel as a whole”
was appropriate in Penn Central given the railroad’s failure to argue
that the air rights above Grand Central Terminal, which previously
had been transferred, should be treated as a separate parcel.158 The
agglomeration of separate parcels simply was not a factor.159
Finally, the Court noted that the Murrs’ ownership resulted from
“voluntary conduct in bringing the lots under common ownership
after the regulations were enacted.”160 However, the “voluntary con-
duct” was by the petitioners’ parents,161 and, in any event, persons
similarly situated to the petitioners often receive such ownerships
through devise or operation of law.
3. Murr Conflates Ownership and Regulation
While citing Zealy in support of his analysis, Justice Kennedy in
Murr considered the effect of the State’s merger ordinance twice
over—once as a factor in determining what constitutes the relevant
parcel for regulatory takings analysis and once as a factor in deter-
mining whether the imposition of burdens with respect to the rele-
vant parcel amounted to a regulatory taking.
Justice Kennedy summarized several reasons why the Murrs’
contiguous lots should be treated as one parcel. First, the lots were
merged under state and local regulations, and the merger regula-
tions were adopted “for a specific and legitimate purpose, consistent
with the widespread understanding that lot lines are not dominant
or controlling in every case.”162 However, as the Court noted, the fact
that statutes are pre-existing does not make them determinative of
157. Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Wis. 1996).
158. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining that this was a tactical decision
regretted by counsel in retrospect).
159. See supra Section I.C for discussion.
160. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1948 (2017).
161. Id. at 1940 (2017) (noting that the transfer was “arranged for them”).
162. Id. at 1948.
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takings clause rights.163 Also, as Chief Justice Roberts noted, the
issue was not whether parcel boundaries are controlling in every
case but whether they should demarcate individual parcels “in all
but the most exceptional circumstances.”164
Justice Kennedy next stated that the physical characteristics of
the lots “support [their] treatment as a unified parcel” and that this
is enhanced by synergies of use, so that “[t]he special relationship
of the lots is further shown by their combined valuation.”165 More-
over, Justice Kennedy explained,
[N]o single consideration can supply the exclusive test for deter-
mining the denominator. Instead, courts must consider a num-
ber of factors. These include the treatment of the land under
state and local law; the physical characteristics of the land; and
the prospective value of the regulated land. The endeavor should
determine whether reasonable expectations about property
ownership would lead a landowner to anticipate that his hold-
ings would be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as separate
tracts. The inquiry is objective, and the reasonable expectations
at issue derive from background customs and the whole of our
legal tradition.166
Kennedy then invoked the Armstrong principle of “fairness and
justice”167 and concluded: “Treating the lot in question as a single parcel
is legitimate for purposes of this takings inquiry, and this supports
the conclusion that no regulatory taking occurred here.”168
Chief Justice Roberts especially attacked the last point, juxtapos-
ing the role of the Takings Clause in securing “established property
rights” with the majority’s “new, malleable definition of ‘private
property’—adopted solely ‘for purposes of th[e] takings inquiry’” and
which “undermines that protection” the Takings Clause accords.169
163. Id. at 1945.
164. Id. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1949.
166. Id. at 1945.
167. Id. at 1950 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49). See infra notes
336–341 and accompanying text for a discussion of the materially different circumstances in
Armstrong.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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4. Internalizing Those Externalities Irrelevant Prior to Regulation
Externalities are harms or benefits conferred upon neighbors for
which the owner does not have to account, or for which he or she could
not charge.170 Externalities are irrelevant (“inframarginal”) when
internalizing them would not affect the property owner’s behavior.171
An important aspect of Justice Kennedy’s Murr opinion, with
which the dissenters apparently concurred,172 is its explicit recogni-
tion that the value of regulated parcels incorporates externalities
that were irrelevant prior to their regulation.
[C]ourts should assess the value of the property under the chal-
lenged regulation, with special attention to the effect of burdened
land on the value of other holdings. Though a use restriction may
decrease the market value of the property, the effect may be
tempered if the regulated land adds value to the remaining prop-
erty, such as by increasing privacy, expanding recreational space,
or preserving surrounding natural beauty.173
The epilogue of the Lucas case illustrates this point.174 The ulti-
mate result of the litigation was that the South Carolina Coastal
Commission paid Lucas, who had been denied development rights,
$475,000 for each of his two lots. After the legislature refused to ap-
propriate reimbursement, the commission sold each lot to a devel-
oper for $392,500. It later came out that an owner inland from of
one of the coastal lots had offered the commission $315,000 for the
lot, subject to a restrictive easement precluding development. The
neighbor wanted ownership of the lot simply to ensure perpetuation
of his existing ocean view. Prior to the Beachfront Management Act,
Lucas would not have sold the lot for this purpose, since it was
worth considerably more as a building site. After the Act, satisfying
the neighbor’s offer-backed desire for a clear vista would have been
the lot’s most valuable use in light of the restrictions.175
170. See generally James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA
371 (1962). See also Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457 (2016).
171. See Fennell, supra note 170, at 1467.
172. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
173. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946.
174. See EAGLE, supra note 132, § 7-3(b)(2) (providing more detail and citations).
175. The story of why the Coastal Council thought it appropriate that Lucas should lose
his entire investment in the lot, but that the lot would be appropriate for building after the
Council had acquired it, is one worthy of reflection. See id.
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The internalization of externalities that were irrelevant prior to
regulation has important implications for takings law. As the saga
of David Lucas’s lot illustrates, value can reside in unlikely places.
This affects both categorical regulatory takings under Lucas176 and
partial regulatory takings under Penn Central.177 However, a few
caveats are in order.
As noted previously,178 the Federal Circuit has held, in Lost Tree
Village Corp. v. United States,179 that “economic use” does not include
speculative value. It added that “[t]ypical economic uses enable a
landowner to derive benefits from land ownership rather than requir-
ing a landowner to sell the affected parcel.”180 Under the Supreme
Court’s holding in Murr that both lots constitute one relevant par-
cel, both the benefits and burdens of prohibiting development on the
second lot would automatically be internalized. The owner’s conse-
quent inability to claim just compensation is consistent with the
Court’s existing precedent.181
However, if the lots were separate relevant parcels, it is possible
that the benefit that the owner’s unrestricted parcel would have en-
joyed from the restriction would have been no different than the
benefit that would have been derived by neighbors. In the instance of
a government condemnation of a part of a parcel, some states permit
the locality to offset against just compensation only the amount of
“special benefit” that the owner would have enjoyed as a result of the
project for which the severed part was condemned, on the theory that
it would be unfair for the owner to subsidize, both as taxpayer and
also as condemnee, for benefits equally accruing to others.182 On the
other hand, some states do permit an offset-added value resulting
176. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
177. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.104, 124 (1978).
178. See supra notes 55–56.
179. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, United States v. Lost Tree Vill. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017).
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897) (“When, on the other hand, the
part which he retains is specially and directly increased in value by the public improvement,
the damages to the whole parcel by the appropriation of part of it are lessened”). See also
Eagle, supra note 62, at 418–19.
182. See, e.g., City of Maryland Heights v. Heitz, 358 S.W.3d 98, 106 (Mo. 2011); United States
v. 930.65 Acres of Land, 299 F. Supp. 673, 677–78 (D. Kan. 1968); Louisiana Highway Comm’n
v. Hoell, 140 So. 485, 486 (La. 1932). (All example cases listed embody this reasoning.)
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from “general benefits” to the entire neighborhood, most notably seen
in New Jersey in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan.183
More fundamentally, when the Federal Circuit in Lost Tree Vil-
lage referred to “[t]ypical economic uses [that] enable a landowner
to derive benefits from land ownership rather than requiring a
landowner to sell the affected parcel,”184 it did not address condem-
nation, which is a forced sale. The issue then becomes: should the
value of enjoyment of land that results only from the imposition of
a severe government restriction be deemed an “economic use” for
purposes of takings law?
While the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Lost Tree Village,185
these issues are quite germane to its takings jurisprudence.
5. Envisioning a Minimalist Murr Opinion
The Supreme Court in Murr v. Wisconsin186 did not have to reach
the issue of how the relevant parcel in a regulatory takings case is
to be determined. Its judgment in the case could have been premised
on no more than restating that state law could not arbitrarily rede-
fine existing parcels so as to preclude an asserted categorical taking,
and that, treating either of the petitioners’ lots as the “relevant
parcel” would not have resulted in a sufficient diminution in value
so as to constitute a regulatory taking.187
As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his dissent, the very factors that
the majority used to enunciate a new relevant parcel test for regula-
tory takings produced the same result that adherence to the lot lines
of the deeded parcels would have reached.
If Lot E is a legally distinct parcel under state law, the Court of
Appeals would have to perform the takings analysis anew, but
could still consider many of the issues the majority finds impor-
tant. The majority, for instance, notes that under the ordinance
183. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013) (upholding offset for
benefit owner would derive from increased safety from injury and property damage resulting
from taking of easement along shore for construction of a high dune, but would remove
owner’s valuable ocean view, although neighbors would enjoy same safety advantages).
184. Lost Tree Vill. Corp., 787 F.3d at 1117.
185. United States v. Lost Tree Vill. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017) (denying cert.).
186. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
187. But see supra notes 179–86 (discussing issues that might qualify this analysis).
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the Murrs can use Lot E as “recreational space,” as the “location
of any improvements,” and as a valuable addition to Lot F. These
facts could be relevant to whether the “regulation denies all eco-
nomically beneficial or productive use” of Lot E. Similarly, the
majority touts the benefits of the ordinance and observes that
the Murrs had little use for Lot E independent of Lot F and
could have predicted that Lot E would be regulated. These facts
speak to “the economic impact of the regulation,” interference
with “investment-backed expectations,” and the “character of the
governmental action”—all things we traditionally consider in the
Penn Central analysis.188
One might speculate about why the Court did not reach what ap-
parently would have been a unanimous holding on this basis. Justice
Kennedy, however, was the needed fifth vote, and his Murr opinion
served largely to reiterate and extend his advocacy of balancing tests189
and also to affirm his concurrence in the judgment of Lucas.190
Early scholarly reaction to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion has
been unenthusiastic. Professor Nicole Garnett pronounced that “the
majority opinion transforms the ‘muddle’ of regulatory takings law
into a mudslide that threatens to undermine the very foundation of
property rights. Thus, all property owners—not just the Murrs—
lost in the litigation.”191 Similarly, Professor Richard Epstein con-
cluded that Chief Justice Roberts “had by far the better of the
argument in insisting that state property lines should govern,” as op-
posed to Justice Kennedy’s “complex facts-and-circumstances test.”192
Professor Maureen Brady dubbed the new multifactor test “Penn
Central squared,” which was not intended as a compliment.193 She
argued that Murr exacerbates problems with private property and
federalism because “the Constitution protects different interests in
188. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1957 (internal citations omitted).
189. See infra Section II.E.2 for elaboration.
190. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
191. Nicole Stelle Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, 2017 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 131, 133 (2017).
192. Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed to
Clean Up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 151, 152 (2017).
193. Maureen Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin
Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2017).
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different jurisdictions, depending on the content of state-specific
law.”194 Brady asserted, “Constitutional property federalism has gen-
erally been perceived as desirable, encouraging beneficial competition
and innovation in property forms.”195 However, Murr “undermines
the guarantee that the Constitution will protect this panoply of
interests,” and “invites courts and litigants to define protected consti-
tutional property by reference to the law and regulation of other
states, undermining the security of interests that would otherwise
appear stable under a single jurisdiction’s rules.”196
Also, building upon the suggestion in Justice Thomas’s separate
Murr dissent that regulatory takings jurisprudence might be
grounded in the Privileges or Immunities Clause,197 John Greil
recently argued in favor of this approach based on “second-best
originalism.”198
II. DESTABILIZING PRIVATE PROPERTY
This Part expands upon the problems raised by Chief Justice
Roberts in his dissent in Murr v. Wisconsin.199 I suggest that the es-
sence of his disquiet, albeit unarticulated, is that the majority’s opin-
ion reflects a movement from Lockean property towards governance
property, which attenuates traditional notions of owners’ rights. I
believe that it is in this sense that the Chief Justice writes that the
majority “goes astray,” which implies more than technical fault.200
This Part also considers the more fundamental question, raised
by Justice Thomas in his separate dissent,201 of whether the Court’s
regulatory takings doctrine is properly grounded in the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause, in the concept of substantive due process,202
194. Id. at 56.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1957 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting). See infra
Section II.E.3 for discussion.
198. John Greil, Note, Second-Best Originalism and Regulatory Takings, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 373 (2018) (contending that the original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause did protect against regulatory takings). See infra notes 422–27 for discussion.
199. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202. See infra Section II.B.
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or, as Thomas intimates, in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.203
A. Lockean and Governance Property
In many ways, the subtext of Murr was the distinction between
Lockean property and governance property.
1. Lockean and Natural-Rights Perspectives
In a civil society stressing individual rights, it is imperative that
individuals easily be able to distinguish what Chief Justice Roberts
referred to as “meum and tuum,” what is mine, and what is not.204 He
added, with some understatement, that “[t]he question of who owns
what is pretty important: The rules must provide a readily ascer-
tainable definition of the land to which a particular bundle of rights
attaches that does not vary depending upon the purpose at issue.”205
An important reason to retain stable property rights is that they
further individual autonomy. John Locke famously avowed, “Lives,
Liberties, and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Prop-
erty.”206 Similarly, Justice Thurgood Marshall observed that “[t]he
constitutional terms ‘life, liberty, and property’ . . . have a normative
dimension . . . establishing a sphere of private autonomy which
government is bound to respect.”207 Indeed, Justice Kennedy, in
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,208 applied what
he termed “an essential principle: Individual freedom finds tangible
expression in property rights.”209 For conservative contractarians,
economic efficiency is merely incidental to the role of contract and
property in furthering private ordering.210
203. See infra Section II.E.3.
204. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct.1933, 1953 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 123 (PETER LASLETT ED., 1965)
(1690).
207. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
208. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (holding that due pro-
cess generally requires note and the opportunity for a hearing prior to civil forfeiture of property).
209. Id. at 61.
210. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 895 n.199 (1997).
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From a utilitarian perspective, clearly defined property rights fa-
cilitate productive activity and exchange.211 Clear understandings
of rights and duties might be achieved among a few individuals
through a contract, which might be as complex as the signatories
desire.212 However, property rights are in rem, meaning that every-
one is bound by them and therefore should understand what belongs
to others. This is why the forms of property must be simple.213 If
“property” most fundamentally is a question of what is mine and
what is thine, the fact that individuals chose to use their property
in ways that are not nuisances, but may seem idiosyncratic and
even annoying to others, should not be crucial.
2. Governance Property
The concept of “governance property,” as opposed to Lockean
property, disestablishes the role of the landowner as the gatekeeper
who decide which persons have access to his or her resources and for
what purposes.214 In his article The Social-Obligation Norm in
American Property Law,215 Professor Gregory Alexander asserted
that, even under an exclusion regime, owners “owe far more respon-
sibilities to others . . . than the conventional imagery of property
rights suggests.”216
211. See, e.g., David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law
Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 23 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)
(asserting that “private ordering through contract is presumptively legitimate because it best
serves [contractarians’] efficiency objective.”).
212. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001). “Contract law typically permits free customization of the rights
and duties of the respective parties . . . . Property law, in contrast, requires that the parties
adopt one of a limited number of standard forms that define the legal dimensions of their
relationship . . . .” Id. at 776.
213. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (adopting the civil law
term “numerus clausus” to the equivalent, but unnamed, common-law principle that “property
rights must conform to certain standardized forms”). See also Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002) (asserting that restrictions on the form
of property exist not to standardize rights but rather to enhance marketability by aiding
verification of ownership).
214. See generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454 (2002).
215. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009).
216. Id. at 747.
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Property rights and their correlative obligations are cognizable
as social goods, worthy of vindication by the state, only insofar
as they are consistent with community and human flourishing
more generally. In the interest of human flourishing, the com-
munity, or more colloquially, the state, affords legal recognition
to asserted claims to resources. Accordingly, the state does not
take away when it abstains from legally vindicating asserted
claims to resources that are inconsistent with human flourishing
or with community itself.217
Professor Alexander extended his views in Governance Property,218
terming “distorted and misleading” the view that property law should
be “built around the right to exclude” and should “concern[ ] itself pri-
marily with the owner’s relationship with the rest of the world.”219
Professor Eric Rosser, in The Ambition and Transformative Po-
tential of Progressive Property,220 noted that “pushback” against an
expanded understanding of the social obligation of property took
forms such as the movement into private common-interest commu-
nities, with gated access, private security guards, and recreational
facilities that allow residents to insulate themselves from the rest
of society.221
Similarly, Professor Lynda Butler asserted that the “management
function” of property requires more than exclusion based on owners’
autonomy.222 “[W]hat is missing” from the exclusion property model,
she wrote, “is an outward-regarding perspective that encompasses
a broader sense of responsibility for the impacts of property use on
society and nature, and that recognizes the role of collection action
in managing the exercise of property rights.”223
All of this is quite different from what conventionally is recognized
as the Lockean, natural-rights view, which envisions government as
the protector of pre-political rights. George Mason’s Virginia Decla-
ration of Rights is exemplary.224
217. Id. at 749.
218. Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853 (2012).
219. Id. at 1855.
220. Eric Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101
CAL. L. REV. 107 (2013).
221. Id. at 159–61.
222. Lynda L. Butler, Property as a Management Institution, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1215 (2017).
223. Id. at 1220–21.
224. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. 1 (June 12, 1776), http://avalon.law
.yale.edu/18th_century/virginia.asp.
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3. Productive-Labor Theory
In an attempt to present an alternative to both the exclusion and
governance views of property, Professor Eric Claeys suggested a
productive-labor theory, predicated on natural rights.225 Productive-
labor theory “permits, justifies, and encourages exclusive rights when
such rights seem practically likely to facilitate concurrent labor by
different citizens for different goals.”226 Claeys noted John Locke’s
famous passage, “all Men are naturally in . . . a State of perfect
Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions and
Persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature,
without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man.”227
Taking Locke as an exemplar of his view, Claeys interpreted the
phrase “within the bounds of the Law of Nature” as constraining
individual freedom within the bounds of natural law.228
4. The Civic Republican Tradition
Scholars such as Dean William Treanor have stressed that during
the colonial and revolutionary periods the view that the State en-
joyed broad powers to regulate and reorder property relations was
pervasive.229
According to Professor Cass Sunstein, the eminent domain provi-
sion and a number of other important provisions of the Constitution
are “focused on a single underlying evil: the distribution of resources
or opportunities to one group rather than another solely on the
ground that those favored have exercised the raw political power to
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot,
by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness and safety.
Id.
225. Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law, 95 N.C. L. REV.
413 (2017).
226. Id. at 418 (2017).
227. Id. at 432 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § II.4, AT 269 (PETER
LASLETT ED., 1988) (1698) (EMPHASIS ADDED).
228. Id.
229. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 792–93 (1995).
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obtain what they want.”230 He added that “[t]he prohibition of naked
preferences also reflects the Constitution’s roots in civil republican-
ism and accompanying conceptions of civic virtue.”231
5. Property as the “Law of Things”
At its root, the fundamental insistence of Chief Justice Roberts in
Murr is that the Court adhere to its “traditional approach” that
“State law defines the boundaries of distinct parcels of land, and
those boundaries should determine the ‘private property’ at issue in
regulatory takings cases.”232 In part, this appears to be a reaction to
views of law predicated upon the “disintegration of property.”233
In Property as the Law of Things,234 Professor Henry Smith argued
that property is a “platform for the rest of private law,” that the need
for traditional baselines created by the law is important, and that “no-
where is this issue of baselines more salient than in property.”235
Property rights are rights “in rem,” which originally meant “in a thing”
and are now taken as rights “availing against persons generally.”236
Professor Smith noted that legal realists and their progeny insist
that property is not about things, but rather that “property” is a
bundle of rights and other legal relationships among persons, against
which things are a “mere backdrop.”237 “[T]he benefits of tinkering
with property [have been] expressed in bundle terms without a
corresponding theory of the costs of that tinkering.”238 In some cases,
Smith added, “the traditional baselines of the law were mocked, and
the idea was to dethrone them in order to remove them as barriers
to enlightened social engineering.”239
230. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
1689 (1984) (enumerating the dormant Commerce, Privileges and Immunities, Equal Pro-
tection, Due Process, Contract, and Eminent Domain Clauses).
231. Id. at 1690–91.
232. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1950 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
233. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
234. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012).
235. Id. at 1691.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1697.
239. Id. (citing, as an example, Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Func-
tional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 833–49 (1935)).
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From a perspective of traditional property law, as opposed to a
governance-property perspective, “what is decisive is that which is
taken, not that which is retained.”240
If property is a unitary thing, so might be government. Although
takings claims typically result from administrative determinations,
and sometimes from legislation, acts constituting eminent domain
are undertaken by the State or its political subdivision. Thus, there is
a plausible claim that acts of judges that radically depart from es-
tablished law might be “judicial takings.”241 A plurality opinion by
Justice Scalia asserted that takings liability could arise from judicial
acts in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection.242 Likewise, in his dissent from the denial
of certiorari in California Building Industry Ass’n v. City of San
Jose,243 Justice Thomas reiterated his view in Parking Ass’n of
Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta244 that the “rough proportionality” and
“individualized determination” tests for reviewing permit exactions,
enunciated in Dolan v. City of Tigard,245 should apply to a “legisla-
tive determination” by the Atlanta City Council as much as to an
administrative determination made by an agency official. “A city coun-
cil can take property just as well as a planning commission can.”246
B. The Continuing Debate over Bright-Line Rules
1. Kennedy and Scalia Debate Bright-Line Rules
In his well-known article The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,247
Justice Scalia spelled out his strong preference for bright-line rules:
Even in simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as incom-
patible with the Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that
those subject to the law must have the means of knowing what
240. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 58.
241. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990).
242. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
243. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the denial of certiorari).
244. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
245. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
246. Parking Ass’n of Ga., 515 U.S. at 1118 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
247. Scalia, supra note 90.
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it prescribes. . . . As laws have become more numerous, and as
people have become increasingly ready to punish their adversar-
ies in the courts, we can less and less afford protracted uncer-
tainty regarding what the law may mean. Predictability . . . is a
needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name. There are
times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.248
Scalia added “it displays more judicial restraint to adopt [a
general rule] than to announce that, ‘on balance,’ we think the law
was violated here—leaving ourselves free to say in the next case
that, ‘on balance,’ it was not.”249
Beyond his general aversion to vague rules, quite possibly Justice
Scalia was “irritated” by the “open-textured approach” emblematic
of Penn Central, “as a matter of judicial function and aesthetics.”250
On the other hand, balancing tests seem second nature to Justice
Kennedy. An important illustration involves the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”),251 which gave the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers powers to authorize the dis-
charge of pollutants into “navigable waters,” which the CWA defined
as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”252
The definition of “waters of the United States” remained unsettled,
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruling in Rapanos
v. United States253 that wetlands connected to navigable waters by
only twenty miles of non-navigable tributaries were subject to the
Corps of Engineers’ jurisdiction.
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion took a narrow, dictionary-based
approach and declared that the “only plausible interpretation” was
that CWA jurisdiction extended only to “relatively permanent,
standing or continuously flowing bodies of water.”254 The dissents of
248. Id. at 1179.
249. Id. at 1179–80.
250. J. Peter Byrne, A Hobbesian Bundle of Lockean Sticks: The Property Rights Legacy of
Justice Scalia, 41 VT. L. REV. 733, 743 (2017).
251. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
252. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722 (plurality opinion) (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7)).
253. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded sub.
nom. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
254. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882
(2d ed. 1954)).
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Justices Stevens255 and Breyer,256 on the other hand, expressed a
much broader view of the importance of environmental protection
and of deference to the expertise of the EPA and the Corps of Engi-
neers. Justice Kennedy, the swing vote, concurred only in the judg-
ment.257 Although he gave the Corps considerable deference, he also
strived to give “the term ‘navigable’ some meaning.” Thus, he adopted
a heavily fact-based standard that determined that the existence of
the required nexus depends on whether the wetlands at issue,
perhaps in connection with others, significantly affects the integrity
of waters “more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”258
In a more germane case, Justice Kennedy declined to endorse
Justice Scalia’s bright-line rule in Lucas v. South Carolina Council259
and instead concurred only in the judgment.260 Kennedy declared,
“The finding of no value must be considered under the Takings
Clause by reference to the owner’s reasonable, investment-backed
expectations.”261
In Lucas, Justice Scalia “stress[ed] that an affirmative decree
eliminating all economically beneficial uses may be defended only if an
objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents would ex-
clude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is
presently found.”262 For Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, the reso-
lution of the case involved the need for a determination as to “whether
petitioner had the intent and capacity to develop the property and
failed to do so.”263 Justice Blackmun agreed, and his dissent asserted
that the provenance of the Court’s per se rule was “unpersuasive.”264
255. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (focusing on the “quality of our Nation’s waters”).
256. Id. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing “no difficulty [in] finding that the
wetlands at issue in these cases are within the Corps’ jurisdiction”).
257. Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
258. Id. at 779–80.
259. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
260. Id. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
261. Id. at 1034 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979), and Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
262. Id. at 1032 n.18.
263. Id. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
264. Id. at 1049 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The Court’s suggestion that Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct.
2138, 65 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1980), a unanimous opinion, created a new per se rule,
only now discovered, is unpersuasive. In Agins, the Court stated that “no precise
rule determines when property has been taken” but instead that “the question
necessarily requires a weighing of public and private interest.”
Id. at 1049 n.11 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260–62).
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While the majority had accepted the trial court’s finding that the
Beachfront Management Act had left Lucas’s lots bereft of value,
Kennedy noted that the trial court appeared to “presume that the
property has no significant market value nor resale potential,” al-
though he accepted the finding as the law of the case.265 He added,
“Where a taking is alleged from regulations which deprive the prop-
erty of all value, the test must be whether the deprivation is contrary
to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.”266 However, similar
to conflating “property” and “expectations,” this conflation of “value”
and “expectations” invites circularity.267
Justice Kennedy’s assertion that the per se rule enunciated by
Justice Scalia in Lucas is subject to the owner’s investment-backed
expectations has received only slender judicial support. In 1999, a
Federal Circuit panel so held in Good v. United States.268 One year
later, however, in Palm Beach Isles Associates, Inc. v. United States,269
another panel ruled that the per se rule in Lucas precluded consid-
eration of owner expectations and that expressions to the contrary
in Good were dicta, inconsistent with the law of the circuit court.270
Subsequent decisions of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and the
Federal Circuit “unanimously endorsed the no-role-for-expectations
view, almost always without discussion. Other courts, in broad
prefatory descriptions of the takings tests, appear to assume the
absence of a role for expectations in the total takings context.”271
Thus, the Penn Central and Lucas tests “are mutually exclusive.”272
The Supreme Court recently declined to review this precise issue in
265. Id. at 1033–34 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
266. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
267. See infra Section II.B.2.
268. Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
269. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
270. Id. at 1357 (discussing Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560
(Fed.Cir.1994)). Florida Rock Industries “stated in summary fashion that ‘[i]f a regulation
categorically prohibits all economically viable use of the land—destroying its economic value
for private ownership—the regulation has an effect equivalent to a permanent physical
occupation. There is, without more, a compensable taking.’” Id. (quoting Florida Rock Indus.,
18 F.3d at 1564).
271. Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307,
332 (2007) (citing cases).
272. Calvert G. Chipchase, Comment, Lucas Takings: Why Investment-Backed Expectations
Are Irrelevant When Applying the Categorical Rule, 24 U. Haw. L. Rev. 147, 148 n.12 (2001)
(citing Barry M. Hartman, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: The Takings Test Turns
a Corner, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 1003 (1993) (discussing the differences between the Lucas and
Penn Central tests)).
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Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States,273 where the Federal Circuit
had concluded that “Lucas does not require a balancing of the Penn
Central factors.”274
The movement towards heavy reliance on expectations received
a setback in 2015 in Horne v. Department of Agriculture.275 The
Court’s opinion, by Chief Justice Roberts, held that the rule that a
physical appropriation of property is a categorical taking applies to
personal property as well as real property.276 He noted the dictum
in Lucas stating that “while an owner of personal property ‘ought to
be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render
his property economically worthless,’ such an ‘implied limitation’
was not reasonable in the case of land.”277 Roberts rejected this
approach, noting that Lucas involved regulatory takings, and that
its distinction between owner expectations regarding real and
personal property would be cabined there and not applicable to
physical appropriations.278
2. The Tendency Towards Circularity
A quarter century before Murr, in his concurrence in the judgment
of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,279 Justice Kennedy
averred that whether a taking could exist would involve the inter-
play of government regulations and owner expectations. In such an
inquiry, he recognized, elements would be mutually referential:
There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis,
of course; for if the owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped
by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental au-
thority, property tends to become what courts say it is. Some
273. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 2325 (2017).
274. Id. at 1119. The court also held that “Lucas does not suggest that a land sale qualifies
as an economic use.” Id. at 1115.
275. Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015) (holding that an appro-
priation of raisins in connection with a government marketing order was a categorical taking).
276. Id. at 2427 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982)).
277. Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992)).
278. Id. at 2428 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 323, for differing treatments of government appropriations of property and
regulation of property).
279. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
2018] PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TAKINGS BURDENS 239
circularity must be tolerated in these matters, however, as it is
in other spheres. The definition, moreover, is not circular in its
entirety. The expectations protected by the Constitution are based
on objective rules and customs that can be understood as reason-
able by all parties involved.280
The definitional circularity employed in his Murr opinion might
be viewed as an incremental extension of his Lucas takings analy-
sis. However, there is an essential and important difference. In
Murr, the circularity was not limited to defining the various factors
regarding the regulation of property but rather was expanded to
bring within its ambit the definition of property itself.
Justice Scalia’s emphasis in Lucas was rooted in the more objective
concept that, in order for regulations “prohibit[ing] all economical[]
use of land” not to be “confiscatory,” they must “inhere in the title
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”281
Justice Scalia’s formulation has been subject to excoriating criti-
cism. Professor Richard Epstein declared it “devoid of legal theory.”282
While Lucas involved the landowner’s entire parcel, it was clear to
Justice Scalia that the “relevant parcel” issue would arise soon,283
and Professor Epstein accused Scalia simply of evading it.284
The essential problem with Justice Kennedy’s “inherent tendency
towards circularity” was succinctly stated by Judge Stephen Williams:
Although the Takings Clause is meant to curb inefficient takings,
such a notion of “reasonable investment-backed expectations”
280. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034–35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
added).
281. Id. at 1029.
282. Epstein, supra note 79, at 1375.
283. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural
tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation
as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use
of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered
a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.
Id.
284. Epstein, supra note 79, at 1375 (“Often the common law wisely proceeds incrementally,
and the open-ended nature of the Eminent Domain Clause invites the Court to create a
system of constitutional common law that is equally slow moving. It is one thing to issue
restrained utterances when it is not clear what lies ahead; it is quite another to practice
evasion in the name of cautious decisionmaking.”).
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strips it of any constraining sense: except for a regulation of al-
most unimaginable abruptness, all regulation will build on prior
regulation and hence be said to defeat any expectations. Thus
regulation begets regulation.285
Justice Scalia’s approach of “background principles” does have
merit. I observed earlier that “[l]ike the sea anchor, background
principles do not prevent gradual change, but do keep individual
rights from being capsized by squalls of legislative passion.”286 Others
have raised similar points.287
In lauding the “flexibility” of the Court’s regulatory takings juris-
prudence288 after setting out the elements of his “relevant parcel”
test in Murr,289 Justice Kennedy soothingly added that “[t]he inquiry
is objective, and the reasonable expectations at issue derive from
background customs and the whole of our legal tradition.”290 He also
reiterated his concurrence in the judgment in Lucas that “a prospec-
tive enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can limit the value
of land without effecting a taking because it can be understood as
reasonable by all concerned.”291
However, the virtue of “flexibility” is tested by Justice Kennedy’s
conflation in Murr of “what one owns,” for purposes of regulation,
with how “what one owns” is regulated.292
C. Murr Intensifies Concerns Regarding Government Overreach
Prior to Murr, the ad hoc nature of the Court’s “parcel as a whole”
formulation had been criticized as a source of great confusion that
285. Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 887 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (Williams, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
286. Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating From the “Rule of
Law,” 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345, 369 (1998).
287. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 213, at 64 (“A rule that has been around a long
time and is relatively unchanging is more likely to be understood because actors . . . are more
apt to have encountered the rule in the past and to have made some previous investment in
comprehending the rule.”); RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELIOT
7–9 (7th ed. 2001) (1953) (“Custom, convention, and old prescription are checks upon both
man’s anarchic impulse and upon the innovator’s lust for power.”).
288. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct.1933, 1937 (2017).
289. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
290. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
291. Id. at 1245 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
292. See supra Section I.D.3 for discussion.
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places the development of a coherent jurisprudence of regulatory
takings at the “mercy of diverse and at times idiosyncratic approaches”
from various state and federal courts, resulting in a “Tower of Ba-
bel.”293 Such a situation is rife with the possibility of government
overreach.
1. The Gerrymandering of Property
The essence of Chief Justice Roberts’s complaint about the Murr
majority opinion is that it “knocks the definition of ‘private property’
loose from its foundation on stable state law rules and throws it into
the maelstrom of multiple factors that come into play at the second
step of the takings analysis”; thus it “compromises the Takings
Clause as a barrier between individuals and the press of the public
interest.”294
To be sure, the Chief Justice is not claiming that the concept of
property is disintegrating.295 Rather, he continued, the majority’s ad
hoc approach to property—its “focus on the particular challenged
regulation”—means that “two lots might be a single ‘parcel’ for one
takings claim, but separate ‘parcels’ for another.”296 Tellingly, he
adds that “[t]his is just another opportunity to gerrymander the
definition of ‘private property’ to defeat a takings claim.”297
It might be that the word “gerrymander” was on Roberts’s mind
because, in the period prior to Murr being handed down, the Court
had agreed to review claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering in
Gill v. Whitford, a case involving Wisconsin election law.298 “Gerry-
mandering” might seem an odd word to describe the general soften-
ing of property rights into a state of incoherence.
However, “gerrymandering” does bring to bring to mind the pos-
sibility of agreements among local officials and developers that slice
and divvy out development opportunities, utilizing parcel- or
293. Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been
Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307,
310–11 (1998).
294. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1956 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
295. Compare Grey, supra note 233, with supra Section II.A.5.
296. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1956 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
297. Id.
298. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
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neighborhood-specific regulatory interpretations. Pursuant to these
“grand bargains” among transient coalitions, local legislatures could
then approve and entrench such arrangements and acquire parcels
for their fulfillment through a combination of eminent domain and
compelled sales from present owners who are subjected to infeasible
development conditions.299
2. Property Rights and Rent-Seeking
“Rent-seeking” refers to efforts to obtain economic rents—payments
for things that cost nothing to produce.300 A primary justification for
eminent domain is to prevent rent-seeking behavior from landown-
ers trying to capture large gains when their strategically located
parcels are needed for public uses.301 In a broader sense, however,
the framers viewed the Constitution as a means for securing prop-
erty. According to Dean William Treanor, James Madison “antici-
pated” the country’s “enormous population growth,” that landowners
would “become a minority,” that “landed property . . . was most
threatened by majoritarian rule,” and that “the greater the number
of the unpropertied, the more likely would they be to pass re-
distributive legislation.”302
Legislation or judicial interpretations that detract from well-
defined property rights may have the effect of turning property and
development into a common pool, with the allocation of rights
within that pool being a negative-sum game, after taking into ac-
count the costs incurred in rent-seeking behavior.303
299. See Roderick M. Hills & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 91, 123–33 (2015) (outlining mechanisms for “citywide deals”). While the authors
advocate the use of government “price sheets” and transparency, the potential for abuse is
clear. See also Eagle, supra note 35, at 1078–81 (noting the relationship between information
asymmetries, political exigencies, and cronyism in the development process).
300. See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 291 (1974) (coining the term). See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,
Monopolies, and Theft, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 39, 48 (James
M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
301. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61,
74–77 (1986). See also EPSTEIN, supra note 8.
302. Treanor, supra note 229, at 849 (citing Remarks of James Madison (debate of June 26,
1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 421, 422–23 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966)).
303. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 203.
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In contemporary times, fear of majoritarian impulses leading to
expropriation might undergird Armstrong’s exhortation that “[t]he
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to
bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole.”304 As Chief Justice Roberts put it in Murr, “[b]y secur-
ing such established property rights [i.e., rights established under
existing state property law] the Takings Clause protects individuals
from being forced to bear the full weight of actions that should be
borne by the public at large.”305
Similarly, Justice Alito’s concerns about local officials making
“extortionate demands” on landowners seeking development approv-
als306 might express the fear that those with relatively deep pockets
would be targets of opportunity. Land use development is marked
by “zoning for dollars,”307 and the practice whereby developers are
subjected to informal demands for exactions far from effective
judicial review makes Justice Alito’s concerns entirely warranted.308
3. The Creep of Expectations
Justice Kennedy asserted in Murr that Lots E and F could easily
be put to a common use.309 However, U.S. Circuit Judge Stephen
Williams countered that argument in a prescient opinion in District
Intown Properties Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia.310 The case
304. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (emphasis added).
305. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1950 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
306. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2596 (2013) (“Extortion-
ate demands for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause
not because they take property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have
property taken without just compensation.”).
307. Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the
Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1991) (de-
scribing and defending the trend of municipalities using incentive zoning to fund various
community needs and amenities).
308. See Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. LAW. 1 (2014)
(describing how informal demands for exactions in the “gatehouse” of off-the-record conver-
sations differ from documented formal demands that might be evaluated in the “mansion” of
judicial review).
309. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1948–49 (2017).
310. District Intown Props Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 884 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (Williams, J., concurring in the judgment).
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involved the attempted repurposing of separately deeded lots that
had served as the lawn of an old apartment building and that the
court’s majority deemed were incorporated, in one relevant parcel,
with the apartment property. Judge Williams began with the major-
ity’s “apparent presumption that contiguous parcels under common
ownership should be treated as one parcel for purposes of the tak-
ings analysis.”311 He noted that this presumption (as does the statu-
tory consolidation of such parcels in Murr) “tends to reduce the
likelihood that courts will order compensation.” He also noted that
the majority’s focus on contiguity, simultaneous acquisition, on the
past treatment of the lots as a single unit, and on the extent to which
the restricted lots benefit the neighboring lot are “irrelevant,” since
“[t]he majority’s focus on the property’s use prior to regulation tells
us nothing about the value-producing opportunities foreclosed at the
time of regulation.”312
In Murr, on the other hand, the majority did look at prospective
values,313 which obviously is relevant to the traditional three Penn
Central factors.314 As Judge Williams might have anticipated,315
Murr did consider the restriction being mitigated “by the benefits of
using the property as an integrated whole.”316 Unfortunately, the
Murr opinions relied upon isolated data pertaining to values prof-
fered by the parties. Those appraisals had not been subjected to
judicial scrutiny earlier. The Court’s failure to remand in Murr
meant that it justified a new test for relevant parcel while partially
depending on self-serving, ex parte evidence.317
4. Conflation of the Police Power and Takings
The application of the police power of the state, which is the
sovereign’s inherent right to protect the public’s health, safety, and
311. Id. at 885.
312. Id.
313. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948–49 (2017).
314. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See supra
Section I.B for discussion.
315. Dist. Intown Props Ltd. Prop. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 888 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (Williams, J., concurring in the judgment).
316. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949 (2017).
317. Id. at 1941 (noting that the trial court decided the relevant parcel issue on summary
judgment).
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welfare, can result in great loss to property owners for which the
remedy of “just compensation” is unavailable.318
In Lucas v. South Carolina Council,319 Justice Scalia observed
that “[t]he transition from our early focus on control of ‘noxious’ uses
to our contemporary understanding of the broad realm within which
government may regulate without compensation was an easy one,
since the distinction between ‘harm-preventing’ and ‘benefit-confer-
ring’ regulation is often in the eye of the beholder.”320
Scalia’s proffered replacement for this distinction, at least where
there was a prohibition of “all economically beneficial use of land,” was
to ascertain whether the limitation “inhere[d] in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property
and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”321 This more ob-
jective test was not too successful. This was because the Court later
emphasized, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., that the Lucas categorical
rule applied only to “total regulatory takings,”322 and also because
regulators responded by ensuring that owners retained at least a
modicum of beneficial use.323 Furthermore, by bringing “background
principles” to the fore, Lucas had the “unlikely legacy” of providing
government defendants numerous defenses to takings claims.324
Two particularly notable conflations of police power and takings
power occurred in Berman v. Parker325 and in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff,326 where the Court seemed to eliminate “public
318. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a
public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its
value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use,
or from depriving a person of his property without due process of law. In the one
case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property is taken away
from an innocent owner.
Id. at 669.
319. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
320. Id. at 1024.
321. Id. at 1029.
322. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
323. See Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the “Impenetrable Jungle”: Navigating the Boundary
Between Land-Use Planning and Environmental Law, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5,
11 (1996) (“If those suffering under confiscatory statutes, ordinances, or regulations can still
salvage even a small amount of value, the Lucas test will not apply.”).
324. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005).
325. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
326. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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use” as an independent constitutional requirement.327 To be sure,
the Court stepped back in Kelo v. City of New London, but, even there,
it broadly equated “public use” with “public purpose.”328 Further-
more, as in Berman, courts routinely treat “blight” as a justification
for condemnation, although the government does not take blighted
property for its own use but rather for what should more accurately
be described as abatement of common-law nuisances.329
D. The Poor Fit Between the Takings Clause and Regulatory
Takings
The Supreme Court first considered the concept of a taking by a
regulatory ordinance in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego.330 It explained that “[p]olice power regulations such as zoning
ordinances and other land-use restrictions can destroy the use and
enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just as ef-
fectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of property.”331
This observation suggests that the Supreme Court had the choice
of either trying to fit overly burdensome regulations into the pur-
view of the Takings Clause or to find some other constitutional basis
for dealing with them.332 It chose the former.
1. Practical Difficulties
Professor Joseph Singer, a leading proponent of progressive
property, recently stated an apparent, universal truth: “Scholars
have long derided the regulatory takings doctrine as incoherent and
unpredictable.”333 He concurred with my earlier assertion that the
327. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right
to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain
is merely the means to the end.”); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240 (“The ‘public use’ requirement is
thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”).
328. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
329. Steven J. Eagle, Does Blight Really Justify Condemnation?, 39 URB. LAW. 833, 833–56
(2007).
330. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 623, 650 (1981) (dis-
missing the appeal for the lack of a final state judgment).
331. Id. at 650.
332. See infra Section II.E for discussion.
333. Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601, 603,
603 n.1 (2015) (citing Eagle, Four-Factor, supra note 21, at 602). See also, e.g., Gideon Kanner,
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Penn Central ad hoc, multifactor test “has become a compilation of
moving parts that are neither individually coherent nor collectively
compatible.”334 I suggest that the reason for those problems is that,
as matters of constitutional law, logic, and history, the concept of
regulatory takings and the Takings Clause have not been a good fit.
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause335 suggests three direct
questions: Did the claimant have a property interest? Did the gov-
ernment take that interest? And did the government provide the
owner with just compensation? The focus throughout this inquiry is
on property: Was it owned? Was it taken? And was property of equal
value provided as compensation? To be sure, determining these ques-
tions often involves subtle inquiry. However, the essential analysis
is straightforward, which reflects the crucial fact that property
rights are in rem, and hence susceptible to being readily understood.
On the other hand, the issues as they have been adjudicated in
regulatory takings cases do not focus on property. Rather, they focus
on burdens placed on individuals who are owners of property.
Armstrong v. United States336 primarily is known for its sweeping
pronouncement, quoted in Penn Central, that the “Fifth Amend-
ment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”337
It is instructive, however, to consider the issues and holding in
Armstrong. Claimants, including Cecil Armstrong, furnished mate-
rials for the construction of boats that later were to be conveyed by
a shipbuilder to the U.S. Navy. Under state law, the claimants
possessed valid liens for materials supplied. When the shipbuilder
defaulted, the Navy exercised its contract rights to terminate the
agreement and demand transfer of boats that were completed or
under construction. The government refused to satisfy the liens, and
Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter Century Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 653, 664–66 (2005) (enumerating
scholarly criticisms of Penn Central).
334. Singer, supra note 333, at 603 n.1 (quoting Eagle, Four-Factor, supra note 21, at 602).
335. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation.”). The Clause is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and through Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
336. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
337. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (quoting
Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
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petitioners brought a takings action. In his dissent, Justice Harlan
stated that the government did not “take” the liens but that their
value was destroyed as an incident of the government exercising its
contract rights against the shipbuilder.338
Justice Black, writing for the Court, declared:
Neither the boats’ immunity, after being acquired by the Gov-
ernment, from enforcement of the liens nor the use of a contract
to take title relieves the Government from its constitutional
obligation to pay just compensation for the value of the liens the
petitioners lost and of which loss the Government was the direct,
positive beneficiary.
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole. A fair interpretation of this constitutional
protection entitles these lienholders to just compensation here.339
While the government did not take Armstrong’s lien, it was “the
direct, positive beneficiary” of the materials that he furnished, that
were incorporated into the boats, and that had given rise to his mate-
rial supplier’s lien under state law. In short, the liens were a statu-
tory substitute for materials furnished. This is confirmed by the fact
that, under Maine law, the petitioners had the right to attach the
uncompleted work. “[T]hey were entitled to resort to the specific prop-
erty for the satisfaction of their claims.”340 The Court added that
“such a right is compensable by virtue of the Fifth Amendment.”341
Penn Central, on the other hand, did not deal with arrogation of
property, or even a property substitute such as a statutory lien.
Rather, the Court focused, in a general sense, on the “economic im-
pact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations.”342
338. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49–50 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Frankfurter, J., and
Clark, J.).
339. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
340. Id. at 44.
341. Id. (citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)).
342. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted).
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Justice Brennan quoted Armstrong’s “fairness and justice” pro-
nouncement.343 He added that the Supreme Court “has been unable
to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fair-
ness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action be com-
pensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons.”344
“Economic injuries,” of course, is a much more varied and subjec-
tive category than property, or property substitutes. Had Armstrong
attempted to reclaim materials delivered to the shipbuilder’s yard
but not yet incorporated within boats, his ability to do so would not
depend on the extent of his wealth, on the size and scope of his
business, or on his personal expectations of his rights vis-à-vis his
vendees. They would depend on the property he supplied and on his
rights under state law.
The Penn Central line of cases thus changed Armstrong’s focus
from protecting the substance of property rights to protecting indi-
viduals from unfair and unexpected economic harm.
When government exercises its power of eminent domain, and
where the focus clearly is on the thing instead of its owner, the
“proceedings are in rem, and compensation is made for the value of
the rights which are taken.”345 Thus, once the amount of just com-
pensation for a parcel is established, those with various ownership
claims, such as freeholders and lessees, can litigate among them-
selves over entitlements to that sum.346 On the other hand, where
there is a claim that an individual has been injured as a result of
government regulations affecting his property, a court must focus on
the extent of, and redress for, those injuries.
2. Constitutional Infirmities
The practical problems of applying the Takings Clause to regulatory
takings, as discussed above, reflect constitutional issues pertaining
343. Id. at 123–24 (1978) (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
344. Id. (emphasis added).
345. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 376 (1946) (internal citations omitted).
346. Direct Mail Serv., Inc. v. Best, 729 F.2d 672 (10th Cir. 1984). “[O]nce the reasonable
market value of the property acquired through the exercise of the State’s eminent domain
authority has been established, the apportionment of that amount among persons claiming
a share thereof is not the concern of the State.” Id. at 675.
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to that Clause.347 In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency,348 the Court stated:
The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for
drawing a distinction between physical takings and regulatory
takings. Its plain language requires the payment of compensa-
tion whenever the government acquires private property for a
public purpose, whether the acquisition is the result of a con-
demnation proceeding or a physical appropriation. But the Consti-
tution contains no comparable reference to regulations that
prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her pri-
vate property.349
However, the lack of a “comparable reference” in the Constitution
does not mean that the Court should add one. Hesitancy on this
point strongly is suggested in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,350 where,
in 1871, the Court carefully recognized that a physical appropriation
of land would require just compensation even without an arrogation
of title. The Court noted that its result would override state deter-
minations that consequential injuries to owners resulting from
internal improvement would not be the subject of redress. It ex-
plained that those state courts had taken the “comparable refer-
ence” principle to its “uttermost limit of sound judicial construction”
and the Supreme Court would go no further.351
Putting cautions expressed in cases like Pumpelly aside, Justice
Stevens stated in Tahoe-Sierra352 that the “longstanding distinction
between acquisitions of property for public use, on the one hand,
and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it
inappropriate to treat cases involving physical takings as controlling
precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a ‘regula-
tory taking,’ and vice versa.”353 In essence, Tahoe-Sierra counte-
nanced two separate bodies of takings law, just as Justice Kennedy
347. Other provisions will be discussed subsequently. See infra Section II.E.
348. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
349. Id. at 321–22.
350. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
351. Id. at 180–81.
352. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323
(2002) (footnote omitted).
353. Id. at 324.
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in Murr countenanced different meanings of “property” itself, de-
pendent upon the purpose and occasion.354 Furthermore, that the
distinction has been “longstanding” does not mean that it is valid.
There is extensive scholarly literature on whether regulatory tak-
ings can find a home in the Takings Clause. A broad reading of the
Clause suggests that it does.355 But others take a narrower view. Dean
Treanor advanced a civic republican view of the values important
during the founding era, one based on virtue instead of self-interest.356
He asserted that the property interest that was the subject of the
Takings Clause was “physical control of material possessions.”357
In his well-known book Takings,358 Professor Richard Epstein
asserted that the framers, who had absorbed the intellectual
framework of Blackstone and Locke, “meant to endorse” both the
Takings Clause and broad government regulation of economic
activities “without knowing the implicit tension between them.”359
Given this contradiction, Professor Epstein concludes that it is the
value explicitly enumerated in the constitutional text that should be
followed.360 Professor Michael Rappaport, after reviewing these
sources, disagreed with Professor Epstein because he concluded that
the founders did not have a uniform Lockean framework of property
rights and because the actual practice during their era was not
consistent with such a broad interpretation.361
354. See supra notes 286–89 and accompanying text.
355. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138 (asserting that the individual’s
right to property “consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all of his acquisitions,
without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”).
356. See generally Treanor, supra note 229.
Liberalism begins with the belief that individuals are motivated primarily, if not
wholly, by self-interest and with the belief that rights are prepolitical. . . .
Republican thinkers, in contrast, see the end of the state as the promotion of the
common good and of virtue. Rights . . . are created by the polity and subject to
limitation by the polity when necessitated by the common interest.
Id. at 821.
357. William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633, 633 (2008).
358. EPSTEIN, supra note 8.
359. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 29 (stating that the “founders shared Locke’s and Blackstone’s
affection for private property”).
360. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 28.
361. Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth Amend-
ment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 737–740 (2008).
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E. Alternatives to Present Takings Doctrine
1. Substantive Due Process
Leading conservative jurists often have looked askance at the
idea that due process includes a substantive component. Justice
Scalia wrote:
By its inescapable terms, [the Due Process Clause] guarantees only
process. Property can be taken by the state; liberty can be taken;
even life can be taken; but not without the process that our tradi-
tions require—notably, a validly enacted law and a fair trial. To
say otherwise is to abandon textualism, and to render democrati-
cally adopted texts mere springboards for judicial lawmaking.362
The view of Judge Frank Easterbrook was just as biting.
Today the Court makes no pretense that its judgments have any
basis other than the Justices’ view of desirable policy. This is
fundamentally the method of substantive due process. Giving
judges this power of revision may be wise or not. The Court may
design its procedures well or poorly. But there is no sound argu-
ment that this is a legitimate power or function of the Court.363
The debate has been neatly framed by academics. Professors Nelson
Lund and John McGinnis proclaimed:
Whatever the cause, due process has continued to provide a
textual thunderbolt that Olympian judges can hurl at any law
that offends them. Neither the Court nor any of its members has
even once so much as attempted to explain how any of this can
be derived from or even reconciled with the text of the Due Pro-
cess Clauses.364
On the other hand, Professor Jamal Greene recently asserted:
“Substantive due process is not a contradiction in terms. Indeed, it
362. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF IN-
TERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 24–25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
363. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 125 (1982).
364. Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 1555, 1560 (2004).
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is redundant. No inquiry into the propriety of some process—its
‘due’-ness—is or can be indifferent to the substance of the associated
loss.”365
Although Murr purported to redefine property only for regulatory
takings purposes, the opinion reflects the Court’s elision of another
inconvenient and troublesome distinction. If government takes pri-
vate property for its own use, it must provide just compensation to
the owners whose identity generally is incidental.366 As the Court
noted long ago, “just compensation is for the property, and not to the
owner.”367 On the other hand, if government singles out individuals
for unfair burdens in connection with their ownership of property,
the owners’ identities and personal circumstances are paramount.
Acts of eminent domain are the subject matter of the Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause whereas the applicability of that Clause to
unfair burdens placed upon individuals is much more tenuous.368
On the other hand, negative land use determinations predicated
on the identity of the applicant can be violative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.369
The question of substantive due process is especially important
in takings law, given both that the concept of regulatory takings has
its genesis there and also the difficulty courts have faced in fitting
regulatory takings coherently into Takings Clause doctrines. Justice
Stevens’s explanation in Tahoe-Sierra that the bifurcation of physi-
cal and regulatory takings jurisprudence is a “longstanding distinc-
tion”370 does not come to grips with the issue.
The Takings Clause provides that “nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation.”371 In Dolan v. City
of Tigard,372 the Court declared that the Takings Clause is “made
365. Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 253, 253
(2016) (internal citation omitted).
366. See supra notes 336–37 and accompanying text for explication.
367. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
368. See supra Section II.B.2 for discussion.
369. See Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (explaining that the Clause can
be invoked by a single applicant turned down by local officials for spite, regarding a previous
lawsuit); Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp.
2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (finding that an ordinance precluding religious organizations while
permitting cultural and membership organizations is violative of equal protection).
370.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323
(2002). See supra note 343 and accompanying text for explication.
371. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
372. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,”373 with
a simple citation to Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of
Chicago.374 However, Justice Stevens’s dissent375 noted that Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. “contains no mention of either the Takings
Clause or the Fifth Amendment” but rather held that “the substance
of ‘the due process of law enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment
requires compensation to be made or adequately secured to the
owner of private property taken for public use under the authority
of a State.’”376
In Murr v. Wisconsin, Justice Kennedy simply restated, also with-
out discussion, that “[t]he Clause is made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment,” citing Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago.377 That the Court has elided the deriva-
tion of regulatory takings, and blithely treats Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy as if it had invoked the Takings Clause, has fundamentally
shaped regulatory takings jurisprudence, culminating in Murr.378
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,379 Justice Holmes both fa-
mously, and cryptically, declared: “The general rule at least is that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”380 With this plain
recognition of takings by regulation, the problematic relationship
between the Takings Clause and substantive due process ostensibly
became clear.381
In subsequent opinions, the Court considered that Holmes’s use
of “taking” might have been metaphorical,382 and that due process
and takings analysis might have been “fused.”383 This interpretation
373. Id. at 383.
374. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
375. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 405–06. See also Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 899, 905 (2007) (asserting that the roots
of regulatory takings are in substantive due process).
377. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R., 166 U.S.).
378. See supra Section II.B for discussion.
379. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
380. Id. at 415.
381. See supra Section II.E (discussing takings protections, the incorporation doctrine, and
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
382. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172, 197 (1985) (holding that the claimant’s takings claim was premature).
383. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(referring to Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928)).
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reached its apogee in Agins v. City of Tiburon384 when the Court
declared that government regulation of private property “effects a
taking if [such regulation] does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests.”385 Only twenty-five years later in Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc.386 did the Court “conclude that [the Agins] formula
prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings,
test, and that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.”387
As recently explained by Professor John Echeverria, “Understood
in historical context, the transposition of due process analysis into
takings doctrine was not as misguided or remarkable as it may
appear 35 years later.”388 In his separate dissent in Murr v. Wiscon-
sin, Justice Thomas suggested that the Court should take a “fresh
look” at the grounding of regulatory takings jurisprudence.389
Despite being an originalist, Justice Scalia executed what Professor
Peter Byrne termed an “untroubled departure from original meaning”
when it came to regulatory takings.390 In Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,391 Scalia acknowledged that “Justice Blackmun is
correct that early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings
Clause embraced regulations of property at all,”392 and that, prior to
Mahon,393 “it was generally thought that the Takings Clause
reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property, or the functional
equivalent of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession.’”394
According to Professor Byrne,
Scalia nonetheless justified applying the Clause to regulations
of use, not on any revised claim about its original meaning, but
on the need to adapt the clause to modern conditions of compre-
hensive regulation. . . . [H]e justified applying the Takings
Clause to use regulations on the basis of his perception of social
384. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
385. Id. at 260 (brackets in original).
386. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
387. Id. at 540.
388. John D. Echeverria, Antonin Scalia’s Flawed Takings Legacy, 41 VT. L. REV. 689,
695–96 (2017).
389. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1957 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting). See infra
Section II.E.3 for discussion.
390. Byrne, supra note 250, at 734.
391. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
392. Id. at 1028 n.15.
393. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
394. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014.
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need combined with a gross and dark generalization . . . of the
inevitability of political overreaching.395
If government takes a home, it does not matter if the occupant
owns five others. It also does not matter if the owner mistakenly
believes that government does not have to compensate owners whose
homes are taken to widen highways. Furthermore, if the governor
takes land in order to convey it to a campaign contributor, that is an
impermissible use of his powers396 and the misuse ought to be struck
down as such.397 Correspondingly, if government takes private land
in order to effectuate a compelling public need, it still must compen-
sate the owner.398 That is what eminent domain is for.399
2. Justice Kennedy and the Extension of Due Process Analysis
It is possible for the Supreme Court to extend the role of due
process in takings law sub rosa. Justice Kennedy often has empha-
sized the role of due process. In Lawrence v. Texas,400 he recognized
an individual’s “destiny” and that “the protection of liberty under
the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental
significance.”401 “Destiny” came up again in Murr, where he wrote
395. Byrne, supra note 250, at 735–36.
396. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (“[I]t has long been accepted that
the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another
private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”).
397. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (“[A] regulation that fails to serve
any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of
the Due Process Clause.”).
398. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017) (noting “the plain language of the
Takings Clause ‘requires the payment of compensation whenever the government acquires
private property for a public purpose’” (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002)).
399. See E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) “The [Takings] Clause operates as a conditional limitation,
permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge. The Clause
presupposes what the government intends to do is otherwise constitutional.” Id. at 545.
400. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding violative of the Due Process Clause
a statute that criminalized a certain sexual conduct between persons of the same sex). Justice
Kennedy declared that the Due Process Clause’s protection of liberty includes “the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.” Id. at 574.
401. Id. at 565 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)) (“Roe recognized the right of a
woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed once more
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that property ownership “empowers persons to shape and to plan
their own destiny.”402
Justice Kennedy’s proclivity to avoid the constraints of takings
law and bright-line rules is illustrated by his swing opinion in
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.403 There, a federal statute augmented
the endangered health and retirement benefits of retired coal min-
ers and their families by imposing severe retroactive burdens on
companies that employed those miners many years earlier.
The plurality opinion, by Justice O’Connor, stated that the
statute violated the Takings Clause principles of fairness.404 Writing
for the four dissenters, Justice Breyer stated that the “Takings
Clause does not apply”405 and that the issue of “retroactive liability
finds a natural home in the Due Process Clause.”406
Justice Kennedy, after reviewing the “perplexing” nature of
regulatory takings law, observed: “Until today, however, one con-
stant limitation has been that in all of the cases where the regula-
tory taking analysis has been employed, a specific property right or
interest has been at stake.”407 He added that “[t]he difficulties in
determining whether there is a taking or a regulation even where a
property right or interest is identified ought to counsel against
extending the regulatory takings doctrine to cases lacking this
specificity.”408 He supplied the plurality its needed fifth vote, indi-
cating the matter fell under the Due Process Clause.409
that the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of
fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.”).
402. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (“Property rights are necessary to
preserve freedom, for property ownership empowers persons to shape and to plan their own
destiny in a world where governments are always eager to do so for them.”).
403. E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
404. Id. at 537 (“When, however, that solution singles out certain employers to bear a burden
that is substantial in amount, based on the employers’ conduct far in the past, and unrelated
to any commitment that the employers made or to any injury they caused, the governmental
action implicates fundamental principles of fairness underlying the Takings Clause.”).
405. Id. at 553 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (deeming the Coal Act of 1992 constitutional under
the Due Process Clause).
406. Id. at 554–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (deeming the Act constitutional under the Due
Process Clause).
407. Id. at 541 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
408. E. Enter., 524 U.S. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part) (emphasis added).
409. Id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (“When the
constitutionality of the Coal Act is tested under the Due Process Clause, it must be invalidated.
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While the issues in Eastern Enterprises were different from those
in Murr, it is interesting to observe that Justice Kennedy’s concerns
in the former case stem from prudence and from the perceived dif-
ficulty in deriving an appropriate standard for review, not from a
principled conclusion that takings doctrine would be inapplicable.
3. Privileges or Immunities
Justice Thomas has been fearless is raising issues regarding the
constitutional limitations on property rights. In his dissent in Kelo
v. New London,410 he “recognized that when the Supreme Court
broadly interprets the public use restriction of the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause, and at the same time defers to politi-
cal actors in this arena, it fundamentally abdicates its constitutional
responsibility.”411 He similarly objected to exempting legislative deci-
sions from the takings scrutiny accorded to administrative determi-
nations, in Parking Ass’n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta.412
In his separate dissent in Murr v. Wisconsin,413 Justice Thomas
declared: “In my view, it would be desirable for us to take a fresh
look at our regulatory takings jurisprudence, to see whether it can
be grounded in the original public meaning of the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”414 He cited the scholarly debate over
those issues as summarized in an article on originalism and regula-
tory takings by Professor Michael Rappaport.415
Professor Rappaport wrote that during the founding period there
was “little evidence that nonphysical takings were covered by the
Clause” but that concerns regarding takings “had grown tremen-
dously” by the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.416 Thus,
Accepted principles forbidding retroactive legislation of this type are sufficient to dispose of
the case.”).
410. Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
411. Carol Necole Brown, Justice Thomas’s Kelo Dissent: The Perilous and Political Nature
of Public Purpose, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 273, 275–76 (2016).
412. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). See supra notes 237–39 and accompanying text for discussion.
413. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1957 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
414. Id. at 1957.
415. Id. at 1957–58 (citing Rappaport, supra note 361).
416. Rappaport, supra note 361, at 753.
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jurists had come to recognize just compensation as a “fundamental
principle of justice.”417 “Even more importantly,” Rappaport added,
“state decisions had recognized that takings could occur not only
from physical seizures, but from consequential and regulatory actions
as well.”418 The case law demonstrated that “many states did not
understand takings to be solely physical takings,” and that takings
jurisprudence “protect[ed] the right to use property, even if there
was no physical interference.”419
Professor Rappaport thus concluded that, although the original
meaning of the Fifth Amendment does not cover regulatory takings,420
there was a “very plausible case” that the Fourteenth Amendment
Takings Clause “covers some regulatory takings.”421 His argument
was amplified more recently by John Greil under the rubric of
“second-best originalism.”422
It is not my intention here to comment on the viability of constitu-
tional theories—such as Rappaport’s “incorporation plus”423 ap-
proach—that would apply the regulatory takings doctrine to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. I
do suggest, though, that Justice Thomas is correct that a “fresh look”
at the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence is in order, given
both the difficulty in fitting regulatory takings under traditional
takings doctrine and also the great expansion of both legislative and
administrative land use rules and exactions.
417. Id. at 754 (quoting AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECON-
STRUCTION 268–69).
418. Id. (citing cases and, inter alia, Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural
Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1549 (2003)).
419. Id. at 755.
420. Id. at 731.
421. Id. at 732.
422. John Greil, Note, Second-Best Originalism and Regulatory Takings, 41 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 373, 376 (2018) (asserting that, “[w]hen the meaning of the text is underde-
termined, but a judge is still committed to enforcing the original meaning of the text, she
needs to perform a ‘second-best’ form of originalism.”).
423. Under the currently prevailing view of “partial incorporation,” specified provisions of
the first eight amendments are deemed applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323–25 (1937).
Under the “total incorporation” approach, all rights set forth in the first eight amendments
are applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See
Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The “incorporation plus”
approach incorporates all of the rights included in “total incorporation” plus other rights as
indicated by experience. Id. at 124 (Murphy, F., and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
While the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause traditionally had
been applied to government physical appropriations of land only,
the Supreme Court first recognized the concept of a regulatory
taking in Mahon,424 and extended it in Penn Central425 and Lucas.426
The latter cases, however, were predicated upon the severity of
burdens upon landowners. That, in turn, required a determination
of the “relevant parcel” with respect to which the burden was to be
measured. The relevant parcel test that would be most simple, and
most respectful of the individual autonomy and productivity that the
Takings Clause sought to advance, would be based on the deeded
parcel. Only in the extraordinary instance where the landowner had
sought to manipulate the integrity of the deeded-parcel system
would another test be needed.
In Murr v. Wisconsin,427 the Court had an opportunity to reinforce
the concept that the deeded parcel was almost always the relevant
parcel. Instead, it melded ad hoc tests for determining the relevant
parcel with Penn Central’s vague tests for determining when the
“parcel as a whole” was taken. The result might not comport with
Fifth Amendment takings law nor Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess, but it does substantially advance a pattern of doleful indecision.
424. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
425. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
426. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
427. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
